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Abstract
Indigenous laws are resurging throughout Turtle Island and have vital roles to play in the
creation and application of laws, governance structures, and decision-making. However, for this
to happen, the understanding of the law which is predominant and dictates legal processes must
change, specifically when such laws apply to Indigenous land and peoples. This will allow
Indigenous legal orders – including Anishinaabe legal norms such as mutual aid, kinship,
giftedness and doodem – to flourish. This thesis explores Anishinaabe law resurgence by asking:
how can decision-making about land, natural resources, and Aboriginal rights through the duty to
consult and accommodate be altered so to be understood and applied through Anishinaabe law?
By exploring the legal principles and theories that form both the colonial and Anishinaabe legal
orders, this thesis considers one way Anishinaabe legal orders could understand the duty to
consult and accommodate.
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Preface
Before I begin my writing, I wanted to introduce myself to you. My name is Veronica, and I am
a writer and a lawyer. I’m also a daughter, a sister, a wife, and an aunt. The most important parts
of who I am are the pieces I just told you, especially because this thesis is dedicated in part to my
nephew, Miles, who was born in November 2020.
Introducing myself to you is important to fully understand my work, and why I write
what I do. I am of Indigenous ancestry on my mother’s side. Her mother, my grandmother, is
Anishinaabe and Iroquoian. I keep a photo of my great, great-grandmother on my bookshelf; she
is dressed in all black, sitting on her land near Oka. Her photo sits next to the various Indigenous
artist’s work I have framed, my smudge shell, feather and medicines. I also have the
autobiography of my great grandmother, Bernice, there. Her story, “Gifted with Strong Life”,
was handwritten and bound before she died. The title, which I hope you will come to learn, is
important for my thesis and Indigenous cosmology. I am also Italian: my father’s parents came to
Northern Ontario with their children from Calabria, Italy after southern Italy was ravaged by
WWII and the civil wars which followed thereafter. My grandparents only spoke Italian, making
Italian my father’s first language, though he never taught us it, partly because he felt it would do
his three daughters no good. So, my sisters and I grew up trying to piece together the words we
heard our dad speak to his family, wishing we could understand and be part of the conversation.
My sisters and I also have thick, dark curls in our hair and dark almond eyes which very much
resemble our Italian roots and are daily reminders of that part of our identities.
I identify first and foremost as a writer. Stories, therefore, are a huge part of my life. I
love to read them, write them, and tell them. Stories are also a critical part of Anishinaabe law. I
will tell you many types of stories in this thesis: personal stories, family stories, and parts of
sacred stories, all for the purpose of conveying my argument that the law on the duty to consult
and accommodate needs to be changed. Because of my love of stories, language has begun to
play a big role in my life as well. I am currently learning both Italian and Anishinaabemowin, the
languages of my ancestors. I like to think that language and storytelling is part of my blood,
passed down to me by all my ancestors. And while my Italian grandparents never wrote their
stories on paper like Bernice did, they very much lived them every day, such as why my Nonno
never ate onions. After the war, he was dropped off in Naples and forced to walk the rest of the
way home to Cosenza, Calabria, one of the most southern points in Italy. Today, that would be a
324 km drive along the Western coastline, and to walk, this would take approximately 70 hours.
I can only imagine what that walk would mean post World War (if you are unfamiliar with what
happened to the Italian landscape in the war, know it involved a lot of bombing, specifically in
the south). Even though my Nonno had no food or water, he walked home, cutting through
farms. And to survive, he ate onions. When he finally made it home, he never ate onions again.
This thesis, ultimately, comes down my questioning of what really is law, and why? I’ve
set out to answer this question, and others, while exploring my role as a lawyer and storyteller,
and have chosen to write from an Anishinaabe legal perspective, as much of the teachings I have
come from Anishinaabe Elders. However, I want to make clear these legal perspectives, stories,
language and laws are not mine, but the works of those who came before me. So, with that, I say:
Aanii boozhoo, Veronica indizhinikaaz. Turtle Island indoonjbaa. Anamikaage
nindinawemaaganagtok.
Hello, my name is Veronica. I call Turtle Island my home. Welcome, all my relations.
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Introduction
One of the Anishinaabemowin words for law is inaakonigewin. There are many other words for
law, such as debwe, truth in so far as we can know it,1 minoniweindawewin, living in harmony,2
and miinigowiziwin, the gifts given by Creator. 3 My 4 favourite word for law is inaakonigewin as
I believe it includes the different forms the law can take: decisions, judgements, truth,
understandings, consideration, justice, constitutionalism, and law as a whole.5 Aandaakonan is
the word to describe changing the law and giving it a new meaning. In the following pages, I will
explore what a changed meaning to the duty to consult and accommodate could be through my
understanding of Anishinaabe legal orders. I will explore the foundational legal principles which
make up Anishinaabe legal orders, how decision-making about land use could look through such
legal principles, and how Anishinaabe law could re-write the duty to consult and accommodate.
While the word aandaakonan can have the meaning “giving a new meaning to the law”, the
meaning I will be exploring in these next 100 pages or so is not new; it is old. Anishinaabe
Nations and peoples know such a meaning. The changed meaning that will be explored in this
thesis is built on Anishinaabe legal principles and norms that have operated within communities
and peoples since time immemorial, and still do, to this day; principles such as kinship and
mutual aid, giftedness and reciprocity, consensus and doodem. This meaning is only new in the
sense that the current colonial state has not seen it.

Lindsay Keegitah Borrows, Otter’s Journey Through Indigenous Language and Law, (UBC Press, 2018) at xiii.
Ibid at xvi; You will note that throughout this thesis, most words that are not English have been italicized. I
recognize that some Indigenous scholars have made the decision to not italicize their languages. For me, I chose to
italicize as I believe it draws extra attention of the reader.
3
Aaron Mills, “Miinigowiziwin: All That Has Been Given for Living Well Together: One Vision of Anishinaabe
Constitutionalism” (2019) Aaron James Mills (Waabishki Ma’iingan), University of Victoria (Mills PhD) at 69.
4
Throughout my thesis, I will be writing in the first person with my experiences and stories interwoven. To the nonIndigenous scholar, this may be an informal choice, however, many Indigenous writers choose to write this way as it
is a way of situating oneself in their work, such as Aaron Mills and Sarah Morales. As Sarah Morales wrote in her
PhD Dissertation, “The notion of relationality requires that you know about me before you can begin to understand
my work. As Indigenous scholars, we write about ourselves and position ourselves at the outset of our work because
the only thing we can write about with authority is our own experiences” (Sarah Noël Morales, SNUW’UYULH:
Fostering an Understanding of the Hul’qumi’num Legal Tradition (Sarah Noël Morales, 2014, University of
Victoria) at 1).
5
See Aaron Mills, “The Lifeworlds of Law: On Revitalizing Indigenous Legal Orders Today” (2016) 61:4 McGill
LJ 847 at 861 and 866 for his discussion on why he chooses inaakonigewin as his word choice for law, as well as
footnote 47 on page 866 for various Anishinaabe scholars’ understanding of what inaakonigewin means.
1
2
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I therefore call my work “Aandaakonan inaakonigewin: 6 Considering an Anishinaabe
meaning to the Canadian law on consultation and accommodation”. My hope is that this
Anishinaabe meaning can be operationalized in real-life, as well as be adapted to fit within the
different Indigenous legal orders and decision-making processes across Turtle Island. 7 In such a
changed meaning, the legal orders of the affected Indigenous Nation will be considered law in
the same sense the Canadian legal order is considered law, and therefore inform the consultation
process fully. I want to make clear, though, that this meaning I set out to explore is only one way
the law on the duty to consult could be understood through Anishinaabe legal orders. It is, by no
means, the only way Anishinaabe law could understand the duty, nor is it necessarily the ‘best’
meaning. It is one understanding, one vision: my understanding, my vision.
Before I can attempt to propose a changed meaning, an understanding of what the law
looks like from both the Canadian and Anishinaabe legal orders is needed. I will start by laying
out the perspectives and legal principles which surround both legal orders; the building blocks of
Canadian and Anishinaabe law. By critically examining both, a picture can start to be painted of
how the differing legal orders cannot ‘come together’ 8 to create a collaborative meaning for
consultation due to their incommensurability, 9 and therefore, a changed meaning is required. I
will then explore the building blocks of Anishinaabe legal orders in detail throughout the
following chapters by looking closer at how language and stories influence laws and processes;
the principles of kinship, giftedness, and mutual aid; and how governance and decision-making
work. I will also be exploring the colonial system and the laws of the Canadian legal order
throughout, which includes an exploration of the legal theories which form the foundation of
Canadian law and the duty to consult and accommodate. In the final chapter, I will culminate all
The spelling and definition of these words come from the 2018 reprinting of A Concise Dictionary of Minnesota
Ojibwe by John D. Nichols and Earl Nyholm, originally printed in 1995 by the Regents of the University of
Minnesota. Anishinaabemowin, like many languages, differs in spelling and definition based on the dialect and
geography. The word for “thank you” has, for example, at least four different spellings that I know of: miigwetch,
meegwetch, miigwech, meegwech. I have always been taught the spelling of miigwetch, and have chosen to continue
with that spelling, despite this specific dictionary spelling it differently. For consistency, and because I am not fluent
in Anishinaabemowin, I have chosen to use the spelling and definitions found in this dictionary by Nichols and
Nyholm for any words I do not hold spelling and definitions for myself.
7
Many Indigenous peoples and Nations call the land Turtle Island in reference to their Creation Stories, many of
which have a narrative that the land grew from the back of a turtle. Throughout this thesis, I use Turtle Island in
reference to the land mass now known as Canada.
8
Having different legal orders ‘come together’ and operate within the colonial system has been gaining traction over
recent years, most notably by non-Indigenous peoples.
9
Aaron Mills, an Anishinaabe legal scholar, uses this term in his PhD Dissertation, supra note 3 to explain the vast
differences of the two legal orders and how they cannot be judged by the same standards or understandings.
6
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these building blocks to propose one way the law on the duty to consult could be re-written
through Anishinaabe legal orders.
Chapter One begins the exploration of both legal systems, starting with the foundational
legal theories which form the Canadian understanding of the duty to consult and accommodate:
Lockean theories on property and the theory of legal positivism. Juxtaposed to these foundational
theories are Anishinaabe legal principles of giftedness, kinship, and mutual aid. These are pivotal
building blocks to Anishinaabe law and lifeways, and therefore, foundational principles of what
the duty to consult could look like. Language is critically important in building an understanding
of both legal systems, and this means the language spoken both in and out of law, in stories, and
in every day speaking. As will be explored in Chapter Two, understanding the multiple layers of
language is needed in order to understand the language that is law. By building such an
understanding of language, I can engage with Anishinaabe legal orders, stories, and individual
laws without misconstruing or misunderstanding them.
Chapter Three builds on the importance of foundational theories and language from
Chapter’s One and Two by exploring in detail the Anishinaabe legal orders’ foundational
theories of kinship, giftedness, and mutual aid, and how all relate to governance and decisionmaking via doodem – the clan system. Decision-making is a critical piece to the duty to consult
and accommodate; therefore, to understand the process through an Anishinaabe legal order, I
will explore what Anishinaabe legal orders say about decision-making and governance. In this
chapter, doodem is explored both historically and presently to demonstrate its ongoing integral
role in many Anishinaabe communities’ culture, identity, laws, and policies, and how doodem
can be implemented in a changed understanding of the duty to consult. Chapter Four is when the
duty to consult, as it is currently understood in Canadian jurisprudence, is explored in expanded
detail. At the beginning of Chapter One, the duty is discussed very briefly, and there are a few
reasons why I leave the full details of the current duty to Chapter Four. In part because it is
important for me to scale back to the grounding roots of Canadian and Anishinaabe legal orders
before exploring the duty as it currently stands, and a possible Anishinaabe understanding of it.
Another reason is because I see the duty as a Pandora’s Box: 10 something filled with unexpected

The Greek mythology story of Pandora and her jar of unexpected troubles can be found in Hesiod’s Theogony,
Works and Days, “Why Life is Hard”, composed originally in Greek in the 8th or 7th century, B.C. The version I rely
on was translated to English by S. Lombardo in Anthology of Classic Myth, Second Edition.
10

3

troubles. Opening the lid to this jar 11 before acknowledging the incommensurability of the two
legal orders can lead to an expectation of positive outcomes. By understanding that the jar is not
what is expected, I can open the lid, braced for the truth of its contents. Upon exploring this
Pandora’s Box 12, and having explored the foundational roots of both legal orders, I can finally
put the pieces together in one version of an Anishinaabe understanding of the duty. Putting the
pieces together happens in Chapter Five where I propose a changed meaning to the duty to
consult by culminating the theories, language and legal orders explored in the first four chapters.
Chapter Five does this by telling two short stories: the first is a story of how the current duty to
consult works; the second is a story of how the duty to consult could work through an
Anishinaabe meaning.
As I embark on exploring a changed meaning to the duty to consult, consider perhaps this
thesis as a story, with shorter stories interwoven. It is a story of colonial law and of Anishinaabe
law; a story of owning the land and respecting the land; and a story about language and kinship,
governance and relationality. I offer these stories as an invitation to engage with them, beginning
with the story behind the Canadian law. The story of the Canadian law can be a challenging one;
it can be a story of settler supremacy, 13 violence, assimilation, coercion, and the erasure of
Indigeneity, language, and Indigenous legal orders. Perhaps, one day, it can be a story of once
upon a time. For now, though, it is a story of the current reality of the Canadian legal order.

11
While the saying is ‘Pandora’s Box’, the actual ‘box’ Pandora opens in the myth is a jar. In Hesoid’s telling of the
misery of man in “Why Life is Hard”, Pandora opens a big jar, not a box.
12
For reference, in Hesiod’s Theogony, “Pandora”, lines 573-620, Pandora is created by the gods as the first mortal
woman, and is described as a lovely evil. She is resistibly beautiful, but filled only with evil so to punish the men of
the earth for at this time in creation, the Fates – the three women who weave every human’s life line – had created
no evils for men to combat. Alternatively, Hesiod explains Pandora somewhat differently in “Why Life is Hard”,
lines 58-128, saying that all gods gave Pandora something when they collectively created her. She was given a
voice, named Pandora because pan meant “all” and dora meant “gifts”, and described as a “pain for human beings”.
In this telling, Pandora took the lid of a large jar that was filled with all “miseries that spell sorrow for men” and
unleashed it unto the human world.
13
Settler supremacy is a term used by Aaron Mills in his PhD Dissertation, supra note 3. I borrow this term
throughout this thesis, which Mills defines as being the relationship of colonialism, defined by the notion of the
settler being supreme to Indigenous peoples, and mandated by the interests of settler persons.

4

One: Inendaagwad – it is thought of a certain way
The understanding of Canadian law which is accepted as legitimate law is both historically and
currently dictated by a colonial system and the theories which shape it, most notably that of
European philosophers and theories. As will be argued in this chapter, European philosophers
and theories were instrumental to the erasure of Indigenous legal orders as holding the status of
law. Specifically, this chapter explores how the theories of the natural world as argued by John
Locke, and the theory of legal positivism which categorized Indigenous law as not law, were
foundational to forming the Canadian legal order’s understanding of the duty to consult and
accommodate. Furthermore, this chapter explores how these foundational theories are
incommensurable to Anishinaabe foundational theories, and therefore, should not be writing the
law on the duty to consult. Instead, it should be the laws of the affected Nation.
Understanding (and Misunderstanding) the Law
Cree legal scholar Tracey Lindberg explains that ‘law’, as a word, “has its origin in nonindigenous etymology”, and that while some Indigenous languages have “comparable and
translatable terminology and concepts, it is many Indigenous peoples’ shared experience that
‘law’ does not translate”. 14 As will be explored throughout this thesis, the words we use to create
and define law are the building blocks to legal orders and governance structures. In Canada, this
is a colonial system with colonial building blocks, both of which thrive on what Anishinaabe
legal scholar Aaron Mills calls the principle of settler supremacy. 15 If the colonizer was not of
the opinion that he was superior to the colonized, this thesis would never have needed to be
written. Alas, a colonized state is fueled by the principle and belief that the colonizer and his
legal orders and beliefs are supreme. This has extended itself into all aspects of modern life, from
socio-economic standards to consumerism to education to language. It extends, also, to the law.
Over time, settler supremacy and the colonial system have created a divide between what
is considered law, and what is merely considered a worldview. In this reality, Indigenous legal
orders do not fit into the category of law and are instead shoved into the category of a

Robert J. Miller, Jacinta Ruru, Larissa Behrendt and Tracey Lindberg, “The Doctrine of Discovery in Canada” as
found in Discovering Indigenous Lands (2010) Oxford University Press at 92.
15
Mills, supra note 3 at 4.
14
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worldview. This categorization is accomplished through settler supremacy which has
“[mandated] that the interests of settler persons and peoples are to be given priority over the
interests of indigenous persons and peoples”. 16 Settler supremacy has achieved this by tearing
down the core of Indigenous legal orders through the destruction of the self, the Nation, the
story, the language, and the land.17 As Brenna Bhandar explains, even pre-existing economies,
“such as that of the potlatch … were outlawed and criminalised by the colonial settler state”. 18
As language is a critical piece of this thesis and understanding legal orders, I want to
address the language that I will be using. Throughout this thesis, I say Anishinaabe legal orders
plural as every Anishinaabe Nation 19 – just like every Indigenous Nation – is unique and has
their own interpretations and traditions within their individual legal order. An Anishinaabe legal
order therefore could be an individual First Nation, a larger council of Anishinaabeg Nations, or
that of individual persons. I am in no position to define who is or is not included within an
Anishinaabe legal order, nor do I purport to. The understanding of Anishinaabe legal orders
throughout this thesis, therefore, is only that of my own understanding; an understanding I have
been learning throughout my life, and throughout this past year writing this thesis, and is not
attached to any one Nation or peoples. This understanding is only one version – my
interpretation – of what could be varying versions and interpretations of Anishinaabe laws and
legal principles, lifeways, and governance structures. With language addressed, let me now move
to exploring the legal principles which make up the Canadian legal order and the duty to consult.
The most important theories which make up the Canadian understanding of the duty to
consult and accommodate, I argue, are Lockean notions of property and legal positivism. 20
Ibid at 3.
Settler supremacy and laws have forced many Indigenous laws and practices into corners through the domination
of peoples via claimed Crown sovereignty and the outlawing of laws and practices, such as potlach. This forced
many Indigenous peoples and Nations to stop practicing their laws, languages, ceremonies, and stories.
18
Brenna Bhandar, “Status as Property: Identity, Land and the Dispossession of First Nations Women in Canada”
2016, Reflections on Dispossession: Critical Feminisms vol 14, 1-20 at page at 11.
19
Anishinaabe Nation can mean a First Nation as recognized under Canadian law, but more importantly, it can mean
a Nation through the laws of the individual Nation and collective of peoples. For example, The Anishinabek Nation
is a legal entity which represents 39 Anishinaabe First Nations throughout Ontario. Anishinaabe Nations exist
outside of Ontario as well. You can visit the Anishinabek Nation’s website to see who they represent at:
https://www.anishinabek.ca/ Grand Council Treaty #3 is a council of Anishinaabe Nations of Treaty #3 in Ontario
and Manitoba. You can see who they represent here: http://gct3.ca/our-nation/
20
John Austin, a British legal philosopher, theorized the “command theory of law”, which we now know as “legal
positivism”. This theory, Michael Freeman and Patricia Mindus argue in their book, “The Legacy of John Austin’s
Jurisprudence”, (2013) Springer Netherlands, at v, defined positive law “as the command of the sovereign, his
peculiar idea of sovereignty, the sharp distinction between law and morality, the harsh criticism of the concept of
natural law and rights, his particular conception of liberty, his strong commitment to the codification or rule of law,
16
17

6

Without the notion of property, which can be understood as the ownership of the natural world,
or legal positivism, which denied Indigenous legal orders the status of law, a very different
conversation about land and decision-making, not to mention law write-large, may be taking
place. I acknowledge that focusing on Lockean theories may seem too narrow a focus on what
property ‘means’ in Canada; however Locke is an important start, specifically when attempting
to understand property as it relates to Indigenous peoples. The same can be said about the theory
of legal positivism. European philosophers, their theories, and their understandings of the natural
world and what is law have influenced the reality of law in Canada, and by extension, how
natural resources and development should be legally categorized and managed. This shapes, of
course, the Canadian understanding of the duty to consult and accommodate. To not lose sight of
the duty, I will open this chapter with a very brief overview of what the duty to consult and
accommodate is and how it is currently understood in Canadian law, expanding in further detail
in Chapter Four. After the summary, I will explore the Lockean theories of property and
ownership and how such theories became categorized as law through legal positivism, all framed
by Aaron Mills’ notion of settler supremacy.
How the Duty to Consult and Accommodate is Understood – A Brief Summary
In Canadian doctrinal law, the duty to consult and accommodate is a legal and constitutional duty
which both the federal and provincial/territorial Crowns hold. 21 There is a duty to consult, and
where appropriate, accommodate Indigenous peoples when the Crown contemplates conduct that
may adversely impact potential or established Aboriginal or treaty rights. 22 This constitutional
duty arises from the principle of the honour of the Crown, which requires the Crown to avoid any
sharp dealings with Indigenous peoples.23 The legal duty is grounded in the Crown’s assumption
of sovereignty over the land and resources of Canada. 24 The duty is recognized and affirmed by s
35 of the Constitution Act, 1982; however, along with other s 35 rights, the content of these
rights are not actually written in the text of the Constitution. This leaves the duties and their

and the various classifications of the law, most notably, the distinction between the law of things and the law of
persons, and primary and secondary rights and duties”.
21
See R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483, at para. 6.
22
See Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minster of Forests) [2004] 3 SCR 511 (Haida Nation) at para. 31.
23
See Haida Nation at para. 19 citing R v Badger, [1996] 1 SCR 771 (Badger) at para. 41.
24
See Haida Nation at para. 53.
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definitions open to negotiations and something for the judiciary to decide upon.25 The legal
understanding of the duty has been growing, changing and expanding over the last two decades,
and the duty has gone from a simple notion26 to being something that can be delegated to
proponents. 27 Canadian courts view the duties as “a means to further reconcile the relationships
between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples” 28 and are meant to require Crown actors to “create
opportunities for participation and input from Aboriginal peoples impacted by proposed
conduct” 29 as the duties themselves have origins in reconciliation. By localizing this
understanding, the judiciary, most notably the Supreme Court of Canada, interprets the duties
purposively, aiming them at “promoting reconciliation”. 30 In contrast, the duty in practice is
different as it “carries out significant economic regulation in the context of natural resource
developments,” 31 making the duties much less about reconciliation and more about the
development of resources.
When the words of the judiciary are compared to the specifics of the duty to consult, the
economic regulation of natural resources is front and centre. Take Haida for example, which is
often championed as the leading case which defined the duty in Canadian law. In Haida, forestry
was the issue. The British Columbia government was issuing logging licenses to forestry
companies on lands and resources subject to Haida Nation’s Aboriginal title claim.32 Haida
Nation was not consulted on the logging licenses, and even though their Aboriginal title to the
land was unproven in the Canadian court system, the British Columbia Crown should have been
aware of this claim,33 and therefore consulted with Haida Nation. The court went further,
explaining that there is a “spectrum” of how much consultation and accommodation is required
by the Crown which is based on “an assessment of the strength of the claim to the asserted right
and the potential for harm from the proposed Crown conduct”. 34
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Let’s dissect this: Haida Nation, a First Nation who has lived within its traditional
territory from time immemorial, was not properly consulted by the colonial provincial Crown
before that Crown issued logging licences to forestry companies on traditional Haida lands. In
order to have Aboriginal title to this land, as recognized by Canadian law, Haida Nation needs to
have their claim, and the rights within the claim, proven in Canadian courts by Canadian terms.
The provincial Crown should have been aware of Haida Nation’s claim, whether the right was
proven yet by the courts. Moreover, whether Haida Nation will be given “deep consultation” is
going to be decided by the same Crown who is issuing the licences to Haida Nation land, based
solely on a spectrum designed by the colonial government’s judicial system. At the end of the
processes, the logging licenses to Haida Nation land may still be issued because Haida Nation
was “properly consulted”, therefore allowing for the economic development of Haida Nation
land by non-Haida Nation logging companies, and, because Haida Nation was consulted, the
process will be considered by the judiciary as “reconciliatory”.
How Settler Supremacy Shapes Understandings of Law
To begin my argument of Lockean theories and legal positivism being foundational to the duty to
consult, as well as incommensurable to Anishinaabe legal orders, I will start by exploring settler
supremacy in detail. As will be addressed in the section, both theories are rooted in settler
supremacy, and this is a key distinguishing factor in the two legal orders being
incommensurable. I want to focus this chapter also on the development of the natural world, as it
is a driving factor in the duty to consult as well as the incommensurability between Lockean and
positivistic theories, and Anishinaabe legal orders.
Two questions I often ask myself are: how can land be developed when it is attached to
Indigenous peoples; and why do the laws of development stem from the Canadian state and not
the Indigenous peoples? Anishinaabe legal scholar Aaron Mills argues settler supremacy is the
answer to these questions, and similar ones. What settler supremacy means as it relates to the
categorization of laws and legal norms relates not only to colonization, but also to the
Eurocentric view of laws and societies as reflected onto Indigenous peoples, seen most often
reflected in concepts around the natural world. Of course, those two things go hand in hand as
colonization is the forcing of European laws and societal structures onto a collective of peoples
through the claim that the laws of the colony are supreme. Indigenous peoples and their legal
9

orders were specifically singled out by European theorists as being a reason why certain
European legal theories should have standing on Turtle Island, such as Lockean theories on
property and legal positivism’s categorization of Indigenous legal orders not having the status of
law.
Perhaps the most dangerous part of settler supremacy via Canadian law and policy is that
it operates both unseen and unheard35 and is a principle which is inferred from its consequences
and patterns in legal positions, as well as in legal reasoning. 36 Mills argues that settler supremacy
comes in three forms of violence: the first is settler violence against Indigenous peoples. 37 This
violence targets the bodies, minds, hearts and spirits of the individual person and is the most
visible and understood version of settler supremacy. 38 This is the way colonial laws cause harm
to the individual Indigenous person, whether it be through Indian Act amendments or criminal
law policies. The second form of violence is settler violence to Indigenous peoples. 39 The
violence to Indigenous peoples is “group-centred” and attacks the “languages, ceremonies,
economies, oral traditions, child-rearing practices, medicinal practices, the patterned mobility of
our communities, and of course our earth interactivity”. 40 Essentially, violence to Indigenous
peoples is violence to how an individual identifies as belonging to a people, seeking to “destroy
the group in which individuals seek belonging”. 41 This form of violence seeks to harm the
collective body of Indigenous peoples, Nations, laws, stories, and connections. Settler supremacy
can hack away at an individual’s body and spirit, but if their collective Indigently is whole, the
person can persevere. However, when settler supremacy destroys everything it means to be an
Indigenous person and/or Nation, the harm affects more peoples, identities, and generations.
Settler supremacy in Canada is so strong and prevalent in part because Canadian law has
been built upon the theories of majority white-male theorists and philosophers from Europe.
Take, for example, property law and the Doctrine of Discovery 42: it was theorized that ‘savage
Mills, supra note 3 at 4.
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Indians’ could not possibly own property, therefore, laws were established upon such an idea. 43
The Doctrine of Discovery was used by Europeans “to justify [their] alleged right to the lands of
Indigenous peoples. This was the principle called terra nullius (a land or earth that is null or
void), or vacuum domicilium (an empty, vacant, or unoccupied house of domicile)”. 44 The
Doctrine of Discovery and its principles asserted that lands unoccupied by persons or nations, or
occupied by persons or nations but not being used “in a manner that European legal systems
approved” were “available for Discovery claims”.45 Settler supremacy, with its roots in the
Doctrine of Discovery and the theories built upon its notions, is founded on the assumption of
European/Christian asserted superiority over Indigenous peoples, governance structures, and
legal orders. They are “built upon this largely racialized philosophy: those who were superior
had superior rights to those who were inferior”.46 As Tracey Lindberg explains, this notion of
‘infidel inferiority’ was predicated on the “notions of correspondence with the imperialist
defined notions of humanity” via religious theology. 47 European/Christian beliefs existed by
virtue of their theology defining Europeans “as possessing direct relationships to the Supreme
Power through His representatives on earth”. 48 Therefore, any peoples who were “unrelated to
the representatives” were therefore “opposed to and conflicting with the authority. They were
also understood to possess lesser humanity”. 49 This related directly to Indigenous peoples within
the ‘New World’. 50
Further entrenched in the Doctrine of Discovery and the understandings which stem from
it was the belief that Indigenous peoples were also inferior in regard to their relationship to land
and the natural world. As Lindberg argues,
Conceptions of the ‘New World’ and Indigenous peoples were based upon imaginary,
misconstrued, or fear-based constructions of peoples whose individual traits, philosophies
and values, and systems (government, land holding, laws, etc) differed from their own.
the Tsilhqotin’in Nation decision to repudiate the Doctrine. The unanimous SCC ruling did not name the Doctrine
directly, the Court did say the related doctrine of terra nullius “never applied in Canada”. For more, see the very
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Casting imperial law as normative and Indigenous law as non-existent or abnormal
played a distinct role in the implantation of beliefs about the rightfulness of European
property laws.51
All these notions are deeply rooted in Christian-colonial and racist legal architects, and yet, the
property law taught and practiced in Canada is built upon it, nonetheless. The Canadian public
does not question that owning property in Canada comes from settler supremacy frameworks.
Instead, Canadians set out to own property as a means of success. The fact the ‘savage Indians’
could not possibly own property as an underlying basis to Canadian property law does not get
categorized as an outdated, colonial, or a racist worldview: it simply remains law. If you were to
ask an Anishinaabe person what their Anishinaabe legal orders say about owning property, the
reasoning will not be, “because we savages simply cannot own property”. Instead, the answer
will likely lean us towards what their legal principles say about the relationship between humans
and the Earth, likely rooting itself in the legal obligations a human has to their non-human kin.
Take for example Basil Johnston’s version of the Anishinaabe Creation Story, 52 centred
on Father Sun and Mother Earth, and how The Great Laws of Nature came to be. 53 In this story,
Johnston explains that Nanabush and his father, Epingishmook, had just smoked from the Pipe of
Peace together and Epingishmook begins to tell his son of the special relationship and
dependence Anishinaabe peoples have to the sun, earth, moon, and stars. Epingishmook explains
that in creation, there are four orders: first is the physical world; second, the plant world; third,
the animal; and last, the human world.54 All four orders are so intertwined that they make up life
and one whole existence. Epingishmook continues, explaining that no one order is self-sufficient
or complete alone because each order gets its meaning from creation. “From last to first,” he
explains, “each order must abide by the laws that govern the universe and the world. Man is
constrained by this law to live by and learn from the animals and the plants, and the animals are
dependent upon plants which draw their sustenance and existence from the earth and the sun. All
of them depend ultimately on the physical world. The place, sphere, and existence of each order
Ibid at 94 and 95.
It is important to note that Creation Stories vary between different Indigenous Nations. This version of an
Anishinaabe Creation Story is told by Anishinaabe writer Basil Johnston. There are many other versions of
Anishinaabe Creation Stories, some of which will be explored later on in Chapter Three.
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is predetermined by great physical laws for harmony.” 55 These laws are known as The Great
Laws of Nature, and as Johnston shows in his story, they provide for the well-being of all of
creation. 56 The Great Laws govern the sun, moon, earth and stars; the wind, water, fire and rock;
the rhythm of life, birth, growth, and even death.57 This story showcases the Anishinaabe legal
principles of kinship and mutual aid (which will be explored in detail in Chapters Two and
Three). These legal principles are not seen as ‘law’, however, from a colonial perspective, and
are instead seen as an Anishinaabe worldview or story that do not garner the status of law in the
eyes of the colonial state.
Why is this? Aside from settler supremacy overriding the original laws of Turtle Island,
what has caused such a modern-day recoil to the notion that Indigenous laws are, and should be,
considered law? Why are they put into the same box where folklore lives? Anishinaabe-kwe
Lindsay Keegitah Borrows explores these types of questions, writing that when it comes to
Indigenous peoples and their stories and laws, there is a common response of “Wow, I can’t
imagine that”.58 This “wow” is rarely followed up by asking to learn more about the story and
the laws within, and rather is followed up by nothing: the listeners choose to “ignore, reject,
silence, or manipulate Indigenous stories”. 59 This unwillingness to learn, as Borrows explains,
results not only in the disconnection and misunderstanding of Indigenous stories and laws, but
also results in governments making decisions about Indigenous peoples, rights and land without
the proper, adequate knowledge of the stories and laws, which leads to people suffering. 60 I
would take Borrows’ categorization of misunderstanding further, and categorize this “wow” and
what follows, or lack thereof, as a product of Lockean theories and legal positivism.61 As John
Borrows explains, the reason Indigenous laws having the uncertain status they do in Canada’s
legal order stems from the “debate about what constitutes ‘law’ and whether Indigenous peoples
Ibid at 21-31.
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in Canada practiced law prior to European arrival”. 62 Borrows goes on to explain that those who
take this stance, both historically and contemporarily, believe that societies only have laws if
they “are declared by some recognized power that is capable of enforcing such a proclamation”,
and if they do not have this proclamation, then the Indigenous legal tradition is seen only as
customary, and therefore, “not clothed with legality”. 63 Legal positivism describes customary
laws as being: “...a conduct which the governed observe spontaneously, or not in pursuance of a
law set by a political superior”.64 Legal positivism as a theory states that custom is only
“transmuted into positive law” when the custom is adopted by the “courts of justice, and when
judicial decisions fashioned upon it are enforced by the power of the state”. 65 Legal positivists
who agree with this definition of law then see Indigenous laws as purely customary, worldviews,
as they have not been converted into positive law. As Borrows argues, this is problematic
because while some Indigenous laws may be customary, other laws may be “positivistic,
deliberative, or based on theories of divine and natural law”.66 Borrows goes further, arguing that
even if the laws are customary, customary laws have more than just moral force, and to believe
otherwise is misleading and harmful.67
What legal positivism and its categorization of Indigenous laws has done is successfully
create the view that Indigenous legal orders are not law. 68 This can be seen as Aaron Mills’ third
form of settler supremacy, which is violence inflicted against and to Indigenous peoples. This
third form is a violence which seeks to “accomplish Indigenous erasure”.69 Mills describes this
violence as only recognizing Indigenous peoples as a unique peoples, “but in a sense not our
own”, meaning Indigenous peoples may retain the “substantive trappings of peoplehood” while
losing “something much more profound”. 70 Settler supremacy does this by maintaining “a
singular social order by means of force and law [by] supressing the diversity of human
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worldviews”. 71 Mills argues that the third form of violence is unlike the first two forms because
the third is not substantive.72 The third form does not target “particular indigenous practices,
doctrines, or embodiments” and instead, targets Indigenous peoples and their “capacity to
understand the world on [their] own terms and to organize [themselves] accordingly.”73 This
third form, therefore, is much more abstract, making it difficult to identify.74 However, what can
be identified from this third form is that the violence denies Indigenous peoples the ability to
speak their languages 75 and laws, live their truths 76, and even “to imagine [their] lives constituted
within [their] own understandings of persons, freedom and community.” 77 This third violence
also encompasses the first two by enforcing a law and social order that is not the law of the
peoples, ultimately inflicting violence to and against Indigenous peoples as well as their
identities, laws, stories, ways of being, and most damaging of all, their land. This third form of
violence can be linked not only to legal positivism, but also to Locke’s theories of property, the
natural world, and ownership in law.
How Lockean Theories Understand Property Law
John Locke wrote that “The earth, and all that is therein, is given to men for the support and
comfort of their being”.78 To him, every piece of creation was “made to become property –
things owned by individual men, to be used for human ends”. 79 Locke’s ideology or creation
story is starkly different than Basil Johnston’s Creation Story as explored above. And while
creation stories differ depending on the Indigenous persons and Nations, 80 just as they differ
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between many human societies and religions, at the root of many Indigenous stories is a
cosmology of giftedness. 81 As Mills explains, many present the belief that all of creation “holds
a gift worthy of our respect” and in “need of our gratitude”. 82 The notion of gifts is extremely
important in Anishinaabe cosmology, 83 and one of the Anishinaabemowin words which
encompasses giftedness in cosmology is miinigowiziwin: “a spiritual gift from Creator”.84 Robin
Wall Kimmerer explains the importance of gifts in Anishinaabe lifeways, writing that “when
people’s lives [are] so directly tied to the land, it [is] easy to know the world as a gift”. 85
In a different Basil Johnston version of the Anishinaabe Creation Story, which is also the
version I have been taught, gifts are explored when the Great Spirit, Kitchie Manitou sets out to
create a world of life and beauty after waking from the most marvelous of dreams. 86 When
creating this world, Kitchie Manitou first created rock, water, fire and wind. 87 Then came the
sun, moon, earth and stars. 88 Kitchie Manitou then gave the sun, earth, moon and stars their own
powers. Grass, flowers, trees and vegetation came next 89 followed by animals of every kind. 90 It
wasn’t until Kitchie Manitou thought back to the initial dream where the world was created that
he made humans. 91 Humans had the ability to dream, just like Kitchie Manitou did. While human
was “last in the order of creation, least in the order of dependence, and the weakest in bodily
powers,” 92 humans had the power to dream. This, Kitche Manitou thought, was the greatest gift
of all.93 In this version of the Anishinaabe Creation Story, Johnston writes that the earth was not
created to benefit the existence of humans, and in fact, ‘human’ was the last being Kitche
Manitou created. The earth, and all the creation within it, was gifted to all creation, including
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humans, as was the gift of dreaming.94 Johnston goes on in his re-telling, explaining that once
humans were created, The Great Laws of Nature were formed. 95 The Great Laws of Nature were
made for “the well being and harmony of all things and all creatures.” 96 These Great Laws
“governed the place and movement of the sun, moon, earth and stars; governed the powers of
wind, water, fire, and rock; governed the rhythm and continuity of life, birth, growth, and
decay.” 97 Most importantly, all of creation “lived and worked by these laws”. 98
This story shows once again the differences between Anishinaabe and Christian beliefs.
Locke wrote that, based on his Christian ideologies, there must be a means to appropriate all of
creation before creation can “be of any use, or at all beneficial”, 99 which contrasts with the
Anishinaabe principle that the natural world is a gift. Locke wrote that in the beginning of time,
the God of Christianity gave all of nature to mankind in common: this meant that all men had “an
equal right to gather natural resources for their own use”. 100 Once you appropriated the natural
resource, the item belonged to whomever made the effort to gather the item while the nature the
item came from remains common property.101 Locke’s notions of property were very much
centred on the individual: ownership was conferred only through effort that was expended to
make the item, such as an apple, available for one’s personal use. Locke’s theory, when applied
to land, held that while originally, all land was owned in common, anyone could acquire a
property claim to land and resources simply by labouring on the land to make it productive. 102
As John Bishop explains, this meant if you could “clear the forest, plough the soil, and cultivate
crops” 103 you would be effectively appropriating the woods for your own ownership, entitling
you to own not only the crop from the woods, but also the land which you cleared.104
Locke’s beliefs and theories contrast further with Anishinaabe legal orders rooted in
cosmology and giftedness. He argued that Indigenous peoples were “ignorant of the moral
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necessity of appropriating the life of the world for private purposes,” writing that the “fruit, or
venison, which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no inclosure and is still a tenant in
common, must be his and so his, i.e. a part of him, that another can no longer have any right to it,
before it can do him any good for the support of his life”.105 Locke’s articulation has carried
itself deep into the colonial history and present of Canada, embedding itself in much more than
our understanding of property law. This belief, at its core, has shaped the understanding of
property and natural resources in Canada, influencing the laws, policies and practices of
development, including the duty to consult. Property in Canada has different meanings and
therefore different laws which govern how it operates. Even so, it is generally accepted in
Canadian law that property is a means of managing resources. 106 Further, property as a right is
actually rights plural: a bundle of rights. 107
Locke further wrote that once you passed laboured land onto another, that person would
not have to labour the land to have rights and ownership to it, because that first person did the
labour necessary. 108 This imposed a duty to “undertake actions which tend to preserve the human
species,” 109 and because original appropriation of property expends the necessary labour,
“original appropriation of private property becomes a right”. 110 Original appropriation was
applied to the arrival of Europeans to Turtle Island as a right of settlement.111 Locke’s theory
was interpreted to mean that a European could acquire ownership of property on Turtle Island if
they invested their labour in “making the land more productive”, and if the land was common
property prior to their arrival either “because there were no indigenous people in the area or
because the indigenous people had never transferred the land from common ownership to private
ownership by original appropriation”.112
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To further understand the importance of Locke in Turtle Island’s colonial history, it is
important to note who Locke was in relation to European colonization. As James Tully notes,
Locke had extensive knowledge of and interest in European contact with aboriginal
peoples. A large number of books in his library are accounts of European exploration,
colonization and of aboriginal peoples … [and] Locke was one of the six or eight men
who closely invigilated and helped to shape the old colonial system. 113
Locke’s theories on the natural state of the Turtle Island reflect notions of settler supremacy and
what later becomes known as legal positivism. He described Turtle Island as an example of “the
state of nature”, classifying the land and its peoples as “the earliest age in a worldwide historical
development”. 114 This ‘state of nature’ brings us back to legal positivism and the Eurocentric
view that when there is no hierarchical government – therefore no ‘state’ – you cannot transmute
customs to laws. Locke’s writings described in detail the life of Indigenous peoples living on
Turtle Island, stating that the way of life of Indigenous peoples supported his theory of popular
sovereignty. As Tully explains, because Indigenous peoples exercised what Locke later came to
call “individual popular sovereignty” or “individual self-government”, Indigenous peoples were
not afforded the ability to “know and to interpret standards of right (natural laws), to judge
controversies concerning oneself and others in accordance with these laws, and to execute such
judgements by punishments proportionate to the transgression and appropriate for purposes of
restraint and reparation”.115 This, along with Indigenous people appropriating the earth’s bounty
“without consent” 116 of a governing authority meant that Europeans had “a right to wage war
‘against the Indians, [and] to seek Reparation upon any injury received from them’”. 117 This
instilled the belief that Indigenous peoples did not understand property and that Indigenous
peoples had no governing state or recognized legal order, and therefore, did not have any
property laws of their own. 118
I acknowledge that there are many contemporary critiques of Locke; however, one cannot
deny the influence his writings had in early colonization. While it may be easy to think of Locke
as purely historical and dismissing parts of his theories as something of the past, doing so would
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further perpetuate the violence of colonial laws. As Breanna Bhandar argues, “Locke fashioned a
theory of self-consciousness that justified and fit with a non-absolutist form of government.
Colonial governance, and juridical representations of subjects of governance frame the
constitution of categories of Indian and settler and indeed the Indian Act regime”. 119 Moreover,
the Doctrine of Discovery and Locke’s categorization of Indigenous peoples as savages without
a past memory further justified the European’s ability to appropriate and own Indigenous land. 120
As Bhandar argues, the European settler who pre-empted land “fits into the Enlightenment
historicism that equated cultivation with a narrative of civilizational progress”, leading to “The
property logic of Indian identity [being] entirely different from that of the self-possessed,
proprietorial subject”. 121 Further, the Indian Act, both historical and current, along with the
imposition of private property were “premised on the denial of First Nations’ memory of their
relationships to land and place” as theorized and justified by Locke.122 The colonial state,
Bhandar argues, has refused to credit the colonized peoples with “a memory of place before
settlement, before ‘civilisation’”.123 The subject of the Indian Act is therefore not an individual
who is afforded the ability to engage freely in commerce, nor can they be a private property
owner of fee simple land.124 The Indian Act was able to create a separate judicial space 125 where
the state that once did not exist could now “regulate nearly all aspects of labour, the use of
natural resources, and exchange” on land reserved for Indian subjects. 126
Locke misconstrued Indigenous legal orders to justify his theories; as Tully argues, he
was well aware that Indigenous peoples were politically organized Nations who were not
“wholly individual and independent” as he said in his descriptions of the state of nature. 127 Locke
therefore described Indigenous Nations in such a way that they could not be understood as
“political societies” with governance and law, 128 fitting the definition of law via legal positivism.
Indigenous peoples failed to meet the Christian-European criteria of a distinct political society
which garnered political recognition: having an institutionalized legal system, judiciary,
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legislature and executive, and the “sovereign right to declare war and peace”. 129 These theories
became the reality of thinking of early colonizers and have stuck with the Canadian state through
the imposition of colonialism. 130 The world being of no value until developed is perhaps the
most prevalent theory we see in the duty to consult, as natural resource extraction and
development is the largest moving factor triggering consultation, showing how a Lockean belief
that a tree is not of benefit until it is developed into pulp and paper continues to be a legal
principle.
James Sakej Youngblood Henderson of the Bear Clan writes that “To speak of modern
legal notions of ‘ownership’ and ‘property’ rights in the context of Aboriginal languages or
worldview is very difficult, if not impossible”.131 Indigenous concepts and visions of properties,
Henderson argues, have to do with “ecological space that creates our consciousness, not an
ideological construct or a fungible resource”.132 Furthermore, legal positivism’s categorization of
the laws and societal structures of Indigenous peoples, most notably their behaviours and lack of
property ownerships, as ‘primitive’ and therefore not legal in status also influences how the
colonial legal system views Indigenous laws and the natural world socially and legally, and
builds, arguably, on Locke’s writings. In this next section, I will use natural resources as a focus
in discussing how legal positivism, as influenced by Lockean theories, further misunderstands
Indigenous laws and legal orders, and as a building block to the duty to consult, makes the legal
order incommensurable to that of the Anishinaabe.
How Legal Positivism Misunderstands Indigenous Law
The Black’s Law Dictionary defines natural resource as an “asset or material contributing to the
nation’s natural capital. To extract, process, or refine natural resources requires capital and
human resources, as mental and physical labour. By these means, the nation obtains its true
economic value”. 133 Natural resources as a definition and means of extraction, as can be seen
from this definition, can arguably be tied back to Locke, and how his theories developed over
Ibid at 152.
The Indian Act, as the example given by Bhandar, still inflicts violence to Indigenous peoples, land and bodies.
As an example, Bhandar explains in her article, supra note 17 at page 11, that in the 1970s, First Nation women
were bringing forth legal challenges to the Indian Act for discrimination on the basis of sex.
131
James [Sákéj] Youngblood Henderson, “Míkmaw Tenure in Atlantic Canada” (1995) Dalhousie Law Journal, 18,
1, 196-294 at 217.
132
Ibid at 217.
133
Accessed at: https://thelawdictionary.org/natural-resource/.
129
130

21

time to reflect the notion that the potential gain from allocating resources and property allows for
sophisticated systems of property rights.134 This can also be seen in how Canada’s resource
development is traced historically. The history of natural resource development as it is traced by
economic historians starts not with Indigenous peoples and governance structures, but with
European settlement.135
Economic historians such as Harold Innis state that as European settlers began increasing
their dependencies on resources, such as fish, timber, and water, the need to parcel land for living
and farming started to increase. 136 Slowly over time, the need to expand where one could parcel
out land also grew, leading to the ‘frontier’ – or the ‘unappropriated’137 part of Canada –
receding, development proceeding, and natural resources needing allocation amongst competing
users and uses. 138 As a British colony, this meant property in land could only be acquired from
the English common law,139 and therefore, acquiring land from Indigenous peoples happened by
the Crown through treaty or surrender before title to the same land could be granted to the
settlers. 140 These early Crown grants were the easiest and cheapest way to acquire land, and the
grants tended to carry a full range of freehold rights. 141 Crown grants to European settlers also
became one of the earliest recognized legal ways of acquiring and managing natural resources
until 1867, where responsibility for granting rights fell to provincial governments as outlined in
the Constitution Act. 142 Around the turn of the century, federal and provincial governments
stopped granting complete or outright title to land and resources, except when the land was for
agricultural or urban purposes, and started to grant permits and licenses to resources such as
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timber, minerals and water.143 These licenses and permits were issued to private parties to give
access to the resources, while keeping the title to the land and resource with the Crown. 144 By
keeping title, the Crown kept property over the resource until the resource was “recovered and
(usually) paid for” by the permit holder.145 While economic historians do not fully understand
why the Canadian system turned away from English private ownership to public ownership of
land and resources, some historians believe it may be tied to the “growing populist sentiment,
especially in regions opening up for settlement”. 146 Regardless, the development of property
rights in Canada as attached to the natural world has created a spectrum of rights which ranges in
duration, exclusiveness and transferability,147 translating to what we know as the ‘bundle of
rights’ understanding of property, as explored above. This historical pattern of natural resources
understood as property reflects two major influences: “the historical pattern of settlement and the
historical pattern of interest in resources”. 148 These influences have resulted in the exploitation of
natural resources by the private sector, and this reliance on the private sector is “as entrenched as
our commitment to public ownership of [resources]”. 149
One of the clear issues with this historical dating of natural resources in Canada is the
starting of the dating at European settlement. I argue that this start date is rooted in legal
positivism categorizing Indigenous peoples as being lawless. The concept of natural resources as
we understand in Canada requires that we expand on this exploration of legal positivism, as it
influences what is considered Canadian law, and what is not. As Sundhya Pahuja, an Associate
Professor of Law at the University of Melbourne in Australia argues:
The ideal(ised) version of law in the development story is the law of the legal positivist.
Legal positivism as a jurisprudential endeavour is another narrative, about a certain body
of rules made in a particular way. According to this story, these particular rules are the
only rules which may rightly bear the name of ‘law’. And this ‘law’ is the language in
which legitimate authority is brokered in modern society. 150
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Under legal positivism, the laws which governed Turtle Island prior to European settlement did
not rightly bear the name of ‘law’ as they were not part of the body of rules which made up the
law that did rightfully bear the name of law under European legal orders. Legal positivism’s
defining of what did or did not bear the name of law gets to what Gordon Christie argues is a
concept that, when one speaks of the law, they “talk of x being law or an element of the law, of a
case standing for a legal proposition, and so on”.151 This concept, Christie explains,
…suggests that behind legislative and judicial practice there is meaning, that jurists
intend to project meaning through such statements. That is, much of the language of
everyday discourse in legal communities (and broader society) rests on the notion there is
such a thing as ‘law’. A concept we hold that captures what it is for a particular rule to be
law, a particular action of a legislative body, and so forth.
Trying to describe the nature of the thing called law, Christie explains that it “seems to require
initial theoretical or conceptual presumptions. This thing we might all feel we can identify – the
law – is incapable of self-definition and does not simply rise up before us to declare what it is
like”. Saying what does and does not fit into the law “is to do nothing but pick out features of our
collective social existence we seem licensed to say go into our conception [of law] for no
discernable reasons other than we intuit or feel this is so”. Christie explains that this, in turn,
“implies our concept of law might be socioculturally fixed – that there may be no such thing as
the concept of law”. 152
This concept of law being ‘socioculturally fixed’ is an interesting analysis of legal
positivism as it defines what bears the name of law based not only on European standards of
legal orders, but also socio-cultural standards. Examples of this are the concepts of nation and
development. 153 Nation and development are a network of terms defined by referencing the other
through legal positivistic views, essentially enabling a narrow version and vision of society,
political organization, economics, 154 as well as law. A nation that is worthy of a legal positivistic
definition of law is one that is developed through legal positivistic means, such as developing the
natural world through European means of ownership and labour, and through the socio-cultural
standards of living. This definition of nation and development furthers Eurocentric supremacy as
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it “erases the inevitable violence” that comes with ‘developing’ a nation that is not yours; 155 you
erase the legal order and socio-cultural standards of a people when you develop them as your
own nation, on your own terms, and within your own laws.
Both Pahuja and Christie cite H.L.A Hart in their discussions on legal positivism, a
European philosopher who advanced legal positivism as a theory. Hart’s conception of law
“gained jurisprudential favour as the new positivist conception… as an explication of how
positive law could command the right to be called ‘law’”.156 Hart’s theory was that a legal
system could claim the right to be law when it demonstrated two minimum conditions that he
deemed were “necessary and sufficient for the existence of a legal system”. 157 These two
conditions were: “rules of behaviour which are valid according to the system’s ultimate criteria
of validity” and, “rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of
change and adjudication [which] must be effectively accepted as common public standards of
official behaviour by its officials”. 158
Hart’s concept of law, coincidently, “just happens to lie so close overtop the legal system
with which he is intimately familiar”:159 European definitions of rules and law. As Christie
explains, the concept of law being that of what European philosophers were familiar with is
“knocking at the door leading to questions about the place of culture and perspective in thinking
about ‘the law’”.160 Legal positivism, then, sees legal orders as ‘legal’ if they are “built
according to essentially structural requirements, with the structure containing elements that are
themselves reason-giving”, 161 the reasons being that of which is familiar to the theorist
themselves, and not that of something ‘foreign’. Foreign reasons and legal orders were that of
Indigenous legal orders. Not only were they groups of people from a far away land, but their
foundational legal principles did not coincide with the legal principles of Europe. Therefore,
legal positivism did not just dismiss Indigenous legal orders as being non-law because they did
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not ‘fit’ into its rules, categories, or sociocultural standards of law, but it also dismissed them as
they had foundational principles which were incommensurable to their own.
To continue with the natural resource and development example from this section, I want
to focus on Hart’s positivistic writing on resources. Hart argued that in a “crowded world of
scarce resources [men] must adopt some form of social organization”. 162 Within this social
organization, there once again must be rules, one of which must restrict the use of violence by
establishing “set, stable patterns of ownership or use of resources”. 163 As Daniel Gormley points
out, while this notion of survival is important, Hart does not do an adequate job explaining how
the desire to survive is the sole source of moral obligation.164 What Hart does explain is that a
“stable institution of property is necessary within a community”.165 What this translates to is
Indigenous societies not having institutions due to their lack of property ownership; because the
legal orders are incommensurable in their legal understandings of ownership and property, one is
accepted as law while the other is dismissed. Gormley argues that what Hart established through
these arguments is that “some form of property regime among communities is morally required
insofar as it enhances the stability which permits human development”. 166 Without such a
regime, the legal order is dismissed as primitive and non-legal. 167
Legal positivism marked “the step from the pre-legal into the legal world” by converting
“the regime of primary rules into what is indisputably a legal system”.168 Because Indigenous
societies did not meet either of the minimum conditions which afforded legal orders the status of
law under legal positivism, nor did they have commensurable notions of property, Indigenous
peoples did not have law. This connects once again to the violence that settler supremacy inflicts
onto Indigenous peoples, bodies, laws, and land, as argued by Aaron Mills. As Mills explains,
the principle of settler supremacy obviously doesn’t operate transparently. One won’t
find a Canadian court, legislature, or minister appealing to it as justification for state
action. It operates unseen and unheard. It’s a principle which must be inferred from
consequences and patterns in legal positions and in legal reasoning. 169
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Legal positivism’s labeling of Indigenous societies as primitive, as well as its notions of property
and wealth, are examples of how settler supremacy can be inferred from consequences and
patterns in legal positions and reasonings. This, I argue, is perhaps a reason why economic
historians do not link the beginning of natural resources in Canada to Indigenous peoples.
Whether we are taught legal positivism or not, the Eurocentric vision of what Canada was, is,
and will be, is based on positivistic theories and its creation of a hierarchy of legal orders,
influencing the patterns of legal reasoning and positions we see, and accept, as law. 170
However, Indigenous legal orders were, and are, legitimate legal orders with laws and
rules. For example, environmental law or responsibilities in John Borrows’ understanding of an
Anishinaabe legal order are defined by Elders in “reference to the way natural resources are
used, the manner in which they are monitored, and the relationships among different users in
their allocation”. 171 These laws are attached to established rules and the “literal connection and
interaction between those things in the environment that act to use their surroundings, and those
that are acted upon”. 172 These laws could be categorized as being either positivistic, deliberative,
and/or based on theories of natural, customary and divine laws. 173 What is important, however, is
that Indigenous legal orders are considered as having the status of law by their own means and
definitions, and never that of non-Indigenous legal orders. Only allowing the recognition of
Indigenous legal orders as law because of European theories and doctrines is a continuation of
colonization and settler supremacy, specifically the third form. This supremacy is extended into
how one attempts to understand Indigenous legal orders through language. As will be argued in
this next chapter, one needs to learn, or re-learn, language before attempting to learn Indigenous
legal orders. Language, in this sense, is threefold: the language of the Nation; the language of
stories; and the language of law. By taking you on my journey of learning language, and
therefore the language of stories and of law, I will argue that the order of learning law is
important for any legal order, including that of Anishinaabe legal orders. Without understanding
language in all three forms, I am ill-equipped to understand the depth of meaning words hold,
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and therefore if I attempt to learn the language of law out of order, the meanings of words will
be, literally, lost in translation.

Two: Bimaadiziimagad – it is alive and living
Language is important for understanding any social structure, government system, culture,
literature, and legal system, and not just in the sense of speaking or reading language. The dialect
is important, as is the grammar, the rules and exceptions, and how it translates. On top of the
formality of the written and spoken language, the principles that underly the language and the
peoples who speak it are equally important, especially when speaking about Indigenous
languages. In this chapter, I will explore language and how it relates, in all its meanings, to
Anishinaabe legal orders. Specifically, I will explore what I call the three forms of language: the
language of Anishinaabemowin, the language of stories, and the language of law. By layering
my understanding of the languages found in Anishinaabe legal orders, and by a bracketing of my
understandings of the languages of the Canadian legal order, I can build my understanding of
Anishinaabe legal orders without misunderstanding or furthering settler supremacy in my
analysis of Anishinaabe laws, principles, and languages. I want to note at the outset of this
chapter that I am very much still a student of language. Therefore, everything in this chapter is
my understanding, as it currently stands in my level of learning, of Anishinaabemowin and its
related grammar and syntax.
The Grammar of Strawberries and Cats
I am currently learning Anishinaabemowin and Italian as they are the languages of my ancestors.
To learn both means learning the formality of the language, such as formal grammar, as well as
the principles behind the language, which can also be classified as a form of grammar. I call this
the grammar of principles, inspired by the works of Robin Wall Kimmerer. 174 In my journey to
understand my identity, I have found the reclamation of language as my method of choice. When
See Robin Wall Kimmerer, “Braiding Sweetgrass” supra note 85 where she similarly explores what she calls ‘the
grammar of animacy’. Kimmerer’s grammar of animacy focuses on the animate beings that the grammar is speaking
to: the bay, as a noun, is living, therefore it is animate. My grammar of principles is inspired and informed by
Kimmerer’s grammar of animacy, taking it a step further to include more than just animacy as a grammatical
principle in Anishinaabemowin. Principles, for me, go beyond the strict formal grammar of a language, such as a
bay is animate, and expands it to include when a noun is animate whether the formal grammar categorizes it in such
a way or not, based on how the peoples who speak the language categorize the noun in their lifeways.
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I started to learn Anishinaabemowin a few years ago, so much of what I had been coming to
understand not only in myself but in my work started to make sense. For Italian, the years sitting
in my Nonna’s house trying to piece together the fast, thick Calabrese 175 being spoken by
everyone in the room except me and my sisters makes me feel like I deserved to be part of those
conversations. Until I started this journey, I was quick to dismiss one of the two forms of
grammar. For Italian, I was quick to dismiss the grammar of principles and purely focus on the
formal grammar. Is the word masculine or feminine, and how do I conjugate it? For
Anishinaabemowin, it was the opposite: I focused only on the grammar of principles while
dismissing the formal grammar of the language. Blueberries are part of creation, therefore
animate. 176 But as I have come to learn, without both grammars, language is simply just
squiggled lines on a page or sounds on the tongue we cannot decipher, and this is true also of
law. Even though learning a language can make you feel as though you are caught up in one
form of grammar or the other, I am learning just how important it is to ground myself in the
notion that both grammars exist at the same time, whether one form of grammar makes it seem
that way or not, and that contradictions in the formal grammar need not detract from the
grammar of principles, and vise versa.
When it comes to formal grammar, which we understand to be the structure of the
language such as syntax, punctuation and infliction, the two languages I am learning are very
different from each other, as well as from English. Having studied French for many years, the
formal grammar of Latin languages was already seared into my memory, making learning Italian
much easier than Anishinaabemowin. That, and the fact I have heard my dad speak Italian my
entire life. Yet, I still cannot help but get frustrated when I come across the simple word cat and
am affronted with the fact that it has a masculine and feminine spelling (which also affects its
plural): Cat (m): gatto, Cat (f): gatta, Cat (pl)(m): gatti, Cat (pl)(f): gate. When I asked my dad
about the gender of the word cat, he said, “cat is gat”. His dialect, which is Calabrese, may have
resulted in him shortening the word and making it genderless. If I were to ask another Calabrese
As I explore later in this chapter, Calabrese is a dialect of Italy, and is the dialect my dad’s entire family has
always spoken. Currently, I am learning what many call ‘Italian proper’, i.e., the dialect spoken for business, such as
in Rome and Milan. When I talk to my dad in Italian, a majority of the words we speak are the same, if not
extremely similar, despite being different dialects. However, they are not identical languages, hence they are
categorized as dialects. For example, the Italian word I know for bowl is ciotola. My dad’s word for bowl is
scodella.
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person the same question, they may not say gat, or perhaps they will. Either way, what I know to
be important is that whichever word one gives cat, whether it be gatto, gatta or gat, the meaning
is still that of a furry four-legged cat. However, the dialects of Italy’s Provinces and regions do
differentiate how words are pronounced, spelled, and even at times what their meaning or
definition is. What I am starting to understand from my daily Italian lessons is that whether cat is
masculine or feminine has to do with the gender of the cat being spoken about, the default being
masculine. While nouns are gendered in Italian, that does not necessarily mean the feminine
strawberry, la fragola, is alive. It is like how in English nouns can be a person, place or thing.
However, in either English or Italian, if I were to say the strawberry has personhood, I would
have some explaining to do, as that is not part of either language’s grammar of principles. That
being said, the grammar of principles as it pertains to the fruit would differ to some degree
between them as the cultural grammar around food is very different in Italy, making
conversations about la fragola grammatically different than English on both fronts.
Understanding the basics of this grammar is key to me learning Italian and hopefully
becoming fluent. I have to throw the English language out the window when doing my daily
lessons, which can be hard when it’s the language I have done everything in for almost 30 years.
But, if I want to learn my father’s language, as well as understand the culture better, social
constructs, and even laws one day, it all starts with whether cat is masculine or feminine. The
same goes for learning Anishinaabemowin. If I want to understand the Anishinaabe culture,
social and government structures, stories and laws, I also have to throw away the rules of English
and start with the grammar of cat. My cat Inde, who actually has an Anishinaabemowin name,
would not be masculine or feminine in Anishinaabemowin the same way she is in Italian. Cat is
gaazhagens and is an animate noun. Inde’ means my heart and is a dependent inanimate noun.
Even though the word Inde’ is inanimate, I decided to give it to my animate cat, which is animate
in two senses, both in formal grammar and grammar of principles. I believe we can all agree,
whether we speak a language that gives animacy or genders to words or not, that a cat is alive in
the sense that it is a breathing being. Not all languages, however, would be as quick to agree that
a strawberry is, which is why understanding language and grammar is so critical.
Words as static letters have multiple meanings, and once multiple words are strung
together in a sentence, their meanings can change and evolve even more, eventually becoming,
in some form or another, what we call law. However, law at the end of the day, boils down to
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words, either static or strung together; written or spoken. Law, and therefore its words, are
interpretive, and to interpret them correctly, we must understand the meanings of each individual
word in the sentence called a law. Without an understanding of each word, and each words
individual meaning, we have no means of understanding the words together as a sentence and
law, nor the meanings the words have when strategically placed together. If we expect these
layers of understanding for the Canadian legal order, why then do we not hold ourselves to the
same expectation with other legal orders? To understand Anishinaabe legal orders, I argue, the
same layered understanding is called for as just like in English – or Italian – words have
meanings that change when other words are strung before and after them. This chapter will
explore these layers through the three forms of language, exploring each form on its own, but
also layered with the others, as a vital step in exploring what an Anishinaabe legal order may say
about the duty to consult.
The First Form of Language: The Language of Anishinaabemowin
The first form of language, the language of Anishinaabemowin, requires learning both forms of
grammar of the language which houses the legal orders I am setting out to learn. For
Anishinaabe legal orders, that means Anishinaabemowin. As a learner of Anishinaabemowin, I
have to learn the grammars in the language I currently understand, which is English. The key,
therefore, is bracketing my English grammars when learning those of Anishinaabemowin.
Building on the examples from above, that means the grammars of nouns. The Ojibwe People’s
Dictionary explains that nouns in Anishinaabemowin “are inflected; that is, they take on affixes
– prefixes and/or suffixes – that give grammatical information about them. For example, affixes
can indicate whether a noun is animate or inanimate (gender)”. 177 Animate nouns can reflect that
the noun is alive. However, not everything that is animate necessarily adds up in the two forms
of grammar. Another online Anishinaabemowin resource I use is Anishinaabemodaa. 178 Here,
they explain similarly that,
In Ojibwe, all nouns belong to one of two classes of gender – animate and inanimate.
Nouns referring to people, animals, trees, and spirits belong to the animate class of nouns.
Some non-living things are also included in the animate class … For example … it is
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difficult to understand why star, mitten, and net are animate, and earth, shoe, water, and
boat are inanimate.179
Even within the categorization of animate and inanimate, these ‘genders’ are not how we
currently understand gender in English as they are not a sexual identity; instead, they “identify
different ways of existing in the world”.180 Perhaps the most puzzling thing for me in learning
Anishinaabemowin is not cat like in Italian, but why earth, aki, is an inanimate noun, just like
Anishinaabemodaa explains. Part of this is because I am learning the language out of order: I am
learning the grammar of Anishinaabemowin after already learning many of the stories and laws.
Having teachings such as the earth is alive is counterintuitive to learning that the word for earth,
aki, is inanimate,181 supporting the argument that order is important.
Basil Johnston writes about language and its order, arguing that one cannot be expected
to understand anything about a culture or a people “Without the benefit of knowing the language
of the Indian nation” and that “unless scholars and writers know the literature of the peoples that
they are studying or writing about, they cannot provide what their students and readers are
seeking and deserving of.”182 Language, for Johnston, is inseparable from literature183 in the
same way I argue it is inseparable from law. He explains that words in Anishinaabemowin have
three levels of meaning: the first is the surface meaning that you understand instantly at hearing
or reading it; then, beneath this meaning, is the fundamental meaning of the word, derived from
prefixes and combinations with other words or terms; and the third level underlies both of these
first two, and is the philosophical meaning. 184 Taking this, we can extend Johnston’s language
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and literature to language, literature and law: language, stories, law. Within each, the meanings
of the words use form the basis of what we then understand as a language, a story and a law.
In many Anishinaabemowin dialects, both forms of grammar affirm the notion that the
natural world is animate.185 In the grammar of principles (or what Robin Wall Kimmerer calls
“the grammar of animacy”186), animacy can go beyond formal grammar and extend to the
personhood of the noun. By learning this first form of language, stories and literature can be read
in Anishinaabemowin or English, as the grammar of the words being read will not be lost in
translation. Without this first form however, the stories and literature, as Johnston explained,
cannot be understood fully as the meanings of the words will be misunderstood on both a
fundamental and philosophical level.187 Without these levels of understanding, the laws cannot
be drawn from the stories let alone understood. It is important to note that this form of language
does not require that everyone become fluent in Anishinaabemowin, or only read stories in
Anishinaabemowin. In fact, many Anishinaabe stories have been shared in different forms
through the English language without losing their meaning. For example, I can read an
Anishinaabe story in English and the law embedded within the story won’t be lost on me so long
as I understand the meanings of the words in each sentence through the lens of
Anishinaabemowin and an Anishinaabe legal order. What this means is that regardless of the
language I am speaking or reading, I understand the story because I understand the two
grammars of the story’s language.
Both Aaron Mills and Gordon Christie also connect understanding language to
understanding law. Mills argues that there is a “violence of translation across legalities” when
one attempts to understand law without language, and he calls this “constitutional capture”. 188
Gordon Christie calls this same notion the “liberal snare”. 189 What both scholars point to is that
understanding different legal orders accounts for the person understanding the culture attached to
them through language. 190 Is the cat alive? Does the strawberry have personhood? As Mills
explains, “We must specify that legal processes are empowered and constrained by the
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constitutional orders (again: logic and structure) which generate and authorize them”.191 Logic
and structure can relate to language, and legal orders are seen “as existing in outer layers of
spheres and beliefs, constantly challenged, constantly being revised and rejected … their very
meaning is dependent on who has influence over the task of providing a platform for
communication between language users”. 192 Furthermore, the language spoken in a liberal legal
discourse, inclusive of the concepts of rights, freedoms, and even autonomy, is “so all-pervasive
it can be said that the political morality of liberalism supplies the language of everyday legal
discourse”. 193 This constitutional capture, or liberal snare, blocks differences in legalities, and
when this is done in a colonial state with the violence of settler supremacy inflicted against
Indigenous peoples, Indigenous lifeways are also affected. 194
The effect of settler supremacy’s violence to legal discourse is that Indigenous legal
orders are not seen as law. When speaking just about language, the English language prohibits us
the ability to use Indigenous languages because of the perception that English language rules can
be applied universally to Indigenous language rules. This limits one from being able to truly
speak, write and use Indigenous language. To do so, you have to remove the rules of the English
language and learn the rules of the Indigenous language. This extends to law. As Christie argued,
the English language when it comes to legal discourse is heavily influenced by political morality,
therefore shaping the words we use to describe laws and legal processes. And while this legal
language can be translated to a different spoken or written language, the legal language is harder
to translate. It is when a legal language is translated to another legal language that has a different
political morality195 and lifeways 196 that the translation inflicts violence. In Canada, this happens
when one attempts to translate Indigenous legal languages into their colonial legal language
without accounting for differences in grammars; the political morality of liberalism and the
lifeways so heavily attached to the self and not the community 197 result in forcing of one
language’s rules onto another. What often follows is only speaking about Indigenous laws and
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legal languages in vague terms, such as a ‘legal tradition’ or ‘legal culture’.198 Law is not called
what it is: law. What the legal language is, is quite literally, lost in translation.
Similar to the different dialects of Italy, there are dialects of Anishinaabemowin that
depend greatly on the geography and history of the location the dialect derives from. If I were to
call my dad’s Calabrese Italian a dialect of Italian, and not an Italian dialect would cause some
Calabrian’s to have an uproar. The distinction, as I understand from my aunt who was born and
raised in Italy is that Calabrese is a direct descendent of Latin and has massive Greek influence
due to Calabria being a Greek settlement for much of human history (and still has this influence
to this day in parts of the province). To say Calabrese is a dialect of Italian and not an Italian
dialect therefore means that Italian, not Latin, is the parent language, which according to my aunt
and linguists, is not the case. 199 Even formal Italian is a descendant of Latin, which means formal
Italian is merely a sibling to Calabrese. To take this even further, within the Calabrian Province
different Calabrese dialects are spoken. The same is true of Indigenous languages. There may be
different spelling, pronunciation and even meanings of Anishinaabemowin words depending on
the Nation. While much of the language will be the same, like in Italian, to say they are all the
exact same would simply be wrong. Whether we formally call these dialects or not, the principle
remains: depending on where you are, the influences of peoples, geography and history have a
lot to do with the spoken and written language. It will also have a lot to do with the language of
stories and literature, and of course, the language of law. Therefore, the translation system in
place must account for these differences.
The Second form of Language: The Language of Stories
The second form of language is the language of stories. For Italian, that means learning the
stories of the Peninsula, and even the stories of my ancestors, such as my Nonno’s onion story I
told you in my Preface. For Anishinaabe legal orders, many of the laws are derived from
aadizookaanag: sacred stories. 200 Sacred stories are traditionally told orally, and have only
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recently been written down through publicly available texts. Within these stories, laws, morals,
values and life lessons are often told. There are other forms of stories too: as Anishinaabe
politician Jerry Fontaine explains, “our truth, gah-wi-zi-mah-ji-say-muh-guk” are stories of
origin, while the “ah-di-so-kahn-i-ni-ni-wahg/kwe-wahg” are sacred storytellers who share “the
ah-di-so-kah-nahg (sacred stories) and their di-bah-ji-mo-wi-nan (stories of personal
experience)”. 201 Through all types of stories, Anishinaabe identity is grounded, as is ones
“intimate relationship with the land”. 202 Information is passed down from one generation to
another, ensuring a cultural and legal continuity.203 Stories and storytelling also help the
Anishinaabeg to “make sense and meaning of how we came to be and our existence”. 204 As
Fontaine writes, “Storytelling provides us with some context for [our existence] and the
beginning of our own narrative”.205 All these stories “tell the world that we are human, not
blood-thirsty savages and inhuman. [Stories] are also complex and, in many ways, different from
academic historiography because Ojibwaymowin and our other languages are interwoven with
our relationship to the world around us and to the land”. 206
Canadian law, which may also be categorized as a form of story, is distinguishable from
Indigenous law stories, most notably because Canadian law is not passed down from generation
to generation through storytelling in the same way per se. 207 Typically, to gain an in-depth
understanding of Canadian law that goes beyond ‘stealing is illegal’, one would have to obtain a
legal education. While stories may be told from parent to child about the dangers of breaking a
law, the history, reasoning and meaning of these laws are traditionally saved for the elite of
society who study, advocate and make law. Even with modern technology allowing one to look
up the human trends and legal principles of different times, there remains a difference. A story
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which encompasses the founding laws of creation is not synonymous to a story of how Johnny
got caught stealing candy from the General Store, or Johnny’s case against the General Store
from any time period. This difference does not necessarily relate to the cultural significance of
stories and storytelling. In fact, storytelling is one of the most basic ways that humans, from all
cultural backgrounds and parts of the world, have been relating human experience throughout
our shared history. 208 Much of what humans do and experience as a species revolves in one way
or another around stories.209 Take, for example once again, the story of my Nonno walking home
after the war and eating onions. This story relates his experience, as well as explains why he
never ate cipolla again. You could even argue that there is a life lesson in his story about
perseverance. The concept of story for all humans has always been to relate human existence and
experiences, whether it be through song, dance, ritual or art,210 and there is science to explain
this. Storytelling has roots in the physiology and contextualizing processes of the human brain,
getting to the heart of the human psyche, reflecting the ways the human brain organizes and
stores information.211 However, stories that hold law are not synonymous with my Nonno eating
onions, or even what we call case law.
Granted, case law is in a sense the story of people and their circumstances. Johnny stole
candy from the General Store.212 Johnny v The General Store. Evidence; fact; finding; a story of
law and how it came to apply to Johnny. Johnny’s story, and how the law came to apply to
Johnny, is transmitted to others via a story. However, the similarity in the definition of story
across legal traditions should not be taken to show that Indigenous laws and the common law are
one in the same as attempting to categorize Indigenous law in common law concepts only
furthers settler supremacy. As Borrows says, “the categorization of Indigenous law into common
law or civil law categories may be problematic … [this] risks the crass manipulation of
Indigenous legal worldviews to fit Euro-Canadian legal boxes”. 213 Perhaps a defining difference
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in stories in Indigenous laws and common law traditions is that Indigenous stories, whether the
aadizookaanag of the Anishinaabeg or the pūrākau 214 of the Māori, have the ability and purpose
of relating the unique human experiences of their peoples and ancestors in a way that is not only
a narrative, “but an echo of a truth lived and remembered”. 215 These stories have the ability and
purpose of teaching the laws and cultural traditions of a peoples through language, as language
embodies the law. 216 These stories therefore are different than my Nonno’s onion story or case
law, as they have a normative force that goes beyond “my grandfather walked the length of
southern Italy and ate onions”,217 or the facts and application of law against Johnny.
Many Anishinaabe stories are embedded in relationships and relationship-making
processes, 218 and as Anishinaabe scholar Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark explains, aadizookaanag
are seen by many Anishinaabeg as living strands that “constitute the relationships Anishinaabeg
hold between themselves and with all of Creation”. 219 Many aadizookaanag focus on values,
such as respect and responsibilities, and “embody interest in forging healthy communities to
benefit Anishinaabeg and the world around them”. 220 This illustrates the difference with case law
and aadizookaanag even further. As Borrows explains, it is easy for us to not see a difference
between such stories and case law as they both
... attempt to provide reasons for, and reinforce consensus about, broad principles and to
justify or criticize certain deviations from generally accepted standards. Common law
cases and Aboriginal stories are also similar because both record fact patterns of past
disputes and their related solutions. Furthermore, both ... are interpreted by
knowledgeable keepers of wisdom and presented in a manner suitable to a particular
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dilemma. Finally, both … are regarded as authoritative by their listeners, and there are
natural, moral, and cultural sanctions for the violation of their instructions. 221
Furthermore, Borrows explains that Indigenous stories are distinguishable from common law
precedent due to the way Indigenous stories are recorded and applied.222 The oral tradition of
Indigenous societies is one of the main pillars of this difference.223 Oral tradition was and is still
used to chronicle important information as well as store and share the information through “a
literacy that treasures memory and the spoken word”. 224 This oral tradition allows for what
Borrows calls “a constant reaction of First Nations systems of laws”. 225 Furthermore, Borrows
explains that the changes to stories does not equate to the story’s truths being lost; instead,
modifications recognize “that context is always changing, requiring a constant reinterpretation of
many of the account’s elements”. 226 The fluidity of Indigenous legal stories allows for contextual
meaning to be conveyed to the listener.227
Each Indigenous Nation has their own languages, stories, laws and governance structures,
which will be reflected in their own oral traditions and traditions around stories, 228 therefore each
demand the listener to understand the foundational principles they are built on, starting with
language. 229 Understanding the first form of language then allows me to understand the second
form: stories can be law in the same way law can be stories. Johnny stole from the General Store:
stealing is illegal. Trees are alive: living creation has personhood. However, the critical
distinction remains that I must look to Indigenous legal orders, and therefore the laws and
stories, on their own terms, resisting the urge to compare them to Euro-Canadian systems for
validation, 230 or the terms of other Indigenous legal orders. Furthermore, as can be pulled from
Larry Chartrand’s writing, without understanding the language of stories, there is an inability to
identify who can interpret and apply laws. Chartrand explains that,
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Both Indigenous legal traditions based on customary law (articulated in oral legends and
stories passed down from generation to generation) and the common law have similar
roots in local laws as understood by the local community. The primary difference,
however, is that in the common law, a specialist enforcer or decision-maker such as a
judge interprets and applies the law. In Indigenous systems, the community as a whole
fulfills this role, in the sense that each member has the responsibility and authority
(usually in consultation with Elders) to apply the law as understood communally.231
Chartrand also explains that Indigenous stories are not authoritative in the same way common
law cases are. As he explains, while there may be symmetry between a sacred story and Johnny v
The General Store; “the stories and legends” Chartrand writes, “‘reflect’ the law, but they are not
the law unlike judicial common law opinions and legislations … the source of law is found in the
actions taken collectively by the community members as they live and interact with one another
grounded in a particular culture”.232 Moreover, Indigenous stories may not exhibit the same
“conceptual understandings of law” that common law does, as Indigenous law is “inherently
fluid” and not necessarily confined to constructed authorities as in the common law.233
Therefore, to engage with Indigenous laws and their sources properly, they cannot be engaged
with through a common law understanding.234
The language of stories gets further at the incommensurability between Indigenous law
and the Canadian common law, even on the seemingly simple basis of where the law is. At the
core roots of what creates law, Indigenous laws and the common law are so vastly different that
they cannot be expected to ‘go together’. Not only are the values and theories incommensurable,
but so too are what the laws are, where they come from, and who has the authority to apply them.
Therefore, to understand these legal orders and engage with them meaningfully, the colonial
understanding and operations of law cannot interfere. In Chartrand’s own words, “We can teach
Indigenous law, but if it is not recognized as ‘law’ by lawyers and judges because of continued
colonial intransigence and the denial of legal authority (apart from specific legislative
recognition), what is the point?” 235 For me, it is worth inquiring whether European philosophers
would have understood these two forms of language of any one of the hundreds of Indigenous
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societies on Turtle Island and beyond if they had taken the time to do so, and if so, whether they
would have still categorized and dismissed Indigenous societies and their laws as being primitive
and of no standing. Further, if they had taken time to understand Indigenous law and where it
comes from, had understood the meanings of language, the differences of grammar, and the
legality of sacred stories, would they have still considered Indigenous law as non-legal? Perhaps
if they had stopped to understand the complex and developed legal orders of Indigenous Nations,
they would have a legal view of the world that has a moral responsibility to water and trees, and
a legal system that recognizes the personhood and standing of other species. 236 While Kimmerer
described this as being “all in the pronouns”,237 I would define it as also being all in the
principles. I would also stretch it further to say it is also all in the stories because, as Kimmerer
herself writes, “our relationship with land cannot heal until we hear its stories”.238
Now that the first two forms of language have laid the foundation of understanding, I can
continue to the third form of language, which is the language of law. Up to now, I have argued
that the theories of the common law, such as Lockean theories of property, legal positivism, and
settler supremacy are all reasons why Canadian law is incommensurable with Anishinaabe legal
orders, and because of this, I am setting out to understand a changed meaning for the duty to
consult and accommodate through Anishinaabe legal orders. Of course, to do this, I need to have
an understanding of some of the Anishinaabe laws which could play a role in this changed
meaning. This brings me now to the final form of language: the language of law.
The Third form of Language: The Language of Law
The third form of language is the language of law. As I already explained, at the very root, laws
are simply words strung together. To understand or interpret the law, you need to have an
understanding of the words and their meanings that you are reading. Lindsay Keegitah Borrows
argues that for Anishinaabe laws to be expressed, the laws must live within the peoples as well as
the language in order to be authoritative. 239 She argues that law cannot simply be written on
paper to be ‘law’; it must also be written “on people’s hearts”, bringing it to the core of the
person and the “core of their being” for proper revitalization to occur. 240 Sākihitowin Awāsis
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argues that because the English language can implicitly permit for nature to be disrespected
through the denial of being regarded as persons, 241 language assimilation poses a threat to
Indigenous knowledge systems 242 and laws. But what does the language of law mean? Mills
argues that what ultimately counts as law and as “legitimate processes of its generation,
adjustment, and destruction” are created, constrained and empowered by the constitutional orders
“from which [the laws] derive life”. 243 These constitutional frameworks that create, contain and
empower laws reflect the unique understandings about what law is. 244 The Anishinaabe
constitutional principles that encourages us “to know and to use the sacred gifts one has been
given” is different than a liberal understanding of law, which considers “the sacred and natural
sense” of Anishinaabe law as being “improper because it’s too vague to proscribe behaviour”. 245
Anishinaabe legalities give emphasis to an “earth-centric ‘rooted’ form of constitutionalism”
which is “characterized by mutual aid and its correlate structure, kinship”. 246
To scale Mills’ categorization of Anishinaabe constitutional principles back, we must
understand what he calls “cosmological giftedness”. 247 Cosmological giftedness comes from
Creation Stories, according to which “creation holds a gift worthy of our respect, in need of our
gratitude”.248 Gifts for the Anishinaabeg can be conveyed in the Anishinaabemowin word
miinigowiziwin. 249 Mills shares in his dissertation how different elders in his life have defined
miinigowiziwin, all of which defined it on similar lines of cosmology giving creation all the gifts
needed for life.250 Kimmerer also speaks about giftedness grounding Anishinaabe law. Gifts, she
explains, whether from the earth or from another being, “establish a particular relationship, an
obligation of sorts to give, to receive, and to reciprocate”. 251 This relates itself back to
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Henderson’s writing on consciousness to space in Indigenous languages. Gratitude and
reciprocity, along with a consciousness in language, are directly connected to gifts and therefore
giftedness. This correlation is what Mills calls the positive analytic of mutual aid: gift 
gratitude  reciprocity.252 In this part of Mills’ dissertation, he recounts a story by Basil
Johnston, which I believe merits retelling here:
Bear gave one berry to each of his neighbours that stood near him. So many berries did
the bear give out to everyone that called out, ‘Give me one’ that his container should
have become empty. But it didn’t. It remained always full. Bear gave and gave until
every insect, bird, animal and fish had received a berry. Still, his container was as full as
it was before.253
The generosity of Bear is what claims the reader’s attention. Bear offers her gifts of berries to the
other beings of creation,254 yet her bowl never seems to empty. As Mills explains, to the reader
this seems illogical: how could Bear give away all these berries yet still have a full bowl? 255 Is
the bowl magical? Is Bear magical? Perhaps. However, to get the real answer is to remove the
liberal narrative in which these questions of logic appear. 256 As Mills argues, this logic “belongs
to another kind of story. In a liberal narrative, it’s a zero-sum truth that the more an autonomous
person gives, the less he necessarily has”. 257 Here, in the kinship relationship of the animate
characters, the more they give to each other the more they have, as the beings they give to will
give back to them because of the principle of mutual aid, which Mills explains, governs their
kinship relationship. I will explore the legal principle of kinship further in Chapter Three;
however, for now, the explanation Mills gives, I argue, is consistent with the three forms of
language. If I did not know that the characters of this story are animate and have a kinship
relationship with each other, both in the story and in reality, and that stories tell us laws and
reasonings, I could easily dismiss this story as being illogical, not realizing that the law of this
story is, in fact, giftedness and reciprocity. Or, as Mills says, mutual aid.
Kimmerer gives her own explanation of the liberal misunderstanding of the legal concept
of giftedness in her chapter “The Gift of Strawberries”. Here Kimmerer argues that,
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From the viewpoint of a private property economy, the ‘gift’ is deemed to be ‘free’
because we obtain it free of charge, at no cost. But in the gift economy, gifts are not free.
The essence of the gift is that it creates a set of relationships. The currency of a gift
economy is, at its root, reciprocity. In Western thinking, private land is understood to be a
‘bundle of rights,’ whereas in a gift economy property has a ‘bundle of responsibilities’
attached. 258
Unlike in liberal legal orders, in Anishinaabe legal orders, the value of the gift is based on
reciprocity.259 Reciprocity means reciprocating giftedness to others in our life: one gives their
gift to the next person knowing that through mutual aid, the gift will return, 260 just like it did to
Bear in Johnston’s story. This is the fundamental nature of giftedness: gifts move, and as they
move, their value increases. 261 In explaining giftedness, Kimmerer also uses berries, writing
about removing liberal logic from one’s mind when exploring another’s language of law:
The fields made a gift of berries to us and we make a gift to [others]. The more
something is shared, the greater its value becomes. This is hard to grasp for societies
steeped in notions of private property, where others are, by definition, excluded from
sharing. Practices such as posting land against trespass, for example, are expected and
accepted in a property economy but are unacceptable in an economy where land is seen
as a gift to all.262
Strawberries, as part of creation, are a gift that creates an economy of reciprocity and gratitude,
and also of sharing and caring for our kin. It is this human perception of the world, the
consciousness, which makes creation – the world or the berries – a gift.263 To bring this all back
to Bear’s bowl of berries, in a mutual aid society, Bear’s bowl remains full “for the reason that
gifts begets gratitude, which begets thanksgiving and reciprocation: return gift”. 264 The word
thanksgiving is not to be confused with the Canadian holiday. To put all three forms of language
together, thanksgiving as the first form of language is to be understood as the Anishinaabemowin
word miigwetch, which “is literally an acknowledgement of a gift, linguistically situating one
within the analytic”.265 Thanksgiving, as the second form of language, may be a story told by an
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Elder about why thanksgiving occurs, such as the story of bear. Thanksgiving, as the third form
of language, may be the law of giftedness.
Bear Speaks all Three Languages
I want to take the analysis of the three forms to a deeper level than I did for the word
thanksgiving by revisiting once more the story of Bear and her berries 266 (before I do this,
however, I remind you that I am still a student of Anishinaabemowin, and therefore, this is an
engagement with my learning of language and grammar, stories, and laws). My understanding of
language and grammars allows me to understand and accept why Bear is animate, allowing me to
see that “Bear gave one berry to each of his neighbours” and not question it in a liberal logic
way. I am also able to deduce that “every insect, bird, animal and fish” are also creatures of
animacy and beings with personhood without the storyteller having to stop and explain this to
me. Understanding what stories in Anishinaabe legal orders mean, I can see this story of Bear
and know it is not folklore or mythology. I can understand that within this story, laws may be
present and therefore are actively being shared with me, such as giftedness. I also know I cannot
compare this story to, or attempt to understand it through, Canadian law or the English language,
no matter the symmetry that may be present. Because of the first two forms, I am able to engage
with the principles in this story as well through the third form. As Mills explained, the
Anishinaabe constitutional principles of this story relates to giftedness and mutual aid. I can
apply this principle to my everyday life, as well as apply it to a legal problem that warrants
giftedness and mutual aid as legal principles.
These three forms of language are essential for outlining my understandings and abilities
to engage with Anishinaabe legal orders, but also for understanding the incommensurability of
Anishinaabe and colonial law. In all three forms of language, I can see just how different the
language of law is: trees have personhood vs natural resources are objects; stories convey legal
principles vs the evidence against Johnny; giftedness vs property. These three forms of language
may not translate to different Indigenous languages, just as Italian does not translate to
Anishinaabemowin or English.

If you have been wondering why I refer to Bear as she/her and not he/him like Basil Johnston does in his telling
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by Jill Doerfler, Niigaanwewidamm James Sinclair and Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark, Michigan State University at
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Three: Indinawemaaganidog – all my relations
Brothers and Sisters Everywhere
In this chapter, I will further explore the Anishinaabe principles of kinship and mutual aid, along
with how such principles relate to governance structures and decision-making. My focus on
kinship is two-fold: first, it is a foundational principle in Anishinaabe legal orders and lifeways
and therefore warrants detailed discussion. Second, kinship is one of the teachings I hold close to
my heart and was taught at every stage of my life. Growing up with mixed ancestry meant
learning values and morals from a mix of Italian and Indigenous teachings. As a product of
colonization, my mother was not able to raise me and my sisters with many teachings and stories
of her ancestors. However, the few she did have ended up having the most influence over us;
especially kinship. The way she taught us kinship and the responsibilities attached was through
being a good sister. No matter what we did growing up, the teaching was always the same: treat
your sister with respect and love. Being a good sister did not just stop at my blood siblings: it
extended to family and friends, our pets, the plants growing in our garden, and the trees in our
backyard. You have sisters everywhere, she would say.
Sakej Henderson writes that “the Aboriginal order of kinship implies a distinct form of
responsibilities. Everyone has the responsibility to give and receive according to his or her
choices and gifts”. 267 For my mother, this was instilling in us that we each had our own gifts that
allowed us to help, teach and support the other, and with our gifts come responsibilities. Kinship,
therefore, is an integral part of Anishinaabe lifeways and legal orders, meaning it is also an
integral part of Anishinaabe governance structures and decision-making. Kinship relationships
and responsibilities can be found in doodem, 268 the clan system, which has been used by many
Anishinaabe Nations for centuries and continues to be an integral part of Anishinaabe
governance. The multilayered importance of doodem and kinship in Anishinaabe legal orders
and lifeways, both historically and currently, as will be explored in this chapter affords it an
important role in changing the understanding on the law of consultation as the duty to consult
James (Sákéj) Youngblood Henderson, “Sui Generis and Treaty Citizenship” (2002) 4:6 Citizenship Studies, 415
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and accommodate deals specifically with development of land, and through consultation,
decisions are made about the project. Without doodem, an exploration of how many Anishinaabe
Nations make decisions would be incomplete as many communities have, and still do, use
doodem. Moreover, without doodem influencing development decision-making processes, the
process of consultation will continue to be that of colonial understandings.
Furthermore, doodem and its ties to kinship is an integral part of understanding
Anishinaabe identity broadly. Doodem, as will be argued, links kinship to mutual aid and
giftedness, as well as to how one may identify with the world and the laws which govern it.
Doodem can therefore shape life in all aspects, from language to stories, creation to being, and
governance to law. In principle, doodem kinship influences how one lives within creation,
inclusive of language and actions. Doodem is a reminder that we have brothers and sisters
everywhere, that they are all our relations, and that we have the responsibility to share our gifts
with other beings. As Aaron Mills explains, our gifts take the form of “general responsibilit[ies]
for how to be-with the land while using it”, and that these responsibilities are “internal to a
particular set of relationships”.269 This chapter will explore doodem in a few ways: doodem as
identity; how doodem has foundations in kinship; and how doodem is a foundation of
governance and decision-making, all to demonstrate the integral importance of doodem in and its
principles and how they can be integrated into Anishinaabe understandings of the duty.
Doodem as it Shapes Anishinaabe Identity
Doodem is rooted in many aspects of Anishinaabe legal orders and lifeways, including that of
identity. Lindsay Keegitah Borrows writes that “One’s dodem, usually an animal, is a nurturer
with life-giving properties”. 270 She explains that the de in doodem “shows how our relations can
centre our hearts while the do nourishes us. Humans and nonhumans are part of the same
community and, as such, we have mutual obligations to sustain one another”. 271 The connection
between animals and humans is one of inter-dependence “where humans are dependent upon
animals and other ensouled life”. 272 Jerry Fontaine talks about the origin of the word doodem,
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explaining that the word derives “from the root ‘de,’ meaning ‘heart’ or ‘centre’”, and that,
“Simply stated, [doodem is] about our connectedness … The clan is therefore accepted as the
centre of identity/responsibility and the drum is the heartbeat and/or the centre of the nation”. 273
Doodem, therefore, defined “Every social, political, economic, military and spiritual element of
Anishinaabe life” including values, beliefs, and worldviews. 274 Doodem is viewed as “the
Creator’s gift [to the Anishinaabe] and that creation gave each of us certain responsibilities”. 275
Understanding the natural world as kin, as brothers and sisters, was such a critical piece
to Anishinaabe law and cultural identity historically that the Anishinaabeg included them in
almost all of their stories. 276 Within aadizookaanag the origins of doodem and the kinship
relationship between humans and non-humans can be found. As Darlene Johnston explains, the
soul of one’s Nation is the soul of their doodem. 277 For the Anishinaabeg, living beings have
souls, 278 and therefore, have personhood. That is why many Anishinaabeg represent themselves
as their individual doodem. For Johnston’s great-great-grandfather, this meant representing
himself as an Otter. 279 The Anishinaabe kinship relationship to non-humans also attaches itself to
the land. As Johnston explains, for the Anishinaabeg of the Great Lakes, “the Great Lakes region
is more than geography. It is a spiritual landscape formed by and embedded with the regenerative
potential of the First Ones who gave it form”. 280 The ‘First Ones’ are the original doodem
animals from aadizookaanag, and such stories importantly create a sense of belonging to kin and
landscape, while emphasizing the “fundamental importance of gift exchange and reciprocity”. 281
Doodem is part of Lindsay Keegitah Borrows’ version of the Anishinaabe Creation Story
that she tells in “Otter’s Journey Through Indigenous Language and Law”. In her telling, there
was a great flood that resulted in the land, animals and humans being submerged in water.282 The
animals who could swim or fly were all that survived, and they had grown tired and were starting
to long for Mother Earth. 283 The animals all gathered in a council to discuss how to bring back
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the land.284 Some volunteered to swim down to the bottom of the water to bring back soil, but
they all failed, that is, until the little muskrat, wazhashk, tried. 285 While the little muskrat was
under the water, all the animals worried and waited; it took a long time, but finally she floated up
to the surface, clenching life-saving soil in her little paw. 286 Borrows’ retelling of the creation
story goes on to tell how humans, and therefore doodem, came to be:
A great mountain had grown where Wazhashk was buried. There were large hunting
grounds and beautiful waters, plentiful with food. But despite the animals’ general wellbeing, they felt that something was missing – what, they did not know ... Kichi Waaboz,
who was in charge of propagating the creations of the earth, went around the Great Lakes
to ensure the animals’ needs were fulfilled … He took the asemaa (tobacco) for an
offering and pushed through the pine curtains. Beyond this green veil was the woods, the
place to ask Gizhe-Manido what was needed ... At the edge of the forest, he found
singular corpses of the owaazisii (bullhead), ajijaak (crane), an’aawenh (pintail duck),
makwa (bear), and mooz (moose). Kichi Waaboz summoned the powers of the
manidowag (spirits). From these corpses arose the first humans. We come from the
animals, and we share our sounds, our hearts. Dodem. 287
While there are many other Anishinaabe scholars who have recounted aadizookaanag on
doodem, 288 much of the earliest historical documentation come from early European writers,
such as William Warren. Warren wrote that “the doodem tradition is itself a gift to the
Anishinabek and, as a gift, it creates an obligation between humans and other-than-human beings
of the same doodem to share resources and to assist one another as kin should do”. 289 Doodem
promoted the cooperation of different Anishinaabe societies as well as their integrative
organization, allowing not only for a personal identity and gifts, but also created a responsibility
to aid other doodemag. Again, we see giftedness, an integral piece of Anishinaabe legal orders
and lifeways, being rooted in doodem.
Nicolas Perrot is another European who documented doodem. Perrot’s account of
doodem is important to analyze as it brings up two crucial points: “first, that the Anishinabek
constituted their governments as doodemag beings who met in council, and second, that specific
284
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doodem beings took on responsibility for particular places in the Great Lakes region”.290 Perrot’s
writing of doodem comes from an Anishinaabe re-creation story that, similar to Borrows’ from
above, followed a flood. 291 In Perrot’s account, “The animals were gathered on a great wooden
raft as it floated on a vast body of water, with no land in sight”.292 Nanabozhoo, a prominent
character in many Anishinaabe stories, is the Great Hare, and is “described as the leader of the
animals”. 293 Great Hare proceeds to ask the animals to dive off the raft and swim to the bottom
of the sea to retrieve a grain of sand.294 Alike to the version Borrows tell, it was the muskrat who
succeeded. 295 Perrot writes that Nanabozhoo took the sand from the muskrat and,
Let it fall upon the raft, when it began to increase; then he took a part of it, and scattered
this about which caused the mass of soil to grow larger and larger … As soon as he
thought it was large enough, he ordered the fox to go to inspect his work, with power to
enlarge it still more; and the [fox] obeyed … After the creation of the earth, all the other
animals withdrew into the places which each kind found most suitable for obtaining
therein their pasture or their prey.296
Perrot recognized that while the first beings of creation were not human, they were still
considered persons, and wrote that these First Ones had laws, governments, and a decisionmaking structure.297 Great Hare was a leader, and as a leader, “he called a council of all beings to
discuss what course of action should be taken to provide land for them and who should take on
the responsibility of trying to acquire the sand”.298 Perrot recognized that these animal beings
had souls which could be passed to subsequent generations of related beings, 299 writing that
“When the first ones died, the Great Hare caused the birth of men from their corpses … [the
Anishinaabe] derive their origin from a bear, others from a moose, and others similarly from
various kinds of animals”.300 In Darlene Johnston’s examination of Perrot’s account of
doodem 301 she explains the focus on Great Hare gives the reader a lot of information about
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Anishinaabe notions of leadership, decision-making, and land. 302 Great Hare, as a chief of the
animals, does not embody the leadership traits that we see in historic European leaders; “he is
not despotic. His authority depends upon persuasion, not coercion”. 303 Instead, Great Hare
demonstrated cooperation and bravery, and the decision to create land was for mutual
sustenance, not Hare’s personal gain.304 Perrot’s account of doodem demonstrates that the first
non-animal human beings understood that they were descendants from the animals who were the
First One, 305 and that the actions of Great Hare and the other animals were critical not only to
their creation, but their survival. Perrot’s writings also connect each different doodem to a
distinct territory, as each animal ancestor “withdrew into the places which each kind found most
suitable”. 306 This has translated to a responsibility to and for the land where the doodem was
born,307 and the early Europeans understood this connection to land so well that they even
compared it to their own familial traditions of Coat of Arms.308
Jerry Fontaine explains that doodem was created to “respect the order of creation,
including those that flew and swam and those that crawled and walked”. 309 The order of creation
from Basil Johnston’s version of the Anishinaabe Creation Story places humans “last in the order
of creation, least in the order of dependence, and the weakest in bodily powers”.310 In Perrot’s
account, humans came from the bodies of the animals, relating to animal’s place in order of
creation. As Fontaine writes, because of the order of creation, “a world without animals would
have been unimaginable. There wouldn’t be order as we know it and the world wouldn’t have
made any sense”. 311 Historically and presently, the way in which the Anishinaabe govern
themselves reflects this order of creation and dependence on their animal older brothers, 312 even
if the stories doodem comes from differ. In his book, “Our Hearts Are as One Fire”, Fontaine
shares his story of how doodem began:
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At our beginning, the animals helped by nourishing newborn infants with fruits,
vegetable, berries and drink, while the birds and butterflies brought joy. The bear who
loves the newborn beings offered his flesh so that Anishinaabeg would survive.
Following the example of the bear, the deer, moose, porcupine, beaver, groundhog,
grouse and goose and almost every other animal offered himself/herself for the wellbeing of their human brothers and sisters. 313
The animals both possessed and reflected characters which were respected, therefore becoming
the animals of the clan system. 314 The crane was the leader; the loon represented fidelity; the
bear, strength and courage; the marten, guardianship; the fish had a gift for teaching; the birds
were spiritual leaders; and the deer the grace of poets and artists. 315 These animals, their
characteristics, and the doodem they represented get at what Fontaine calls “humanity’s five
basic individual and social needs”: leadership, protection, sustenance, learning, and physical
well-being. 316 Further, doodem was an “incredible system of social order and structure [that] was
one of the original laws of creation, which came to represent life itself”. 317
With governance comes decision-making processes of any society or civilization, and this
is no different for the Anishinaabeg. As stated above, doodem was such a critical piece of
Anishinaabe life prior to colonization that early Europeans knew it was necessary to work with
the doodem because of its “political, economic, social and military influence”, as well as the fact
that Anishinaabe “society was governed by specific protocols and responsibilities” which the
doodem encompassed. 318 As Heidi Bohaker explains, when Anishinaabe leaders met to make
decisions “they brought the specific knowledge and attributes of their doodem beings with
them”. 319 Doodem “informed both governance practices and decision-making” 320 as well as
leadership and councils, which all relate to Anishinaabe legal orders.321 The specific knowledge,
attributes, and relationality doodem creates through kinship are key to understanding how
doodem operates within governance. Therefore, I will now expand on mutual aid and kinship.
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Doodem has Foundations in Kinship
In Chapter Two, I explored Mills’ discussion on mutual aid and kinship, most notably in the
story about Bear’s bowl of berries. In this part of Mills’ dissertation, what kinship and mutual aid
are, and how they relate not only to each other, but Anishinaabe constitutionalism and life –
specifically as it translates in community – is explored in depth. The driving themes regarding
kinship which can be pulled from Mills’ argument are dependence, responsibility and
connectedness. As Mills explains, these themes can also be called mutual aid, reciprocity and
giftedness. Mills explains that mutual aid “is structured into the lives of community members
through kinship”, 322 which he explored in Basil Johnston’s story about Bear and her bowl of
berries: “Thus the bowl, in a mutual aid society, remains full for the reason that gifts beget
gratitude, which begets thanksgiving and reciprocation: return gift”. 323
Mills’ exploration of the positive analytic of mutual aid, reciprocity and giftedness in
community as well as with the natural world is an important piece to understanding kinship and
how it relates in different aspects of Anishinaabe legal orders, lifeways and governance, but so is
his other form of mutual aid. This other form is the negative analytic. Instead of gift  gratitude
 reciprocity324, which we explored in Chapter Two, Mills’ negative analytic formulation of
mutual aid is need  responsibility  reciprocity. 325 As he explains, in the negative
formulation, a need “is met with a sense of responsibility to the needs-bearer, which in turn gives
way to beneficent action”.326 Mills uses another one of Basil Johnston’s Anishinaabe stories to
demonstrate this: in this story, a young boy yearns for a gift and “struggled to recognize when his
gift (a water lily) came, and how to act responsibly in respect of it”. 327 The young boy finally
does recognize the water lily as a gift, then, “[he] takes it, uses it, and heals his grandmother’s
illness” with the water lily.328 Months later, the young boy says to his grandmother:
‘No’okomiss, the flower gift that I received; it was really meant for you, wasn’t it?’
‘In a way it is. But it was meant for everybody. But that’s the way all human gifts are’. 329
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This notion of responsibility takes a new meaning in the negative formulation of mutual aid,
meaning benefiting others with your gift, not just yourself.330 The possession of gifts becomes
coupled with a responsibility to use the gift “for the benefit of all”.331 What this translates to is
instead of beings coming to Bear asking for berries, the boy goes to his grandmother with his gift
of the lily. In both forms, however, there is a responsibility to share the gift. Whatever the gift
may be, how one distributes the gift is articulated through their kinship relationships: “claims
within indigenous legal systems are to be construed as responsibilities, which are necessarily
embedded within kinship”.332 The structure of relationality which forms mutual aid “is kinship,
which places familial assignations upon, and thus relations between, radically interdependent
persons”. 333 The organization of kinship implies specific responsibilities attached to the
relationships: relationships are formed through kinship ties; responsibilities are dependent on the
gifts and choices we make as well as the relationship we have with other beings. 334 Therefore,
kinship is both the formal and substantive system of categorization in which one’s relationships
and responsibilities are distributed.335
Mills categorizes kinship as a constitutional structure within the Anishinaabe legal
system, while mutual aid is a constitutional logic,336 meaning mutual aid is achieved through
kinship. 337 Kinship then, as the structure of mutual aid, “sets out the relationships through which
community members present and receive their gifts and needs”, much of which happens through
kinship roles, such as older and younger sister. 338 Mills explains that each kinship role or
relationship “specifies the mutual aid analytic in a particular way” as the different kinship role is
shaped by gratitude and reciprocity, and how “responsibility shape[s] reciprocity may vary
considerably” between kinship roles. 339 Mills uses the example of brother/sister kinship
relationship in explaining how the relationship changes responsibility. He explains that the
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brother/sister relationships serve “as a kinship ideal, establishing a close connection, allowing for
significant flexibility in the scale and the flow of give and take”. 340 This differs, he writes, from
the father kinship relationship as “fathers bear responsibility for meeting the needs of their
children and partners”.341 The sibling kinship relationship, which is the relationship I know best,
is rooted in looking to the other for aid,342 and because the sibling relationship can transcend
beyond blood siblings to a number of different contexts, such as members of the same clan,
“almost anywhere she travels, an Anishinaabekwe can find the level of support she’d receive
from a sibling; she need only find someone who shares her clan”. 343
In the positive analytic, because my older sister has different gifts than I do, I seek her
out when the aid I need falls within her giftedness. As my older sister, she has the responsibility
to share that gift with me. If we take this example to the negative analytic, I know that when I
have the gift which would benefit my sister, I go to her with my gift in the same way the boy did
with his lily. Mills speaks to brother/sister relationships transcending blood relations: you have
sisters everywhere. The clan relationships and identities he speaks of, which are found in
doodem, establish a brother/sister relationship even across differences in regions and “even
amongst persons from distinct ethnonational groups”, 344 which was present in Warren’s writing
that kinship created an obligation between doodemag to share resources and aid one another “as
kin should do”.345 The kinship relationship of doodem comes down to an Anishinaabemowin
word: indinawemaaganidog, meaning ‘all my relations’. 346 Indinawemaaganidog “refers to
everyone, not just to humans. I’m to consider animals and spirits, too, as my relatives”.347 The
word comes from the root animate noun inawemaagan, a relative, a kinsman. Kinship is
described, then, as meaning a relationship which extends “to the air, the animals and the
water”. 348 This notion of kinship extending to non-human beings of creation can be found within
other Indigenous Nations. As Stan McKay, a Fish River Cree writes,
Indigenous Spirituality from around the world is centred on the notion of our relationship
to the whole creation. We call the earth “our mother.” The animals are “our brothers and
340
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sisters.” Even what biologists describe as inanimate, we call our relatives. This calling of
creation into our family is a metaphorical construction that describes the relationship of
love and faithfulness between human persons and creation. Our identity as creatures in
the creation cannot be expressed without talking about the rest of creation.349
Through an Anishinaabe-specific understanding of kinship, I can explain why “we receive gifts
through our relationships with non-humans, rather than resources by extracting from things”, 350
which we see in the colonial worldview. This distinction is key: it demonstrates the
incommensurability between the world as a gift and the world as a resource: giftedness vs
Lockean theories on property; mutual aid vs legal positivism.
The kinship relationship between humans and animals stems from the human
dependence on animal beings as our kin or elder brothers, 351 extending the kinship relationship
of brother/sister to another level of transcendence: no longer is it just your blood sibling and the
sibling of another doodemag, but also the original First Ones we are connected to. This
relationship can be categorized in three fundamental ways: physically as food; as providers of
tools and clothing; and as giving “knowledge of the world, life and himself”. 352 The third
fundamental way – giving knowledge – comes from animals having “a unique capacity to sense
the changes of the world, the alternations of the seasons, and the coming state of things. Man
does not have the preknowledge possessed by bluebirds or trout, or squirrel. For man to prepare,
he looked to his elder brothers”. 353 Johnston gives the example of eagles, geese and robins: these
birds know “of the advent of autumn” and therefore go south for the winter. 354 Humans do not
have the sense to know when autumn is coming in the same way these birds do, therefore
humans look to their brother and sister eagles, geese and robins to know when to prepare for
autumn. The same way we look to our human kin for advice, we also look to our nonhuman kin.
Each have gifts that are shared for the benefit of the other.
Basil Johnston’s three fundamental categorizations of relationship to non-human beings
brings doodem kinship out of aadizookaanag and into everyday life. With the passing of each
season, the gifts and responsibilities of different beings are needed, and therefore, are given,
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whether through the positive or negative formulation of mutual aid; we either seek out the being
and ask for their gift or are given the gift by the being. For example, in the summer, we may seek
out the strawberry plant and ask for her gift of the heart berry, while in the fall, the geese tell us
of their gift. The gift can have different forms. For the geese, it can be the preknowledge of the
autumn, but it can also be their bodies for food and materials. The same is true of doodem: the
gift of a being can take different forms. Fish, for example, are a doodem but also a staple
traditional food. 355 In Mississauga territory, the people of the fish doodem are considered the
intellectuals of the Nations. The fish doodem of the different Nations meet twice a year to “tend
to their treaty relationships, and renew life just as the Gizhe-mnido had instructed them”.356
Simpson explains that these gatherings held at Mnjikaning – the small narrows between Lake
Couchiching and Lake Simcoe – were extremely important because “the fish nations sustained
the Nishnaabeg Nation during times when other sources of food were scare … Our relationship
with the fish nations meant that we had to be accountable for how we used this ‘resource’”.357
This example of fish doodem meeting at the small narrow between the two lakes reflects
much of what I have been speaking about thus far. First, it is an example of the attributes and
gifts a fish doodem has. It also demonstrates how different peoples of the same doodem have a
responsibility to other doodemag inside and outside their own Nation. It shows the gifts the fish
gives its human relations, while also showing how doodem relates to location and landscape. The
fish doodem meeting at a spot between two Lakes is not inconsequential: fish, as beings of water,
correspond to the human fish doodem which have responsibility over the waters of their doodem.
As a meeting place for different fish doodem, the narrows of two Lakes which sustain the
Anishinaabeg of the region is quite telling. You have doodem of different Nations meeting
together as one doodem at a location of significance to their individual Nations, but also of
significance to their Nations as a part of broader Anishinaabe society. It is also a place where the
fish move between the two lakes. Doodem, therefore, as a structure of kinship allows for
identity, security, decision-making, leadership, and a keeping of peoples on a personal and
community level. It reinforces the Great Laws of Nature from the creation stories, and the
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importance of respecting the nature and beings which came before us, all of which are rooted in
the principles of mutual aid, kinship, and giftedness.
As Mills argues, through both the positive and negative formulations of mutual aid,
kinship “sets up rooted community as an open and contingent circle of relationships, placing
extraordinary emphasis on individual agency … [consisting] in ongoing, dynamic practices of
relationality”. 358 This all naturally extends to governance, not only of a community or Nation,
but of the self. One’s doodem, such as fish, give them an identity that relates to their gifts and
attributes that they can then find in other Nations and communities. It also gives one an identity
within their own community, such as being an intellectual. As we will see in this next section,
the identity of doodem in relation to governance was and remains almost inseparable from the
personal identity of doodem for many Anishinaabe Nations.
I recognize that coming from Canada’s governance tradition, having an identity in law
and governance in such a way may seem foreign. You may not have been raised with the notion
that your personal gifts have any relation to governance and decision-making unless you chose to
pursue positions of government. This is because government in the liberal worldview does not
start with the self: it starts with the institution and the notions of positions of power and
influence; positions that are incommensurable to Anishinaabe governances. And because power
and influence inform decision-making in these governance structures, the notion that decisionmaking is the work of the community, and not that of the upper positions of governance, may
also seem foreign. However, as I have explored in the chapters thus far, the colonial
understandings of law and governance are foreign in relation to Indigenous understandings
because, on the most basic of levels, they are formulated with opposing beliefs. Therefore, to
understand doodem as governance and decision-making, I invite you to remove your colonial
understandings once again of what makes up law, governance, and decision-making, so to
understanding them through kinship, giftedness, and mutual aid.
Doodem/Kinship as a Foundation of Governance
In this section, I will explore how doodem, rooted in kinship, is specifically linked to the
governance structures of many Anishinaabeg peoples and Nations. Leanne Simpson writes that
for the Anishinaabeg,
358
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There was a belief that good governance and political relationships begin with individuals
and how they relate to each other in families …In a real sense for the Nishnaabeg,
relating to one’s immediate family, the land, the members of their clan, and their relations
in the nonhuman world in a good way was the foundation of good governance in a
collective sense. 359
The result of what Simpson argues is that one is self-governing “if and only if I live responsibly
as a son, brother, cousin, father, uncle, and so on: in relation with my community members”. 360
Mills writes that he can achieve this state of relationality that Simpson writes about coming from
kinship and mutual aid when he exercises a careful judgement that “accords with what my legal
traditions have taught me, with how my lifeway informs them, with how my lifeworld has
shaped it, and finally, with how that lifeworld is grounded in earth”. 361 How this relationality to
kinship and mutual aid, and therefore also doodem, connect to what Mills calls the earthway:
“[it] is the deeper reason why, in a rooted legality, it’s appropriate to speak of the legitimacy of
governance in terms of the grounding of law”. 362 Anishinaabe rooted legality is the process of
careful decision-making demonstrated through “communal Anishinaabe self-governance context:
zagasawe’idiwin, the council, convened for the most serious of matters”. 363 Mills’ exploration of
zagasawe’idiwin is rooted in a legality and governance structure of doodem, and therefore
kinship and mutual aid. While he only speaks to the clan system briefly, as we see from other
Anishinaabe scholars, kinship can be doodem and vice versa.
Darlene Johnston writes about the symbolism of representing one’s doodem, and that for
her great-great-grandfather, that was drawing his Otter doodem. 364 This drawing would have
represented his identity as an Otter doodem, encompassing “his chiefly capacity, his tribal
identity, [and] simply his personal signature”.365 In her book “Doodem and Council Fire” Heidi
Bohaker explains that doodem images were used as signatures by Anishinaabe leaders, such as
Johnston’s ancestor, on treaties, petitions and letters in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. 366 To a non-Indigenous – or even non-Anishinaabe – person, these images may read
nothing more than the image of a plant, an animal, or a mythical creature; however, these images
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were so much more, written by leaders on documents “pertaining to their lands, at councils held
on those lands, reflecting the decisions of those councils”. 367 These images were expressions of
Anishinaabe law that represented kinship 368 and date back far longer than their use on treaties. 369
The symbolism of doodem drawing on political documentation is telling of how closely tied one
was to their doodem identity in governance, but it is important to remember that the drawing of
doodem, and therefore its symbolism, did not start and end with political documentation: visual
doodem pictographs date back far longer than European-Anishinaabe treaty making. Louise
Erdrich writes about doodem pictographs and rock paintings, explaining that rock paintings in
the Lake of the Woods area of northern Ontario cannot be accurately dated;370 that is how old the
tradition of doodem is. As she explains, some rock paintings in this area of Ontario are hundreds
of years old while others are thousands. 371 Regardless of their age, Erdrich says that the paintings
are alive.372 Bohaker supports this understanding, explaining that for the Anishinaabe, the land
and waters are “simultaneously spiritual and physical spaces”. 373 In the Lake of the Woods, these
rock paintings are not just historical or “pointer signs. They hold far more significance. They
refer to a spiritual geography and are meant to provide teaching[s]”.374
The significance of doodem as rock paintings and signatures both point to the importance
of doodem in Anishinaabe life and governance, supporting Fontaine’s argument that nothing in
Anishinaabe life or law and governance operated without it. By consciously representing oneself
as one’s doodem in a myriad of mediums, Anishinaabeg are “clearly articulating the centrality of
doodem to their system of government and were tying that identity to the lands”.375 This relates
also to the doodem choices for leadership; the Anishinaabe drew metaphors for leaders from
their doodems “of all sizes and shapes”. 376 While strength and size of the being, such as the bear,
makes it an obvious choice for leadership, smaller animals, such as the northern clear water
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crayfish, are also choices for leadership as it “is an assertive defender of its territory”. 377 Edward
Benton-Banai explains that each doodem “was given a function to serve for the people”,378
meaning each doodem allowed for connection to identity, character, life choices, and how one
identifies with place and political roles. 379 For some Anishinaabe communities, 380 this could
mean that the Bear doodem are protectors who are likely to take up occupations centered on
protection,381 while Cranes and Loons may take up roles of leadership and politics. 382 Doodem
leaders were expected to lead discussions and debates related to their giftedness in the
community where elders, women, men, and youth would all have an opportunity to participate in
the discussions and decision-making process. 383 This focus on consensus and a decentralized
political power ensured there was equality within the doodem/clan, community, and broader
Anishinaabe nation. 384 The concept of alliance between different doodemag is a grounding
foundation of Anishinaabe governance and a “lived expression of the interdependence of all
life”.385 The alliance of doodemag is an important part of doodem as it shows the reliance not
only on your own community’s doodem representatives but also those of other communities. The
Anishinaabe Council Fires, a “specific and long-standing deliberative bodies that were
constituted and recognized through and by other Anishinaabe councils to have responsibility for
the lands, waters, and peoples of a particular territory” 386 along with councils of women and
councils of young men are just two examples of the kinship ties doodem created and
sustained. 387

377

Ibid.
Edward Benton-Banai, The Mishomis Book: The Voice of the Ojibway (1979) at 74.
379
Bohaker, supra note 197 at 78.
380
Doodem and clan identities vary based on community, so note that the doodem identities listed here are not
necessarily that of all Anishinaabe communities. Doodem and clan vary historically and currently throughout
communities. Many scholars and writers, such as Edward Benton-Banai and Basil Johnston, have laid out doodemag
by social and governance functions, and even these vary slightly from the other. These examples are purely
examples and are by no means to say every community followed or follows these breakdowns of clan. Furthermore,
as will be explored later in this chapter, how doodemag were used historically can vary exponentially in modern day
communities, or may not. Depending on the Nation, their history and their laws, clan and doodem can vary from
something done in the past to something still strictly followed in all aspects of life and governance.
381
Bohaker, supra note 197 at 79.
382
Ibid at 79.
383
Fontaine, supra note 198 at 138.
384
Ibid at 138.
385
Bohaker, supra note 197 at xv.
386
Ibid at xvi.
387
Ibid.
378

61

I alluded to the incommensurability of governance structures and positions of power
between Anishinaabe and colonial systems earlier in this chapter. A key incommensurability
between the two is the Anishinaabe having multiple leaders. You may be thinking, but we have
multiple leaders in Canadian governance structures, each one representing different geographical
locations; how, then, is that an incommensurability? Perhaps the biggest difference is that within
one community there was no one leader; instead, there were different leaders from different
doodem. Again, you may be thinking about the breakdown of governance in Canada through
different ministries and their ministers, which is ideally broken down by people who have
expertise in certain areas. However, as I have stated throughout this thesis, the comparison
between colonial systems of governance and Indigenous structures is a continuation of settler
supremacy and violence, and this structure of governance is hierarchal in nature and
construction. Furthermore, as just explored, consensus and community-wide participation in
decision-making is a core foundation of governance, something not seen in Canada’s current
system. Moreover, as will now be explored, leadership in Anishinaabe legal orders has a very
different definition and description than in the colonial system.
Simpson explains that the division of responsibilities and expertise between different
doodemag “necessitated different leaders – as did the plurality of issues a family group, clan or
community might face”.388 The expertise one has through their gifts comes from a “combination
of authentic power, knowledge, experience and personal gifts or attributes as recognized by the
collective”. 389 Therefore, it is common for an Anishinaabe community to have more than one
leader. 390 Anishinaabe leaders exercise authority with his or her community members, not over
them. 391 This understanding of authority is vastly different than the Euro-centric understanding
of authority, as Anishinaabe governance authority is not that of accepting the concept of a
majority having the right to enforce a way of life. 392 Instead, it is based on consensus, decisionmaking for the greater good of community, and what Mills calls persuasive authority. 393
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Near the beginning of this chapter, I cited Darlene Johnston’s analysis of an early
European writer, Perrot, where she looks at the governance authority of Great Hare, arguing that
his authority was dependent on persuasion. 394 Persuasive authority is the opposite of the
European coercive authority, where one leader or branch of government has power over the
people and imposes this power through coercion. Coercive authority does not leave room for
consensus decision-making, while persuasive authority relies on it. Both Mills and Bohaker cite
an Anishinaabe writer from the 1800s, Peter Jones, in their description of Anishinaabe
governance structures, persuasion and consensus. An excerpt of Jones’ writings in his book,
History of the Ojebway Indians is worth noting. Jones writes:
The chiefs are the heads or fathers of their respective tribes; but their authority extends no
further than to their own body, while their influence depends much on their wisdom,
bravery, and hospitality. When they lack any of these qualities they fall proportionably
[sic] in the estimation of their people. It is, therefore, of importance that they should excel
in everything pertaining to the dignity of a chieftain, since they govern more by
persuasion than by coercion … They have scarcely any executive power, and can do but
little without the concurrence of the subordinate chiefs and principal men … they are
taught by their chiefs and wise men to observe a certain line of conduct, such as to be
kind and hospitable.395
Persuasive authority, at its core, works without resorting to coercion 396 and is done without
compulsion, allowing people to “follow freely and [be] at liberty to withdraw”. 397 Simpson
writes similarly about persuasive authority, explaining that eniigaanzid, which is the
Anishinaabemowin word for ‘the one to go first’, is a leadership style that is not authoritarian or
based on unilateral decision making, but instead based “on humility, emergence, collectivity in
decision making, sharing in the work and in action, and listening”. 398
To return to Anishinaabe leadership being that of a plurality adds yet another layer of
incommensurability, as not only did the Anishinaabeg not have an authoritative leader in the
sense of European standards, they often had more than one leader, all of whom had their own
expertise and gifts.399 In a liberal logic, a plurality of leaders may not make sense. However, as
Simpson argues, when leadership is continuously defined in terms of liberal and international
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politics, or as a simple statesman with coercive power, European understandings of leader are
privileged over those of the Anishinaabe. 400 This makes one question leadership in plurality due
to defining leadership through liberal and positivistic senses. This continuation of legal
positivism’s categories of legitimate law and governance, including Mills’ settler supremacy, is
damaging to Indigenous peoples, governance structures and ways of life, including how one
raises their children. Simpson explains that colonizers have always mistakenly interpreted
Anishinaabe parenting philosophies as “a ‘lack of parenting’ because of the absence of
punishment, coercion, manipulation, criticism, authoritarian power, and hierarchy”. 401 The list of
absences in parenting are the same absences in Anishinaabe governance. Therefore, the
mistaking of a lack of parenting also extends to mistakenly interpreting Anishinaabe governance
as being a ‘lack of governance’: there is a lack of coercion, singular authority and hierarchy. As
Simpson argues, Euro-centric views on governance and family structures were incommensurable
with Anishinaabe structures, as in Anishinaabeg societies, the parenting environment was one
that “created highly autonomous individuals that were also community-minded”. 402 Anishinaabe
child rearing therefore led to:
leaders that were able to build consensus by listening to people, leaders who were full of
humility, responsibility and respect, leaders who were willing to sacrifice on a personal
level for the betterment of the nation … leadership based on shared, not absolute power,
grounded in an authentic power rather than an authoritarian one; and it created
communities that were profoundly less authoritarian, less coercive and less hierarchal. 403
I find this line of argument extremely telling of the European views of Indigeneity in all forms,
as well as how these views have impacted traditional governance structures today. The Eurocentric view that Indigenous lifeways were invalid did not just stop at laws and governance
structures; it extended the same supremacy and violence to all aspects of life. If you are raised
knowing you have brothers and sisters everywhere, you may very well become an adult and
leader who instills this belief in your positions of responsibility, as well as how you raise your
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own children. To destroy one’s legal and governance structures, you have to start at the root: the
child. And as we know, that is what the colonial government did.404
In Mills’ dissertation, he cites a real-life example of this incommensurability from a 1695
congress with the Governor General of New France, where an Anishinaabe leader named
Chingouabé attempted to explain his community’s governance in contrast to the French systems.
Chingouabé says to the Governor General: “Father: It is not the same with us as with you. When
you command, all the French obey you and go to war. But I shall not be heeded and obeyed by
my nation in like manner. Therefore I cannot answer except for myself and those immediately
allied or related to me”.405 As a leader, Chingouabé could not command his peoples to obey him
and follow him to war; his leadership role was far more complex than that, and to be expected to
do such a thing is to be subject to European understandings of governance. As a leader, he had a
responsibility to his people, one that may have very well been influenced by his doodem, and
perhaps influenced further if his community had multiple leaders. Furthermore, Chingouabé
states that he can only answer for himself and those immediately allied or related, suggesting that
at most, he could only answer for his doodem members.
These differences in governance further enforced the European view that Indigenous
societies had no laws, governance structures, or parenting skills. The belief Indigenous societies
lacked governance was used by legal positivism to categorize Indigenous societies as primitive
and lawless. Even Perrot, whose writing on doodem origins was cited above in this chapter, is an
example of a European view on Anishinaabe governance. In his piece, “Savages of North
America”, Perrot wrote that “The savage does not know what it is to obey … The father does not
venture to exercise authority over his son, nor does the chief dare to give commands to his
soldier”. 406 Even with Perrot’s in-depth understanding of doodem, his worldview hindered him
from understanding that governance can occur without coercion. The same happens each time
one attempts to use liberal logic to categorize Indigenous legal orders in Euro-centric ways. By
doing so, the liberal logic forces society to honour the Euro-centric ways over the Indigenous, all
while continuing to inflict violence on Indigenous peoples.
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The Nibi Declaration – An Example of Anishinaabe Law and Governance
In this final section, I explore the Nibi Declaration of Treaty #3 as an example of Anishinaabe
legal orders creating ratified law. Aimée Craft and Lucas King write about the 2019 Nibi
Declaration of Treaty #3, explaining that the Nibi Declaration “voices the [Anishinaabeg]
relationship with water (Nibi) and jurisdictional responsibility that all Anishinaabe citizens have
within the Treaty #3 territory”, affirming the “responsibilities and relationships that others living
within the territory should have with the water and ensures that the spirit of Nibi is central to
decision-making and water governance”. 407 This modern-day use of Anishinaabe legal orders is
an example of how legal principles, such as mutual aid and kinship relationships, drives many
Anishinaabe legal orders and lifeways, as well as the ties of natural resource extraction to
Indigenous territory.408 In 1997, Treaty #3 Anishinaabe ratified the first written law of the
Anishinaabe Nation, Mother Earth Law. This legislation outlines the legal principles which guide
all decision-making and consultation in the territory that refers to natural resource
development. 409 In 2019, the Nibi Declaration was ratified, and as Craft and King explain, the
Nibi Declaration is an “affirmation of jurisdiction, based on Anishinaabe laws. Its purpose is to
give effect to the Manito Aki Inakonigaawin (MAI or Mother Earth Law) and to help advance the
watershed management planning in the Treaty #3 territory”.410 The Nibi Declaration provides a
“foundation for the development of a Watershed Management Plan” for the territory. 411 This
Plan is “rooted in Anishinaabe Law of Manito Aki Inakonigaawin … [and] is an exercise of
nationhood [ensuring] … the inclusion of Anishinaabe laws through the four-direction (North,
East, South, West) governance model of the Nation”. 412
Furthermore, the Nibi Declaration as a whole is an assertion of Nibi inaakonigewin –
water laws – and the “responsibilities for ongoing water management and governance …
connected to the MAI, which is the overarching legislation that guides the relationship with
Mother Earth for The Nation and for those who are proposing to impact the lands and waters
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within the territory”.413 Nibi inaakonigewin of the Treaty #3 Anishinaabe “is generated from
different sources” and each level of the law “is part of a set of concentric circles sourced in
spiritual law in the natural environment, as applied by other beings in Creation”. 414 Nibi
inaakonigewin “involved accepting responsibility in relation to our relatives”,415 forming
responsibilities to “themselves, others, the land, and all beings on the land”.416 Nibi
inaakonigewin is structured on kinship relationality and relationships “as opposed to rights and
obligations” and is a system of “reciprocity, where beings have a responsibility to one another
based on a variety of relationships that are intrinsically connected, reflecting kinship
structures”. 417 Furthermore, Nibi inaakonigewin instructs us that water is life – Nibi onje
biimaadiiziiwin: “Water gives and takes life; we are born of water and are primarily composed of
it. Our relationship with water is the most central and constant relationship in our human
lifetime. Water is also a living being, which relies on a web of relationships to be well and to
bring wellness to others”.418 Nibi, therefore, is “treated as an actor in a relationship” where
“Women have a special and distinct relationship to water” as well as a sacred responsibility to
Nibi, equating to women being included “in all decision-making relating to Nibi”. 419
Along with Anishinaabe law and relationality, the Nibi Declaration emphasises language.
As argued in Chapter Two, language is critical to understanding any legal order, and the Nibi
Declaration is a ratified example of this. As Craft and King write,
The consistent emphasis on language throughout the life of the project, its central
importance in the ceremonial aspects of the development of The Declaration, the equally
authoritative interpretation of the text in Anishinaabemowin and the ongoing discussions
on the transmission of knowledge and future educational curricula exemplifies the
important role that language has in both conceptualizing responsibility and articulating
concepts through an Anishinaabe lens. 420
Governance, of which is based on consensus building, often involves the meeting of difference
councils, as seen earlier in this chapter. The Nibi Declaration is no different: The Women’s
Council of Treaty #3 developed a purpose statement for the Declaration project titled, Aaniin
413
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Wengi iji chi ge’wiin – Why are we doing this – which outlined that the Nibi Declaration was to
be about “respect, love, and our sacred relationship with Nibi and the life that it brings”.421 This
sacred relationship with Nibi in Treaty #3 territory has been maintained since time immemorial
“through the exercise of sacred relationships and responsibilities, the Anishinaabe of the region
has worked to protect and respect the water throughout the territory [because] Water is life, and
it is the lifeblood of all Creation”.422 The use of Anishinaabe laws and governance for all
decision about Nibi and other parts of creation in the territory has always been a priority of
Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg. Craft and King explain that while the discourse in Canada has lately
progressed “to include references to various forms of traditional knowledge (TK) or Indigenous
knowledge (IK) and the protection of Aboriginal rights with respect to environmental decisionmaking and impacts on the exercise of constitutionally protected rights”, in practice, such an
implementation “has yet to be achieved in a meaningful way”.423 As the pair argues,
Governments and industries struggle with the application of Indigenous knowledge and
values to decision-making. Existing colonial and hierarchical structures based on
capitalist values continue to dominate over Indigenous-led decision-making … Decisionmaking authority has been stripped from Anishinaabe, and decisions are made to capture
a wide variety of interests, often privileging industry, tourism and recreational cottage use
of the lands and waters over the interests and authority of the Indigenous peoples. The
balancing of multiple (and at times conflicting) interests has resulted in the exclusion of
the values and jurisdiction inherently held by The Anishinaabe Nation of Treaty #3. 424
Moreover, Craft and King argue that Indigenous participation in decision-making through the
current consultation model “is not sufficient”.425 Indigenous jurisdiction and decision-making
authority is needed as it “recognizes Indigenous self-determination and environmental
management”. 426 The Nibi Declaration is an example of Anishinaabeg Nations jurisdictionally
asserting their legal orders while also stating an affirmation of “Indigenous jurisdiction over
water governance and management”. 427 Through the Nibi Declaration, the Anishinaabeg of
Treaty #3 are demonstrating that they are “not waiting for external validation or recognition” of
their laws and governance structures.428 The Nibi Declaration is the “vision for Grand Council
421

Ibid.
Ibid.
423
Ibid at 3.
424
Ibid.
425
Ibid at 4.
426
Ibid.
427
Ibid.
428
Ibid.
422

68

Treaty #3 to develop watershed management planning based on [their] inherent jurisdiction and
in order to reaffirm and assert Anishinaabe responsibilities as they relate to Nibi”429 and it brings
“forth the voice of The Anishinaabe Nation in relation to Nibi and the responsibilities and values
that will guide the protection and respect of Nibi for the future”. 430
I see the Nibi Declaration as an example of how the current consultation process is not
suited to making decisions about Nibi, and how Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg Nations have come
together to use their own laws and governance structures. Language is important for
understanding the Nibi Declaration, as well as the Anishinaabe lifeways of Treaty #3
Anishinaabeg. The Nibi Declaration also demonstrates how foundational kinship is to
Anishinaabe legal orders and governance structures in modern day. The Nibi Declaration is
rooted in kinship, as are the laws integrated, such as Nibi inaakonigewin, and is therefore an
example of an Anishinaabe legal order guided and defining a process, and something I will be
drawing from for my proposed understanding of an Anishinaabe consultation process.
As this thesis is about the duty to consult and accommodate, I must, at some point, talk
about it. At the outset of this thesis, I touched on the duty very briefly. Even in such a brief
introduction of the duty, one can see the laws and principles informing the process are purely
colonial ones. The current system takes the same legal principles and values which deny
Indigenous societies of having legal orders, and expects these legal principles to somehow have a
different outcome. Without an understanding of Indigenous legal orders through their own
meanings and laws, it is easy to continue to expect positive outcomes of the Canadian process,
which is why I have left this next chapter until now. I needed to explore not only the underlying
incommensurability of the systems, but I also needed to speak to my understanding of
Anishinaabe legal orders, principles, and languages on their own, as best I could. As explored in
this chapter, the foundation of kinship and mutual aid have remained within Anishinaabe legal
orders to this day, both in how one identifies with their community as well as how Anishinaabe
governances are structured. This can be seen on the most cursory level of symbolism, and on the
most intricate level of living with Anishinaabe laws. Yet even so, when implementing
Anishinaabe legal orders into a changed understanding of the duty to consult and accommodate,
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community specific systems will vary. Understanding that differences in Anishinaabe
communities exist is also why I left the duty to consult for so long.

Four: Aazhawaashi – it sails across by the winds
In this chapter I will be using Homer’s The Odyssey as a metaphor for the Canadian
jurisprudence on the duty to consult. As a natural storyteller, telling you the duty to consult
juxtaposed to one of the greatest stories ever told makes sense to me, as my writing of choice is
Greek Classics. I also see this storytelling as keeping true to my identity, which goes beyond
identifying, first and foremost, as a writer. As I shared with you, I have Italian heritage through
my father, and this is specifically of Calabria, the most southern Province of Italy (along with the
island of Sicily) which was once part of Greece Major prior to the Roman Empire. 431 While I
could draw on Roman mythology (which would make sense as my father is Italian and not
Greek), I offer Greek mythology in this chapter, specifically through the Greek poet, Homer, as
geographically, Calabria houses some of the Greek mythological sites mentioned in Homer’s The
Odyssey. 432 Also, as explored in Chapter Two, stories are an integral part of Anishinaabe legal
orders and lifeways, and are how I link myself to Bernice, my great-grandmother, who herself
was a writer. Storytelling is my gift, and as explored in Chapter Three, I therefore have a gift that
can be shared with you, my reader. The storytelling I am about to do in this chapter, then, is a
culmination of my identities and the legal orders which govern me: writer, Italian, Anishinaabe,
Anishinaabe legal orders, the Canadian legal order.

For more on the history of Italy, see the works of Neapolitan historian, Tommaso Astarita, Between Salt Water
and Holy Water: A History of Southern Italy, (2006) W.W. Norton & Company, New York. Calabria’s history is
fascinating to say the least. It has roots in the languages, cultures and ‘conquest’ of Latin, Greek, Byzantine,
Ottoman, Spanish, French and Napoleon, Norman, Roman Empire and Holy Roman Empire forces. The name
‘Calabria’ has language ties to Latin, Greek, Byzantine and even Hebrew languages. To keep things as simple as
possible, I say ‘Greece Major’ and refer only to the Roman Empire’s rule of Calabria here.
432
The version of Homer’s The Odyssey that I rely on is the Penguin Classics version as translated by E.V. Rieu and
D.C.H. Rieu, originally published in 1946, and published with revised translations in 1991 and 2003.
431
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Opening Pandora’s Box
I have come to refer to the duty to consult and accommodate as my Pandora’s Box: 433 a source of
great and unexpected troubles; something that I opened without knowing exactly what I was
getting myself into. 434 I first started working with the duty during my 1L summer job at Rama
First Nation. At this point, the duty still looked shiny, glittery, and full of positive potential. Ever
since 1L summer, I have been all-consumed by the duty to consult, the difference now is that the
duty is no longer shiny and positive; it is a Pandora’s Box: a deceiving jar435 filled with
unexpected troubles. The more I studied and worked with the duty over time, the more engulfed
in unexpected troubles I found myself. At the beginning, the idea of what the duty could hold
was positive, like a shimmering gold. Over the years, I would unlock the jar and attempt to fully
understand the duty, but stop and swiftly lock it back up. Over time, just like Pandora, I could
not hold back any longer and I leapt headfirst, opening the jar, and unleashing everything inside.
What hit me first were the troubles that the duty holds: the injustices of the process, the countless
court challenges by Indigenous communities, and the lack of Indigenous laws within the process.
The more I studied and worked, the more pain the jar unleashed on me. Eventually, overcome by
the contents, I slammed the lid shut. I had found only troubles in my jar and I was ready to walk
away for good. But then, my jar beckoned me to please, please, open just once more. There was
one last thing left inside both mine and Pandora’s jars: Hope. My once more was applying to
write this thesis. This thesis, then, is my Hope:
But the woman took the lid off the big jar with her hands
And scattered all the miseries that spell sorrow for men.
Only Hope was left there in the unbreakable container,
Stuck under the lip of the jar, and couldn’t fly out.436

For the myth of Pandora’s Box, see Hesiod, supra note 9, Theogony, Works and Days, “Why Life is Hard”, the
Myth of Pandora, composed originally in Greek in the 8th or 7th Century, B.C., as translated by S. Lombardo, in
Anthology of Classic Myth second edition, starting at page 164.
434
In Hesiod’s myth, Pandora is the first mortal woman, created to bring misery upon men, which occurs when she
opens, unbeknownst to her, a jar filled with diseases and despair. The Collins Dictionary defines the saying “open
Pandora’s box” as “If someone or something opens Pandora’s box or opens a Pandora’s box, they do something that
causes a lot of problems to appear that did not exist or were not known about before”. Accessed:
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/open-pandoras-box.
435
While the saying is ‘Pandora’s Box’, the actual ‘box’ Pandora opens is a jar. In Hesoid’s telling of the misery of
man in “Why Life is Hard”, Pandora opens a big jar, not a box. Where ‘jar’ got turned into ‘box’, I’m not sure.
436
An excerpt from Hesiod, supra note 10, Theogony, Works and Days, “Why Life is Hard”, the Myth of Pandora,
composed originally in Greek in the 8th or 7th Century, B.C., as translated by S. Lombardo, in Anthology of Classic
Myth second edition, page 164, lines 115 to 118.
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As I mentioned at the end of Chapter Three, this chapter will look at the Canadian understanding
of the duty to consult and accommodate. It will explore, in expanded detail, what the duty is in
Canadian jurisprudence, painting a picture of what the duty looks like. I have looked to the
incommensurability of the underlying principles of both legal orders and languages and started to
explore the laws and decision-making processes of my understanding of Anishinaabe legal
orders. Now, I will directly address the duty to consult. I will open Pandora’s Box once more and
tell you the tale of the duty to consult, for only once the jar is emptied can Hope escape: a
changed understanding of the duty informed fully by Anishinaabe legal orders.
The Tale of the Duty to Consult and Accommodate
Over the last few decades, the Canadian courts have recognized that the Canadian government
has a duty to consult and accommodate Indigenous peoples as a means of reconciling the
relationship between the Crown and Indigenous peoples. Through multiple court decisions since
the 1990s, the courts have begun outlining what the duty is, how it should look, and how it
shouldn’t look. But before any discussion can take place about the issues with the duty, I will
discuss what the duty is, as defined by the judiciary. Simply put in a few short sentences, the
duty to consult and accommodate is a legal and constitutional duty on the Crown to consult, and
where appropriate, accommodate Aboriginal Nations 437 when the Crown contemplates conduct
that may adversely impact potential or established Aboriginal or Treaty rights.438 This duty arises
out of the principle of the honour of the Crown, which requires the Crown to avoid any sharp
dealings with Aboriginal peoples.439 It is defined as both a constitutional and legal duty of the
Crown, 440 and includes federal and provincial/territorial Crowns. The constitutional part of the

A note on language: Indigenous is not a word recognized legally or constitutionally. Aboriginal and Indian are.
Aboriginal is a pan-term, as defined in the Constitution, which includes Indian (First Nation), Inuit and Métis
peoples. However, many Indigenous peoples find the word Aboriginal to be outdated, and therefore prefer
Indigenous as a pan-term, or First Nation when speaking pan about Indians. As the legal world has not defined
Indigenous, Aboriginal must be used in legal contexts. As a result, in this chapter I will use Aboriginal when
appropriate contextually, but revert back to Indigenous when possible. Furthermore, much case law uses the
wording “Aboriginal groups”. I have opted to not use “groups” under the wise advice of my supervisor, Karen
Drake, who has written about the connotation “group” takes when used by the Courts as opposed to words such as
Nations or peoples. Therefore, I will be using Nations or peoples where the Courts use groups. For more on this, see
her work: Karen Drake, “A Right Without a Rights-Holder is Hollow: Introduction to OHLJ’s Special Issue on
Identifying Rights-Bearing Aboriginal Peoples” (2020) Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Issue 1 Volume 57, Article 13.
438
See supra note 22, Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73.
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Ibid at para. 25.
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See Haida, supra note 22, R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483, at para. 6; and Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v
Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43, 2010 CarswellBC 2867 at para. 34.
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duty is grounded in the notion of the honour of the Crown, 441 which in turn, is protected under s
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. The legal part of the duty is based in the Crown’s claim of
sovereignty over the land and resources in Canada. 442 Furthermore, the duty to consult applies to
modern treaties, not just historical or numbered treaties. 443
Now, let me unpack all this: what the duty is; what the honour of the Crown is; what the
rights are which result in the duty being triggered; how the duty is fulfilled; and who fulfills the
duty. I will do this by looking at what the Canadian courts have said about all these pieces, and
how these holdings are interpreted. As parts of the duty are still being defined in courts, I will
also look at what is still outstanding in the duty to consult, such as free, prior and informed
consent and the implementation of The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples. The contents of my Pandora’s Box have a story of their own, so I will continue with the
Greek mythology metaphor and compare this to Homer’s great epic The Odyssey. Like Homer’s
Odyssey, which is the story of a man named Odysseus attempting to return home after the Trojan
War, 444 the tale of the duty to consult is years in the making. 445 Many stops have been made
which defined, in one way or another, what the duty is or is not, developing it over years of court
challenges. There are more challenges coming its way, so, like Odyssey’s wife Penelope 446
waiting years for the return of her husband, we still wait for the full picture of the duty to
consult, making the duty a process both judicially defined yet shifting with each decision. As an
Odyssey still unfinished, this is an unpacking of the duty to consult as is currently understood.
On the Sandy Shores of a Troy called Sparrow
We cannot talk about the duty to consult or The Odyssey without first looking to where much of
what we know about both all began. For The Odyssey, that is the sandy beaches of Troy as told

Ibid R v Kapp at para. 6.
Ibid at para. 53.
443
See Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation v Yukon (Director, Agriculture Branch, Department of Energy, Mines
& Resources), 2010 SCC 53.
444
The Trojan War is told in Homer’s The Iliad, which is the prelude to The Odyssey, depicting the Trojan War, the
famed fighter Achilles, and the story of the most beautiful woman in Greece, Helene of Sparta, who launched a
thousand ships.
445
Between The Iliad and The Odyssey, Odysseus is away from his island home of Ithaca for twenty years. See The
Odyssey Book XIX where “twenty years” away from home is referenced multiple times.
446
The Odyssey opens on Penelope, the wife of Odysseus, who has been waiting for her husband’s return from the
war. In the Penguin Classic’s version of The Odyssey, the introduction has a very helpful subsection which speaks to
each main character briefly. Penelope’s can be found in this version at page xxiii.
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in The Iliad;447 for the duty to consult, it is where Aboriginal rights began: R v Sparrow. In 1990,
the Supreme Court outlined the general principles that the Crown must comply with when an
Aboriginal right is to be infringed.448 The court held that the Constitution by virtue of s 35
enshrined Aboriginal rights, and therefore, interferences with the exercise of Aboriginal rights
must be justified.449 The court developed a test for the infringement and justification: first, the
test seeks to define whether the Aboriginal right has been infringed or not; second, the test seeks
to determine if the government activity which infringed the right is justified or not.450 The duty
to consult emerges in the justification test which requires that the Crown consult and inform the
affected Indigenous Nation of the activity that is to infringe their right.
Sparrow starts an important conversation about assumed Crown sovereignty, and
therefore, settler supremacy. In Sparrow, the court was “faced with the task of making sense of
Aboriginal rights in light of their entrenchment in the Constitution under section 35”.451 The
court, while acknowledging Aboriginal rights, held that such rights are not absolute as they
operate “to temper the authority of ‘unquestioned sovereignty’ of the Crown”. 452 The court came
to this decision by qualifying sovereignty through Constitutional rights: 453 “while British policy
towards the native population was based on respect for their right to occupy their traditional
The version of The Iliad I rely on is the Signet Classic’s version as translated by W.H.D Rouse, published
originally in 1996, and republished in 2015. For reference, Troy was a kingdom that had the same gods as the
Greeks (most notably Apollo) but was not part of Greece proper. Paris of Troy was tricked by the gods and fell in
love with Helene of Sparta, who was married to the ‘King’ or ‘Chieftain’ of Sparta. Paris took Helene back to Troy
with him, which resulted in all of the Greeks coming to her rescue (thanks to an oath Odysseus had all the princes of
Greece swear years before). When the King of Troy, Priam, refused to let Helene go, the Greeks waged war against
the Trojans, hence the famous Trojan War. While Homer wrote of the Trojan War in relation to great heroes and
gods, there is archeological evidence that a Trojan War possibly occurred. Troy is believed to be located in modernday Turkey.
448
See supra note 26, R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075.
449
These ‘Aboriginal rights’ are rights held by Aboriginal peoples as defined by s 35 of the Constitution: “In this
Act, aboriginal peoples of Canada include the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada”. Aboriginal rights are seen
as a spectrum of rights that include practices, traditions and customs which are “integral to the distinctive culture of
aboriginal peoples”, such as hunting and fishing, many of which take place on the land.449 Aboriginal rights are
considered sui generis, which means unique, not fitting into the categories of English or French laws.
450
The test is as follows: The government activity might be infringing an Aboriginal right if: The activity imposes
an undue hardship on the Indigenous Nation; The activity is considered unreasonable by the court; and the activity
prevents the right-holding from exercising the right. The activity will be justified if: The infringement serves a valid
legislative objective; There has been as little infringement on the right as possible; Fair compensation has been
provided for the infringement; and the Nation was consulted/informed. A valid objective may be the conservation of
a natural resource, for example.
451
Gordon Christie, “A colonial reading of recent jurisprudence: Sparrow, Delgamuukw and Haida Nation” (2005)
The Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice, vol 23(1) at 38.
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lands … there was from the outset never any doubt that sovereignty and legislative power, and
indeed the underlying title, to such lands vested in the Crown”. 454Asch and Macklem’s argument
in their 1991 article explores this assumed sovereignty in detail. The pair argue that the 1867
Constitution Act did not “actually state that the Canadian state enjoys sovereignty over its
indigenous population”. 455 The assumption that the Canadian state enjoys sovereignty over
Indigenous peoples and lands is justified through an interpretation of s 91(24) which states the
federal government is responsible for Indians and lands reserved for Indians, which in the minds
of the court equates to sovereignty over Indians and their land. However, as they argue, s 91(24)
does not actually justify this sovereignty: “interpreting s 91(24) as authorizing Parliament to pass
laws governing its indigenous population absent consent of that population” does not equal
sovereignty over those peoples. 456 If you remove the underlying assumption of sovereignty over
Indigenous peoples and lands from the interpretive picture, “s 91(24) could just as easily be read
as not authorizing Parliament to pass laws in relation to native people absent their consent”.457
Therefore, absent wording in the Constitution to state Canada has sovereignty over Indigenous
peoples, the judicial interpretation of sovereignty is simply that: an interpretation. 458
The Supreme Court would later qualify sovereignty stating that s 35’s purpose is to
reconcile prior occupation with “de facto Crown sovereignty”. 459 However, as Ryan Beaton
writes, the court “is clear that this conception of Aboriginal rights relies … on some attenuated
doctrine of a hierarchy of civilizations, or at least a hierarchy of legal systems”. 460 How else,
Beaton asks, could the Crown “acquire sovereignty over, and underlying title to, Indigenous
territories through mere assertion, in the face of ‘pre-existing systems of aboriginal law’ that did
not recognize the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty and underlying title?”. 461 This hierarchy of
legal systems is legal positivism as discussed in Chapter One. Asch and Macklem argue this as
well, stating that the assertion of sovereignty over Indigenous peoples and lands “ultimately
rest[s] on unacceptable notions about the inherent superiority of European nations”. 462 Beaton’s
See Sparrow, supra note 26 at 1103 [emphasis added].
Asch and Macklem, supra note 450 at 510.
456
Ibid at 510.
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Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia (Project Assessment Director, [2004] 3 SCR 550 at para. 42.
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question along with Asch and Macklem’s argument are important when dissecting the
jurisprudence that defines the systems which make decisions about Indigenous lands and rights.
Even as the jurisprudence gets further away from the sandy shores of Troy that is Sparrow, the
words, and interpretations of the first challenges will forever impact the outcome.
For example, while the courts have come out against “civilization hierarchy”, 463 the
Supreme Court’s qualification of sovereignty in Sparrow and later decisions still upholds the
Crown’s legal power to exercise sovereignty over Indigenous peoples and lands. The courts do
so by explicitly rejecting the Doctrine of Discovery – or terra nullius – the same doctrine they
“traditionally relied upon to justify the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty through assertion”. 464
What this means is that the doctrine which allowed the Crown and courts to assume sovereignty
in the first place, meaning the only basis to originally assert sovereignty, is later rejected by those
same courts. 465 What, then, is the basis for this assertion of sovereignty if we reject the original
basis? To follow what Macklem, Asch and Beaton write, then that basis is a misinterpretation of
s 91(24). Take the Sparrow decision, with its test of infringement justification: this test
“establishes a form of judicially mediated Crown sovereignty” where the courts are “weeding out
illegitimate exercises of Crown sovereignty, while allowing legitimate ones”.466 The legitimate
ones, of course, are legitimate by means of European-derived laws, not Indigenous law. The
belief in the superiority of Euro-centric laws “ultimately supports the unquestioned acceptance of
Canadian sovereignty… in s 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 by the Court in Sparrow”. 467
The supporting and qualifying of Crown sovereignty on the part of the courts throughout
Aboriginal law jurisprudence makes s 35 contexts unique: “the Court has framed the overarching
purpose of section 35 not simply in terms of protecting constitutional rights, but rather … in
terms of reconciling ‘the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the

See Beaton, supra note 457 where he cites at page 27 the Supreme Court decision Simon v The Queen where the
court rejected the view that Indigenous peoples lacked the capacity to enter binding treaties.
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Beaton, supra note 457 at 27.
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See Tsilhqot’in Nation at para. 69 where the court states: “At the time of assertion of European sovereignty, the
Crown acquired radical or underlying title to all the land in the province. This Crown title, however, was burdened
by the pre-existing legal rights of Aboriginal people who occupied and used the land prior to European arrival. The
doctrine of terra nullius (that no one owned the land prior to European assertion of sovereignty) never applied in
Canada, as confirmed by the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The Aboriginal interest in land that burdens the Crown’s
underlying title is an independent legal interest, which gives rise to a fiduciary duty on the part of the Crown.”
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Crown’”. 468 This makes the overarching goal of reconciliation, and by extension the duty to
consult, to be that of the “legitimation of Crown sovereignty through negotiated settlement of
outstanding claims”. 469 This is seen clearly in Sparrow’s legal test: the courts are “spelling out
how Crown authority is tempered”, illustrating the extent to which a “colonial mentality infects
contemporary jurisprudence, and how the duty to consult emerges from an essentially colonial
agenda”. 470 Behind the Sparrow test for right infringement justification, “there lies a clear
colonial vision of the interrelationship between the prior land interests of Aboriginal nations on
the one hand and the Crown on the other. Aboriginal sovereignty is, once again, substantially
ignored”. 471 The courts crafted a test that, ultimately, justifies assumed sovereignty and the
defining of Indigenous interests in land through colonial means, themes that will be seen
throughout the remainder of this Odyssey.
Sparrow, therefore, is an example of a Pandora’s Box of its own. At face value, it is a
case that defines rights and seeks to protect them. This, of course, is appealing and draws people,
rightfully so, to the jar, making them want to open it up and see the beautiful gold that it
promises to hold. However, once the jar is opened, so too are its unexpected troubles: a case
grounded in assumed sovereignty; the categorization of Aboriginal rights through colonial
context and tools; the dismissal of legal orders and governance structures for Euro-centric ones.
However, every Pandora’s Box has Hope, and as Gordon Christie explains:
The only glimmer of hope emerging from Sparrow came from the failure of the Court to
directly eliminate the possibility that Aboriginal rights might be understood not as
grounded in analogous interests held by non-Aboriginal people (protected under such
legal instruments as ‘property rights’), but rather rooted in Aboriginal conceptions of
their own interests in maintaining relationships with their traditional territories. 472
Deglamuukw is another early Aboriginal law case, and similar to Sparrow, at face value it is a
decision that elevates Aboriginal interests in land and expands the possibility of rights to that of
title. However, like Sparrow, the glitter of this case merely attracts one to the jar with the hopes
of positive outcomes, yet once it is opened, you see it for what it truly is:
In Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court of Canada found that some Aboriginal land interests
could constitute right to land, insofar as the interests were grounded in exclusive use and
Beaton, supra note 457 at 28.
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occupation of the lands in question at the point in time that Crown sovereignty was
asserted over these lands … The elevation of certain Aboriginal land interests to the
status of property rights within the common law was in no manner a step away from the
Court's deep commitment to the colonial framework under which it had worked for so
long … all Aboriginal rights – which must include property rights – are not only subject
to Crown regulation, but exist separate from Aboriginal sovereignty. 473
The Supreme Court’s colonial commitment, as Christie calls it, can be found in the duty to
consult beyond the case law which defines it. The duty to consult, and the rights it addresses, are
understood in colonial ways, meaning that Crown consultation is that of Canada’s understanding
of the Indigenous Nation’s identity in relation to land; Canada’s understanding of how the Nation
will interact with the land; and Canada’s vision of how the land will be used.474 Even the mere
definition of Aboriginal ‘rights and title’ are “constructs which reflect nothing other than the
exercise of non-Aboriginal notions about identity, and about how such non-Aboriginal notions
lead into visions of land use”.475
Delgamuukw, however critical in the Aboriginal law jurisprudence, is fairly old in this
Odyssey, just like Sparrow. And while the courts have expanded what rights and title mean in
more recent years, Sparrow and Delgamuukw remain foundational. Looking to Odysseus, even
the earliest challenges he faced, such as smarting his way out of the cave of the great Cyclops
Polyphemus forever impacted who he was and the rest of his journey.476 Upon deceiving and
blinding Polyphemus, Odysseus is excited to continue his journey, thinking he was mere days
from returning home. No one could have expected all the troubles coming his way. Furthermore,
his actions on Polyphemus’ Island followed him for the rest of his Odyssey, forever marking the
next steps on his journey.477 Early cases such as Sparrow and Delgamuukw are no different: their
marks are still seen today. Tests are derived from them that courts still use to this day, furthering

Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at para. 39.
Ibid at 41 and 42.
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the assertion and justification of assumed Crown sovereignty and the forcing of Indigenous
interests into colonial boxes of rights and title.
And so, with Sparrow and Delgamuukw truly begins our Odyssey of the duty to consult.
The sandy shores of Troy are behind us and we have sailed off head first into the open sea that is
Canadian jurisprudence. With each case, we can see why Pandora’s Box is so appealing: each
case is new and exciting, adding a new detail to what the duty is, evolving it into a practical
process we all can use. However, what lies under the glittering gold is often not what is expected,
and the glitter that shrouds the case law is often simply that: a cloak hiding the stark, dark reality
that lies beneath. The optimism of returning home to Ithaca and seeing an end to the journey gets
chipped away with each passing challenge. While the battle may be against a new creature each
time, whether it has one eye or the name of a different Ministry does not matter, for the truth of
who you face is the same: a far more powerful entity who has the power to make rules unfairly
stacked against you. So, we sail across the sea of jurisprudence by the winds that are settler
supremacy; the winds which can be traced back to the earliest of challenges.
The Sirens’ Songs in the Year of Definitions
The year 2004 was a vital year for the duty to consult, mainly due to the key decision Haida
Nation v British Columbia. This was the first decision where the Supreme Court set out the
substance of the duty, and to present day, it remains foundational. In Chapter One, I outlined the
facts in Haida. Essentially, this decision was about the provincial British Columbia government
issuing logging licenses to land and resources that were subject to Haida Nation’s Aboriginal
title and right claim. One of the most important results of this decision is that the Court held that
a duty to consult arose, even though the Aboriginal title claim had yet to be proven in a Canadian
court. The Court also held that the duty is triggered when the Crown is, or should be, aware of
proven or asserted Aboriginal or treaty rights that may be affected by the proposed Crown
conduct. 478 Therefore, rights or title do not have to be proven in a Canadian court, or admitted to
by the Crown, in order to trigger the duty. So long as the Crown is aware of the asserted rights,
or ought to be, and the rights may be impacted by the proposed conduct, then the duty is
triggered.
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In terms of Greek mythology, I see the decision of Haida – and the year of 2004 more
broadly – as the Sirens: creatures who sing beautiful songs that draw men, unbeknownst to them,
to the rocky outposts of their isles.479 Famously, Odysseus is instructed to have his men fill their
ears with beeswax, so not to hear the Sirens’ songs, and to tie him tightly to the boat’s mast to
stop him from forcing them to steer the boat to the intoxicating songs. 480 The jurisprudence that
came from the year 2004 are like the Sirens’ songs; they enchant the listener towards them,
having the listener believe their songs are nothing but beautiful, blinding them from the sharp,
rocky outposts within the jurisprudence. The other aspect of Haida that makes up the core of the
duty, and the deceiving songs of the Sirens, is the notion of a ‘spectrum’. This spectrum has to
do with the degree of consultation, and if appropriate accommodation, that is required by the
Crown, which is based on an assessment of the strength of the asserted rights claim, as well as
the potential for harm.481 At the high end of the spectrum, a ‘deep consultation’ will be required,
while the low end may only require notice of the proposed conduct and hearing the affected
community’s concerns. 482 Haida also states that the consultation and accommodation of affected
Indigenous Nations is “part of a process of fair dealing and reconciliation that begins with the
assertion of sovereignty and continues beyond formal claims resolutions”. 483 This duty is
founded in the honour of the Crown and arises “when the Crown has knowledge, real or
constructive, of the potential existence of the Aboriginal right or title and contemplates conduct
that might adversely affect it”. 484 More recently, real or constructive knowledge was defined by
the Supreme Court. Actual knowledge arises “when a claim has been filed in court or advanced
in the context of negotiations, or when a treaty may be impacted”.485 Alternatively, constructive
knowledge is “when lands are known or reasonably suspected to have been traditionally
occupied by an Aboriginal community or an impact on rights may be reasonably anticipated”. 486
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In the same year of the Haida decision, the Supreme Court released Taku River Tlingit
First Nation v British Columbia. In Taku River, the Supreme Court elaborated on their findings
in Haida, holding that Provinces also have the duty to consult, and that there are limits for
consultation which arise out of decisions that may adversely affect unproven Aboriginal rights
and title claims. 487 Haida and Taku River are also generally understood as defining the means by
which an Indigenous Nation can protect their lands and resources when their rights have yet to be
proven. However, as Christie argues, in truth the cases illustrate “the pressure the judiciary
continues to exert on Aboriginal nations (pressure directed toward the generations-old policy of
assimilation)”. 488 While this pressure takes several forms, the most important for us to focus on
is the form taken in the duty to consult:
… the duty to consult does not operate to merge or reconcile self-understood Aboriginal
visions of land use … Rather, the Crown is imagined as working within and through
nothing but its vision, with the duty to consult operating to potentially modify the
activities that fall under this vision. The consultation process may be directed toward
substantially addressing the concerns of potentially affected Aboriginal nations, but the
accommodation of Aboriginal interests must be understood within this larger context …
In seeking to trigger the duty to consult, an Aboriginal nation is acknowledging its lack of
alternative recourse, and seeking to bring to bear this inadequate, assimilative tool upon
problems generated by the larger colonial context. 489
The duty to consult effectively forces a second form of assimilative pressure onto Indigenous
peoples via legal tests advanced in Haida and Taku River, backed by Delgamuukw and
Sparrow’s justification of sovereignty. This demonstrates my argument about just how
influential and foundational early cases are, even if their justifications are later qualified: these
are the seemingly beautiful songs of the Sirens.
For me, I see the Sirens that are Haida and Taku River as deceiving pillars of optimism:
they bring the jurisprudence one step closer to the end of the journey, as a win, just as Haida is
often seen as a win for the Haida Nation. But, if you are not careful, you can get swept up in the
seemingly beautiful music the Sirens sing, bending to their will, not understanding exactly what
the song is saying or making us do:
Your next encounter will be with the Sirens, who bewitch everybody who approaches
them. There is no homecoming for the man who draws near them unawares and hears the
Sirens’ voices; no welcome from his wife, no little children brightening at their father’s
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return. For with their high clear song the Sirens bewitch him, as they sit there in a
meadow piled high with the mouldering skeletons of men, whose withered skin still
hangs upon their bones.490
It can be easy to get caught up in the advancements of the courts in cases such as Haida and
Taku River, not realizing exactly how the decisions shape the law. When you listen to the
decisions without beeswax in your ears, you can easily become bewitched by their high, clear
song: there is a duty even without proving rights in court; the Crown must act to reconcile past
wrongs; consultation is a balancing of everyone’s interests. This is seen as a beautiful song
drawing you in, wanting you to believe every word. Consequently, you forget to look past the
Sirens and see the meadow piled high with the injustices done to Indigenous peoples in the name
of assumed sovereignty. As a result, in order to protect one’s land and peoples, Indigenous
Nations must conform to the colonial process, transforming their unsettled claims into the
colonial understanding of rights and title. Only then will a Nation be in the all-too-rare position
“wherein their consent might be required before the Crown can act,”491 knowing all the while, as
Taku River makes clear, any recourse via accommodation is not a duty to come to an agreement.
Through this colonial systems, Indigenous Nations are forced to accept the Crown’s vision of
land use as the starting point.492 To protect their lands, peoples and legal orders, they must take
the wax from their ears, untie themselves from their boat’s mast, and listen to the Sirens’ song.
The Cloak of Honourability
Of the entirety of The Odyssey, there is one character who is shrouded in mystery more so than
others, and that is the enchantress – often also referred to as a witch or witch-goddess 493 – Circe,
daughter of the sun-god Helios. As classics scholar Judith Yarnall writes,
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Circe is far more than just another member of this [Book’s] exotic cast; she becomes …
Odysseus’s mystagogue, instructing him in the details of his way. She does not appear
until [Odysseus] is thoroughly lost, and she does not disappear until he has regained some
sense of his bearings and the dangers to come.494
Circe is an enchantress who uses pharmacy – herbs as medicine – to transform people and
beings. 495 She masks her island, Aeaea, and her powers as seemingly simple things, cloaking
everything about her in mystery.496 This cloak of mystery can be seen as a metaphor for the
honour of the Crown. The duty to consult is grounded in this notion of honourability, cloaking
the foundational intentions of actions as being ‘honourable’, and hiding the powers of the Crown
behind honourability.
The honour of the Crown states that Canada must act honourably in its dealings with
Indigenous peoples because they were never conquered 497 and requires that any s 35 rights are
“determined, recognized and respected” 498 as honour is always at stake. 499 Because the Crown
plays the role of the party who makes decisions which could negatively impact Aboriginal
interests and rights, as well as the role of the party charged with protecting those same rights
under the Constitution, the Crown’s honour is always at stake, but not always engaged. 500 The
court held in Manitoba Métis Federation Inc. v Canada that the honour of the Crown “imposes a
heavy obligation” on Crown conduct in its dealings with Indigenous peoples. 501 Part of this
heavy obligation is ensuring the duty to consult is meaningfully fulfilled and the overarching
notions of reconciliation and protecting s 35 rights.502
One can agree that based on the case law, the honour of the Crown seems promising. The
Crown must conduct itself honourably with Indigenous peoples, including while implementing
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the duty to consult. What could be wrong with that? But as you already know, the glitter that is
the honour of the Crown is merely a cloak covering up injustices. When the façade of
honourability is stripped back, the previous legs of this Odyssey which have shaped the honour
of the Crown and what it means for Indigenous peoples come to light. To begin, even though the
honour of the Crown is defined as being at stake in all dealings with Indigenous peoples, it is not
always engaged. Also, the duty to consult does not translate to a constitutional right of
consultation 503 and there is no constitutional duty to consult where no constitutional rights are
being implicated: Aboriginal interests and/or concerns that do not flow from s 35 do not, and
cannot, trigger the duty to consult.504 This also means that Indigenous laws and legal orders do
not necessarily trigger the duty as they are not necessarily protected by s 35. The notion of the
honour of the Crown continues to extend assumed sovereignty as the Crown must act honourably
due to their foundational assumption of sovereignty. The honour of the Crown, therefore, acts
like a proxy505 when Indigenous Nations have not assimilated their interests into the colonial box
of rights or title. The duty, “tied to its honour, lies on a spectrum substantially lower than might
befall the Crown when it contemplates infringing an established Aboriginal right”.506 When a
right or title is proven, the honour of the Crown acts somewhat as a check to Crown sovereignty
and authority; however this check is not a barrier, “but rather a speed bump” 507 for even though
cloaked in honourability, the duty to consult is still a call on the Crown to balance Aboriginal
and non-Aboriginal societal interests. 508
The honour of the Crown, then, is like Circe the witch-goddess, who cloaks her abilities
and intentions in a façade: a beautiful, peaceful island where you can seek refuge. 509 As John
Borrows writes, powers such as Circe and the Crown are like tricksters: both helping and
hindering Indigenous peoples.510 However, like the honour of the Crown, Circe’s cloak only
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covers so much: at the end of the day, she is still an enchantress and goddess, and Odysseus is
just a man; Circe can harness magical powers and Odysseus cannot. The honour of the Crown is
still a colonial tool and justification for sovereignty, and Indigenous interests in land and legal
orders are at the mercy of non-Indigenous visions of land use through balancing. The Crown and
courts have power which Indigenous Nations are not afforded under colonial law. However, so
long as both act honourably – the definition of which is theirs and not yours – they will be able to
go about their actions and intentions without intervention of the gods or colonial institutions.
The Holds of Calypso
Near the end of The Odyssey, Odysseus is held on the nymph Calypso’s Island, Ogygia, for
seven years. 511 Calypso was first introduced in Book 1 as a goddess living on a well-wooded
island “far away in the middle of the seas” and as the child of the god Atlas,512 and she kept
Odysseus, “the unhappy man,” on her island for seven years, where, “Day after day she does her
best to banish Ithaca from his memory with soft, persuasive words; and Odysseus, who would
give anything for the mere sight of the smoke rising up from his own land, can only yearn for
death”. 513 While there, Odysseus often asks Calypso to release him, but Calypso does not let him
go, hoping to keep him forever as her mortal husband. Eventually, Calypso does let him go, but
only after Odysseus tells the goddess Athena 514 of his misery. 515 Athena then demands that her
father, Zeus, set Odysseus free.516
Of all the metaphors I can find in Homer’s epic, the hold of Calypso is perhaps the most
compelling for me: Calypso controls Odysseus for her own benefit; the Crown controls
Indigenous interests in land through the duty to consult for its own benefit. It is not the longings
of the Nation that drive the process or the control, but the longings of the Crown, and it is not the
longings of Odysseus, but of the nymph Calypso, which are determinative. Odysseus appeals to
the goddess Athena for help, and Indigenous peoples must appeal to the Canadian court system
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for help. Neither Athena or the courts are in a domain accessible to Odysseus or Indigenous
peoples as there are power imbalances that do not favour Odysseus or Indigenous peoples, and
each time one appeals to either, there are ramifications. For Odysseus, Zeus tells Calypso to free
him, but clearly states that the final legs of his journey home will not be easy: “neither gods nor
men [will] help him”. 517 For Indigenous peoples, the courts force them to assimilate their
interests and laws into colonial boxes of rights and title. Beings of power such as Calypso hold
control over Indigenous peoples, and one of the means of control is who the duty to consult
applies to. The duty, as it rests with the Crown, is not owed by third parties to affected
Aboriginal peoples. 518 However, administrative bodies can fulfill the Crown’s duty if it has been
delegated to them.519 Delegating to administrative bodies is not a full outright delegation of all
aspects and responsibilities of the duty; the Crown still holds the responsibility of ensuring the
duty was met. 520 Nevertheless, the Crown can rely on a regulatory process such as the National
Energy Board (NEB) either in part or in full to meet the duty to consult, due to the powers bodies
such as the NEB hold.521 If there is a tribunal process that falls short of fulfilling the duty, the
Crown has the responsibility to ensure additional consultation is done to meet the process. 522
Third parties, such as the proponent can be delegated procedural aspects of the duty. 523 When
this is done, the Crown must maintain a supervisory role to ensure the delegated aspect of the
duty is being fulfilled properly.524
Answering the who question involves consideration of the Indigenous peoples affected by
the proposed conduct. In Behn v Moulton Contracting Ltd., the Supreme Court held that the duty
to consult is a collective right that can only be asserted by the community as a collective;
therefore individual members of the community can act as representatives, but do not have
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standing to bring an individual action pursuant to a breach of the duty. 525 In the very recent
Supreme Court decision R v Desautel, the court expanded the who of “Aboriginal groups”,
holding that the duty may apply to Indigenous peoples outside Canada as there “is no
freestanding duty on the Crown to seek out Aboriginal groups, including those outside Canada,
in the absence of actual or constructive knowledge of a potential impact on their rights”. 526 In the
absence of actual or constructive knowledge (as per Haida) the Crown is free to act. 527 However,
if the Crown has knowledge or is “put on notice” of rights of Aboriginal peoples outside
Canada, 528 the Crown must determine whether the duty arises or not, and if so, what the scope
is. 529 This comes from the holding that, “Because groups outside Canada are not implicated in
this process [of the duty to consult] to the same degree, the scope of the Crown’s duty to consult
with them, and the manner in which it is given effect, may differ”. 530 Therefore, the Crown may
need to involve Indigenous peoples outside of Canada into the duty to consult processes ongoing
with Indigenous peoples “inside Canada”. 531
As a process, the duty is determined in scope and extent by the Crown and courts, giving
little power to the affected Indigenous Nation in creating the process, scope, or outcome. This
also applies to the issue of how the Crown goes about fulfilling the duty. The Environmental
Assessment (EA) process, for example, is increasingly being used by the Crown and its delegates
to fulfill the duty to consult.532 This is in part due to the “pragmatic attractiveness” that the EA
process has for the duty as the Crown conduct is the subject of the EA. 533 EAs inform decisionmakers on the potential environmental consequences of the project. Through their processes,
they “inform and consult other government agencies and the public” and have legislation which
“prescribes a set of procedural requirements that determine the level of scrutiny to which a
project will be subject, the scope and content of the assessment itself, and the degree of public
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engagement”. 534 The procedural requirement of the EA varies based on the project’s potential
level of environmental harm, and the outcome can range from reports to hearings before
tribunals. 535 Much of the information about the project and its environmental effects is required
“to assess the impacts of the same activity on Aboriginal rights and interests”. 536 Furthermore,
EA consultations may impact the scope of the project; “for example, consultations within the EA
may result in project modifications that would have implications for the duty to consult
Aboriginal people – the processes of consultation under the duty to consult and in EA are to
some degree inseparable”. 537
A main concern with fulfilling the duty through the EA process is obvious: one has to do
with environmental impacts while the other involves the protection of constitutional rights.
These two things are not one-in-the-same, no matter how much the two processes may overlap.
Environmental interests as they relate to EAs are the interests of all citizens, not just affected
Indigenous peoples. 538 Even though environmental protections may be a central interest of the
affected Nation, they are being consulted because of their rights or title to the land, not their
attachment to the environment. Unlike environmental interests, Aboriginal rights are “defined
oppositionally to the ‘broader community as a whole’. Whereas environmental interest can be
entirely subordinated to other public interests”.539 The purpose of EAs is “the generation of
harmony between the natural environment and development activities; a process that requires
balancing of competing social goals and contested values”. 540 This, of course, is not the same as
the duty to consult. As Neil Craik explains,
EA obligations and the duty to consult go beyond process. Neither is ambivalent about
the outcomes its produces. The substantive aspect of EA is captured by the commitment
to avoid “significant adverse environmental effects” caused by projects and activities
subject to EA and to promote sustainable development. The substantive aspect of
Aboriginal consultation is expressed through the duty to accommodate.…the structure of
EA is such that the government may ultimately decide that the benefits of a project
outweigh its environmental risks. 541
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Regardless of the clear differences between environmental impacts and rights, governments and
proponents keep turning to EAs to fulfill the duty to consult, 542 and courts vary on whether EAs
can adequately fulfill the duty. Of course, this has to do with the uniqueness of each project and
affected Nation, as well as whether the EA process was supplemented in a way to satisfy the duty
fully.543 The required scope of consultation can depend also on the applicable treaty, 544 and when
it comes to modern treaties, the role the treaty plays may vary further with circumstances. 545
However, the principle remains the same for all modern treaty consultations: there is a “need to
respect the intention underlying the treaty itself with respect to consultation”.546
I argue that so long as the who, when and how much of the duty to consult is dictated by
the Crown and judiciary, whose foundations are in assumed sovereignty, Indigenous legal orders
are unlikely to be a subject of the duty. The Crown is exclusively responsible for deciding how
land is thought of and used. 547 With Crown sovereignty’s monopoly on the duty, Indigenous
peoples are constantly faced with “the prospect of never-ending Crown interference with their
interests”, 548 lands and rights. Defining the intricacies of the who, when and how much of the
duty to consult through colonial understandings, Aboriginal rights and the processes which
follow are seen as being “embedded within the state”. 549 These rights and processes exist solely
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as “creatures of domestic law, firmly under the control of the state”. 550 To exist otherwise would
require the courts to understand rights outside colonial frameworks, which are tied to Indigenous
sovereignty. 551 As Gordon Christie explains, the focus on balancing Indigenous interests and
rights with that of societal interests is another signifier from the courts that the process has
“eliminated Aboriginal sovereignty”.552 For me, this is why the metaphor of Calypso is so
compelling: the intricacies of the duty to consult are further colonial controls over Indigenous
peoples and land, just as Calypso exercised control over Odysseus. 553 The affected Indigenous
Nation’s laws, decision-making structures, and interests are rarely included, and if they are, they
are subject to societal balancing and the overarching land-use visions of the Crown. What
Odysseus does is subject to the control of Calypso as she holds all the power, and leaving his
captor required appealing to the gods as he was left with little tools of his own to escape.
Accommodation: the footnote to the Odyssey
I have left out a significant part of this Odyssey: the duty to accommodate. I touched on
accommodation briefly throughout this chapter, but I have not tackled it on its own. I see
accommodation as being similar to what happens after Odysseus does finally return home to
Ithaca: something left out of the narrative.554 Details on the duty to accommodate are often
lacking in the jurisprudence. There is little known, other than Odysseus returns to Ithaca,
although his beloved home is nothing like how he remembered; the project may go ahead, even
with modifications, but it will leave the land and peoples changed. Impacts to the land will be
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made, often irreversible ones, and they will forever change the landscape and peoples, influenced
by all the events of the Odyssey thus far, yet rarely written.
What is known about the duty to accommodate is that accommodation involves a
balancing of interests, and that even when the impact on rights is considered minor, the Crown
still must be willing to address concerns and mitigate impacts. 555 It is also known that
accommodation is by no means a duty to agree. At a minimum, accommodation must allow the
affected Indigenous Nation to meaningfully exercise their rights. 556 However, accommodation
should not come at a cost of “undue hardship for the non-Aboriginal population”. 557 The courts
are also quite clear that accommodation “provides no veto to Aboriginal communities” 558 and is
not a means for the Crown to say they mitigated any Indigenous concerns so that the proposed
project can go on as originally planned.559 Ariss et al. argue that when courts articulate
accommodation in terms of balancing interests, they not only detract from the procedural duty,
but also undermine the constitutional rights which give rise to the duty:
Aboriginal and treaty rights are a constitutive element of Canada, and economic or other
interests do not amount to rights. To make Aboriginal and treaty rights commensurable
with ‘interests’ misunderstands their purpose and standings. Any balancing in
accommodation must stem from section 35 and not reduce [rights] to interests.560
Christie similarly argues that the courts viewing Aboriginal interests, settled or not, as needing to
be balanced by the Crown against societal interests is damaging as s 35 should not be the
mechanism Indigenous interests and rights are syphoned through; it should be Indigenous
sovereignty. 561 Furthermore, Aaron Mills clearly argues that the colonial system is
incommensurable with Indigenous legal orders, specifically Anishinaabe legal orders. To make
Indigenous interests commensurable with colonial categorizations is furthering violence and
supremacy. The rights and title the duty deals with should be understood through Indigenous
sovereignty, and therefore, rights and title through colonial means is not what we should be
asking for. The interests of the affected Indigenous peoples should be part of the process, and
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decision-making about their laws and interests in the land should be the subject of the process.
The key is understanding interests and rights through Indigenous legal means, not colonial
means. Indigenous sovereignty, not colonial sovereignty.
The consultation and accommodation process too often means that the project goes
forward, rights have been infringed, and all the while, the affected community was not the
decision maker. The story goes on, but not in the way of the rest of the Odyssey: how Odysseus
copes with his new reality of a changed Ithaca – and him being a changed person – is of little
concern to Homer. The Odyssey is finished; the case decided. What happens to the character
afterwards does not get written, nor does what happens to the Indigenous Nation and their land
after the damage of the development is done.
The Many Miscellaneous Heads of Scylla
On his dangerous trek home, Odysseus battles the six-headed sea monster, Scylla. 562 Like Scylla,
the duty to consult has multiple heads, many of which have yet to be fully explored by courts. I
want to address, albeit it briefly, three of these heads: guidelines, payments, and international
doctrines. Each play an important role in the practicality of the duty to consult, and each have an
uncertain future in its full tale, partly due to the overall ‘newness’ of their relative jurisprudence.
However, they warrant discussion as current day consultations deal with each of these heads to
differing degrees, which means they influence how the overall process operates.
Over recent years, both the federal government and provincial governments have created
consultation and accommodation guidelines and/or protocols. The purposes of these are to give
Crown actors guiding principles on how to approach consultation and accommodation. For
example, the federal guideline has a step-by-step guide to fulfilling the duty.563 The guidelines,
however promising, do not provide Crown actors with guidance on developing consultation
protocols with individual affected Nations, nor on how to use the Nation’s existing protocols.564
Remember how I explained to you some of the histories of Calabria in Chapter Two, and how my dad’s Italian is
heavily influenced by the Greek history of the Southern Peninsula? Within the Province of Calabria is the famed
mythological home of Scylla. At the Strait of Messina between Calabria and Sicily is the rocky outpost the sea
monster was said to have lived. Scylla is found in Book 12, and briefly again in Book 23. In Madeline Miller’s
novel, the backstory of Scylla, along with her defeat, is beautifully told through the eyes of Circe.
563
See supra note 539 the “Updated Guidelines for Federal Officials to Fulfill the Duty to Consult” March 2011
which can be access through the Government of Canada’s Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs
Canada website.
564
In the Federal Guidelines (at page 54) under Phase 3: Accommodation, Step 2: Identify possible accommodation
measures and options, there is one bullet note that reads: “officials may take into account … whether there are
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What is clear in the guidelines and case law is that the duty to consult is not a duty to agree: all
that is required is the participation of both parties in good faith consultations and that the colonial
laws are supreme. 565 As for who pays for the consultation, the Crown and proponent are
typically the parties with funding. In order for the affected Nation to understand the proposed
project and issues fully, time and resources are needed. Sometimes, even experts need to be hired
to review and analyze the materials. The case law suggests that the Crown and/or proponent
funding the consultation process is a “positive factor in determining that the Crown has fulfilled
its duty to consult”, though of course, it is not, nor should ever be, a determinative factor.566
While there are many international doctrines which address Indigenous peoples, the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) is the doctrine I’ll
be focusing on here.567 Many Indigenous peoples around the world assert that their consent
should be required whenever decisions impact their land or rights. For the duty to consult, this
would mean that the duty is not fulfilled without the full consent of the affected Nations. While
Indigenous peoples have been demanding full consent for a long time, UNDRIP and its
provisions relating to Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) have amplified this demand in
recent years. 568 As Anishinaabe lawyer Sara Mainville writes, “The relationship between the
parties [of litigation] has been more than adversarial; in fact, it is an abusive and untrusting
relationship with the Crown, a relationship in need of an urgent prescription to bring it back to
balance. Will the UNDRIP make a difference here?”. 569 Mainville’s question – which is a
consultation protocols with Aboriginal groups that serve as a basis to discuss, and where appropriate, to implement
accommodation measures”. There is no equivalent under Phase 2: Crown Consultation Process. However, under
Phase 1: Pre-consultation Analysis and Planning, Step 6: Design the form and content of the consultation process,
design effective consultation processes, there is a bullet note to consider “involving Aboriginal groups in the design
of effective consultation processes”; and, “Many First Nations, Métis or Inuit groups have developed consultation
policies, guidelines and protocols and request that the Crown adhere to them. Officials must follow the Updated
Guidelines and their departmental or agency approaches. However, understanding the policies, guidelines or
protocols of the Aboriginal group may become the starting point for a discussion on an effective and meaningful
consultation process”.
565
See Haida, supra note 22 at para. 42.
566
Land and McPherson, supra note 28 at 173 citing Taku River; Chippewas of the Thames; Hupacasath First
Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2008 BCSC 1505; Ka’a’Gee Tu First Nation v Canada (Attorney
General), 2007 FC 763; and Wii’liitswx v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2008 BCSC 1139.
567
UNDRIP became binding Canadian law in the midst of writing this chapter. Because of the timeliness of the Bill
being passed, the existing scholarship on UNDRIP in Canada speaks to UNDRIP possibly becoming domestic law
in the future, or, UNDRIP being customary international law.
568
UN General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of indigenous Peoples: resolution/adopted by
the General Assembly, 2 October 2007, A/RES/61/295.
569
Sara Mainville, “Hunting Down a Lasting Relationship with Canada – Will UNDRIP Help?”, (2020) 57 Osgoode
Hall Law Journal at 102.
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question many Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples alike have been asking – may be closer to
being answered. In 2020, the federal government introduced legislation 570 to implement
UNDRIP as binding law,571 and very recently, this legislation received Royal Assent. 572
However, it is important to note that the purpose of the legislation is to “provide a framework for
the Government of Canada’s implementation of the Declaration”, 573 meaning the federal
government will “prepare and implement an action plan to achieve the objectives” of UNDRIP
through “consultations and cooperation with Indigenous peoples and … federal ministers”. 574
UNDRIP was adopted by the United Nation General Assembly in September 2007, and
sets out individual and collective rights of Indigenous peoples, identifying a minimum standard
of dignity and well-being of Indigenous peoples, while also recognizing the distinctiveness of
Indigenous peoples by asserting that the recognition of the rights of Indigenous peoples will
enhance harmonious and cooperative relations between the State and Indigenous peoples. 575
FPIC is recognized throughout UNDRIP’s articles, including Article 32. 576 FPIC, as a standard,
is “the right of Indigenous peoples to take part in decision-making processes that may impact
their lands, rights, and interests”. 577 In the 2017 decision Clyde River, the appellants argued that
FPIC amounts to: the freedom from force, intimidation, manipulation, pressure and/or coercion;
a mutual agreement on a process for consultation; engagement with community that is robust and
satisfactory; proper resourcing; and most importantly, the “shared objective of obtaining the
reasonable consent of the Aboriginal group”.578 However, with the receiving of Royal Assent
being so recent, it is unclear how UNDRIP and its provisions of FPIC will be implemented in
An Act respecting the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
Prior to Royal Assent, a debate as to whether UNDRIP was considered Customary International Law (CIL), and
therefore through the adoption approach, would already be binding law in Canada. Whether or not UNDRIP has
already had the status of CIL, and therefore already was binding law in Canada, is a topic that could be a thesis on
its own. For more on this debate, see Sylvanus Gbengazhi Barnabas, “The Legal Status of the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) in Contemporary International Human Rights Law” (2007)
International Human Rights Law Review, vol 6, 242-261 who cites prominent scholars on CIL, such as SJ Anaya
and IR Gunning. See also Brenda L. Gunn, “Overcoming Obstacles to Implementing the UN Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Canada” (2013) Windsor YB Access to Justice vol 31, who argues the adoption
approach to CIL in Canada allows CIL to become binding law without legislation stating so.
572
Statute of Canada, c. 14, Royal Assent received on June 21, 2021.
573
An Act respecting the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples at s 4(b).
574
Ibid at s 6(1).
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UN, supra note 565.
576
Ibid, Article 32, pages 23 and 24.
577
Land and McPherson, supra note 28 at 223; see also the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, “Free, Prior and Informed Consent of Indigenous Peoples” (September 2013) [OHCHR] for more on
defining FPIC.
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Ibid at 175.
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Canadian law. Article 32 of UNDRIP states that consent is the minimum standard for decisionmaking about development projects on Indigenous lands, but how this will translate in Canadian
consultation law is unknown. Sara Mainville argues that article 32 can be helpful for beginning
“treaty-based discussion on a truly nation-to-nation basis”. 579 This could very well mean that
under Canadian law, UNDRIP, and its provision of FPIC specifically, may impact how the duty
to consult and accommodate will operate in the foreseeable future.
How FPIC will be interpreted going forward is something to question as prior to
receiving Royal Assent, there were lively debates as to whether FPIC is enshrined in UNDRIP,
as well as whether FPIC equates to a veto. 580 Regarding both, Coast Salish legal scholar Sarah
Morals argues that the power imbalances in the duty to consult become apparent “when one
considers the words of the court in Haida regarding the power to issue a veto”. As she argues,
“the duty to consult does not provide Indigenous peoples with the opportunity to say no to a
Crown initiative that has the potential to adversely affect their rights and interests”. Mikisew
Cree, however, alludes to the notion that veto may occur in circumstances where “an Indigenous
community could be left with ‘no meaningful right to hunt’, however, the court is clear that,
other than in this limited circumstance, the duty does not provide Indigenous peoples with the
ability to stop or prevent outright a particular Crown initiative from occurring”. The notion that
consent does not equal a veto, Morales argues, “is damaging enough to a relationship of
reconciliation in and of itself [and] this damage is compounded further by the court’s
acknowledgment that the duty to consult does not include a duty to reach an agreement”. 581
Morales goes on, arguing that,
[It] is well established in international law that Indigenous peoples, as peoples, have the
right to self-determination. It could be argued that in order to be meaningful, selfdetermination must include economic self-determination, which ultimately involves
Mainville, supra note 566 at 125.
UNDRIP and the provision of FPIC could be an entire thesis of its own. Due to time and scope of this thesis, I
will be addressing what a few scholars say about FPIC. For more, I suggest looking to Dwight Newman,
“Interpreting FPIC in UNDRIP” (2020) International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, vol 2019(2). See also
what some Canadian jurisprudence says about veto power: Haida Nation; Tsilhqot’in Nation; Snuneymuxw First
Nation v Board of Education – School District #68, 2014 BCSC 1173; Ross River Dena Council v Canada, 2017
YKSC 5; Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FC 445; Nunatukavut
Community Council Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FC 981; and First Nations Child & Family Caring
Society of Canada et al. v. Attorney General of Canada (Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada), 2018
CHRT 4.
581
Sarah Morales, “Braiding the Incommensurable: Indigenous Legal Traditions and the Duty to Consult”, as found
in The Centre for International Governance Innovation, UNDRIP Implementation: Braiding International, Domestic
and Indigenous Laws (2017) Special Report at 67.
579
580
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control over traditional lands, territories and resources. Thus, it could be argued that
Indigenous peoples have the right to be informed and to engage with, and grant or
withhold consent, to certain development projects within their lands. 582
The understanding that FPIC flows from self-determination could “greatly influence the
interpretation of the duty to consult”.583 Morales supports this argument by explaining that the
duty has not been developed in a way that “recognized the right to self-determination” and, as
argued above in this chapter, has been developed on basis of assumed Crown sovereignty. 584 The
court’s statements on consent and veto in the jurisprudence further support assumed Crown
sovereignty. 585 Therefore, it is arguable that UNDRIP’s “recognition of a right to consultation,
interpreted as deriving from an overarching right to self-determination, could greatly advance the
project of reconciliation in Canada”. 586 FPIC, as a right,
…is articulated in many provisions of UNDRIP and arises prior to the approval of any
project affecting Indigenous peoples’ lands or territories or other resources; prior to the
taking of any lands, territories and resources that Indigenous peoples have traditionally
owned or otherwise occupied or used; prior to the storage or disposal of hazardous
materials in Indigenous peoples’ lands or territories; and prior to the taking of any
cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property. 587
This, Morales agues, demonstrates that FPIC is “required whenever state action pertains to lands
that Indigenous people occupy or otherwise use, whether or not they hold title to those lands”. 588
As to whether consent is a strict requirement, UNDRIP, Morales argues, requires “states engage
in good faith negotiations in an effort to reach an agreement or consent”. 589
Ibironke T. Odumosu-Ayanu writes that the definition of FPIC as a veto – a process
which “may include the option of withholding consent” – has resulted in some states objecting to
FPIC. 590 Consent, she argues, often triggers thoughts of contract law as defined through the
common law.591 This is problematic because Indigenous understandings of consent, as well as
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See Ibrionke T. Odumosi-Ayanu, “The (Legal) Nature of Indigenous Peoples’ Agreements with Extractive
Companies” as found in Indigenous-Industry Agreements, Natural Resources and the Law (2021) edited by
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their own processes of reaching consent, are important for FPIC’s success. 592 Citing Aaron Mills,
Odumosu-Ayanu notes that for many Anishinaabe legal orders, the issue is not giving a yes or no
to a project, but instead, the processes itself and the relationship building.593 Gordon Christie
argues that the concern of FPIC equaling a veto is reflected in the “actual fears of Canadian
governments (Liberal and Conservative), their courts and those who voice caution about
UNDRIP”. 594 This fear comes from the hope to understand and implement UNDRIP, and
therefore FPIC, through “a liberal discourse, within the language of rights”. 595 As explored in
previous chapters, this liberal discourse and language of rights stems from Canadian colonial
understandings of law, and its understanding of rights as extensions of assumed sovereignty. One
of the issues with wanting to frame UNDRIP and FPIC in this way is that it further pushes the
principles into colonial understandings, which ultimately results in interpreting the articles as
being yet another extension of Crown power and control (hence a controlled head of the
powerful sea-monster). UNDRIP and FPIC may appear to be a non-threatening head of Scylla as
of right now, and perhaps a head of Scylla to be celebrated, but I caution that it is still controlled
by the body of the sea monster, namely, the colonial state. Therefore, as Mainville writes, “The
UNDRIP does have some promising ‘reconciliation’ ingredients, but only if those ingredients
include co-development with Indigenous peoples to create the final recipe and solution”.596 This
means that until co-development happens, Canada controls which way Scylla looks, where she
bends down, and at what she snaps her pearly teeth.
For this thesis, how FPIC and UNDRIP will be understood is only somewhat important.
FPIC is a standard that could be included in such understandings, but what is more important is
consensus and decision-making. I argue that if processes regarding the development of
Indigenous land are that of Indigenous legal orders, FPIC will be inherent: decision-making of
lands will be done through one’s own legal process. Consensus of the community on the
development project will not be understood through colonial terms either; therefore veto may not
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even be of concern. As Karen Drake agues, in Anishinaabe legal orders, whoever is advocating
for the project would participate in Anishinaabe legal norms. 597 Being part of a mutual aid
community would result in the project’s proponent being kin. Under this understanding, there
would not necessarily be a veto598 as all parties would be guided by whether a need truly exists
that needs fulfilling. 599 Drake’s argument re-raises the importance of having legal meanings
understood by the affected Indigenous Nation. A different Indigenous legal order may operate
with veto, and that is unproblematic, as the process will reflect their own legal structures.
Lifting the Lid Once More
I have now told you the tale that is the duty to consult and accommodate. Perhaps now you
understand why it is my Pandora’s Box, a Sirens’ song, a boat sailing at sea being pushed by the
winds of settler supremacy. I hope my telling of Homer’s epic poem, The Odyssey, as a metaphor
for the jurisprudence served its purpose: to juxtapose a mythical tale to reality. While Calypso’s
control over Odysseus was a figment of Homer’s imagination, Canadian control over the duty to
consult is not: it is the reality of the system. However, there is room for Hope. I call the final
chapter Gabekana, at the end of the road, as it is the end of this thesis, my Hope. In this chapter,
I will describe my version of an Anishinaabe understanding of consultation, shaped through
everything explored thus far. I want to repeat that this is my understanding, not a specific
community’s. To borrow from my supervisor Karen Drake, to be consistent with inaakonigewin,
I am not claiming that this is the only means of understanding Anishinaabe legal orders. 600 As
Drake writes, “There may be many other ways of giving effect to these constitutional norms and
procedures. What I have proposed is merely the best I am able to articulate at this time”. 601 I, too,
am proposing one way, articulated at this time given my current knowledge and experiences. To
borrow further, Drake offers not a directive to adopting Anishinaabe constitutionalism, but rather
offers an invitation. 602 I, too, am offering this final chapter, this thesis, as an invitation.

See Karen Drake, “Indigenous Constitutionalism and Dispute Resolution Outside the Courts: An Invitation”
(2020) Federal Law Review 1-16 at 7, 8 and 15.
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Five: Gabekana – at the end of the road
Here we are, at the end of the road. While the road of Indigenous legal orders across Turtle
Island will continue to curve and bend for years to come, this road, this thesis, must now come to
an end. When I was writing this final chapter, my grandfather’s favourite song kept flowing
through my head:
On the road again
Goin’ places that I've never been
Seein’ things that I may never see again
And I can’t wait to get on the road again
I can remember being a young girl and listening to him play this iconic Willie Nelson song. I’d
be visiting him in Northern Ontario, and he would be sitting on the front step with his guitar in
hand, playing the cords and singing the words. The road I took to get to writing this thesis I have
laid out already, so you know it was influenced by my personal experiences. I think it is fitting,
then, that this song keeps playing in my memory while I write this: Bernice is who this thesis is
dedicated to, and it is through my grandfather that I am linked to her, her son. So, in honour of
them both, let us get on the road again and take it to the end.
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Miikanaake – she makes a road
The current duty to consult process and the systems which support and create it are rooted in
settler supremacy and violence.603 As explored in Chapter One, they are founded on ideals of
law, land, property, and ownership that are incommensurable with the legal orders of Indigenous
peoples who have inhabited and cared for the land since time immemorial. This has been
displayed throughout the entirety of this thesis, starting from Lockean theories of property all the
way to the categorization of rights and title under the Constitution. I also explored how
governance structures, from the very building blocks of persuasion vs coercion, 604 are
incommensurable to each other. Even language and the varying meanings of words and grammar
are so vastly different that without learning the language rules and exceptions, the laws and
principles can get lost in translation.605 I then outlined the Canadian law of the duty to consult
and accommodate in juxtaposition to Homer’s The Odyssey, explaining throughout why the duty
is my Pandora’s Box. Now, I can take at all I have explored and suggest how my understanding
of Anishinaabe legal orders could be one version of an Anishinaabe understanding of the duty to
consult. So, I invite of you, one last time to remove the colonial laws and systems from your
mind as you read this final chapter. I invite you to let the understandings of language and
grammar,606 stories and laws, 607 kinship and mutual aid608 explored in the chapters above to take
the wheel and guide you down this road. I firmly believe that the Canadian colonial
understandings of what is law, governance, and rights that were also explored throughout this
thesis will only hinder you from seeing how practical and logical a system understood by
Indigenous legal orders is. The colonial system has controlled the roads we, as a collective, have
taken, as well as the turns we have all made for far too long. I believe it is time to have the
Crown, proponents, and courts, participate in the legal orders which have governed Turtle Island
since time immemorial. I invite, also, these colonial parties to let Indigenous laws form the road.

See Chapter One’s discussion on settler supremacy and the three forms of violence, as set out by Aaron Mills,
supra note 3.
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The Anishinaabe understanding I am about to propose need not be so strict that it does
not adapt to the individual community who is using it. The purpose of an Indigenous-led process
is not to impose Anishinaabe laws on every Indigenous Nation and community of Turtle Island,
nor is it to impose my interpretation of an Anishinaabe legal orders onto Anishinaabe
communities. The purpose, instead, is to create a template that other communities, Anishinaabe
or not, can build on and adapt to reflect and imbody their own legal orders. This template, I hope,
will contribute to conversations happening across Nations about reclaiming legal orders on
broader extents and using them to create systems for decision-making.
The bottom line is that the Canadian system and understanding of the duty to consult,
from the very building blocks which form notions of property to the government created
consultation guidelines, are incommensurable with Indigenous legal orders. The categorization
of Aboriginal rights and title are meant solely to continue the assimilation of Indigenous Nations
to colonial rules and understandings, 609 and as it stands, Indigenous legal orders, for the Crown
and courts, are only something the Crown ‘may’ consider during their consultations. 610 I invite
you to see how such categorizations are a continuation of assumed Crown sovereignty and Aaron
Mills’ third form of settler violence. Instead, should it not be the legal orders of the affected
Indigenous Nation that are considered by the Crown and proponent, and which inform the
understanding of the process? Through my understanding of Anishinaabe legal orders, mutual
aid would say that the Crown and proponent would have roles in the decision-making process
alongside the Anishinaabe Nation, welcoming them to express their needs and discuss if this
need really needs to be met.611 The understanding of the process should therefore change so to be
that of the affected Indigenous Nation’s legal orders. To continue otherwise is to continue the
assertion and forced dominance of Euro-centric supremacy, inflictions of violence, and
justification of assumed sovereignty.

See Gordon Christie, supra note 448; Michael Asch and Patrick Macklem, supra note 450; and Ryan Beaton,
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To demonstrate my proposed Anishinaabe understanding of the consultation process, I
will tell you two stories. These stories are small snapshots of hypothetical consultations between
the Crown, a proponent, and a fictional Anishinaabe community. In both stories, the Crown can
be assumed to be the Federal Crown, and the proponent is a fictional development agency with
no name. The first hypothetical tells us the story of how the consultation process currently
works; the second hypothetical tells us the same story, but with a consultation process guided by
Anishinaabe legal orders. By telling you the same story, with the same characters, plot, proposed
project, and objective of consultation, but with the narrative flipped, I will show the gaps in the
current process and one possible way to fix it. The First Nation, proposed project and characters
throughout these stories are figments of my imagination, however, the Crown process is not, and
neither is the Anishinaabe understanding. Anishinaabe legal orders have been governing the land
and Anishinaabeg of Turtle Island since time immemorial. I am proposing just one version of an
Anishinaabe understanding which will allow for the Crown to approach affected communities
and know that the process which will follow will allow them to act honourably and not run
roughshod over rights or land. Relationship building between the Crown and Indigenous Nations
has the opportunity to grow, and decisions about the development of Turtle Island can be
conducted in meaningful ways, influenced by legal norms that reflect the principle that we have
brothers and sisters everywhere. Broader societal interests and concerns can be brought to the
table without them dominating the decision-making process. The environment and possible
impacts can be weighed on their own merit as the subsequent studies will not determine
consultation writ-large, but instead, educate the decision-makers.
Let me make this clear once again: this Indigenous process is not new. Indigenous legal
orders have been around far longer than the colonial laws and systems and have been applied for
far longer than the systems that Canada unquestionably calls ‘law’. It is also not something of
my imagination, or that of another’s. It is a system rich in customs, respect, and efficiency. It is
an old system, a good system. A system that has worked for centuries and can continue to work
for many, many more. I am merely just writing one version of it down for you to read.
For the stories I am about to tell you, the circumstances which surround the consultation
will be the same: a road is being proposed that runs through traditional territory. A road is simple
yet still complex. It can be moved, altered, or not built at all. It can run through trap lines, natural
medicine gardens, sacred sites, hunting grounds, or abandoned fields. The road can affect a
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myriad of rights, and it can also affect the environment in similar ways. The road could affect
fishing, wild rice gathering, and the overall health of those who swim in and live by the water. A
road can do many things, good and bad, and it can affect one thing, or it can affect countless
things. Roads, no matter their consequence, are built by humans for human benefit, interrupting
nature, ecology, and ways of life. A road is simple, yes, but it can also be very complex, and
because I am at the end of this road with you, reader, I believe it makes sense to use this
metaphor for my stories’ proposed project as well. This road therefore will run through
traditional territory of a fictional Anishinaabe First Nation in an undisclosed part of Turtle
Island. Consultation on the part of the Crown has been triggered because the proposed road is to
be built where the Anishinaabeg have traplines. The difference between each story is why the
duty is triggered, the consultation process, and how decisions are ultimately made. So, without
further adieu, these will be the final stories I tell you.
Which is best, I leave to you to decide.
Maanadamon – the road is bad
This first story begins on the fictional Anishinaabe First Nation, Waagosh First Nation. 612 The
duty to consult process is dictated by the Crown and Canadian laws and processes. 613 In order to
trigger the duty to consult, the proposed Crown conduct may affect asserted or proven
Aboriginal rights or title as defined through the Canadian Constitution and case law. 614 When
this happens, the Crown must notify the affected Indigenous Nation(s) of the proposed project.
The Crown then decides the scope and amount of consultation necessary to fulfill their legal and
constitutional duty to consult.615 This story focuses on Raven, 616 an Anishinaabe-kwe from
Waagosh First Nation. She is part of a group of members who work on consultation requests.
Waagosh is Anishinaabemowin for fox. Waagoosh First Nation is a fictional Anishinaabe First Nation; note that
throughout the hypothetical stories, Waagosh First Nation is never shortened, and always typed out in full. This was
intentional. Often when we shorten words, we lose the full meaning. I had the pleasure of learning under Coast
Salish legal scholar Sarah Morales in my final year of law school. During her course, she explained to me why she
never shortens certain words because typing or saying them in full maintains the power the words hold. Taking this
teaching, I have decided to keep Waagosh First Nation in full.
613
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Often, her work is very exhausting: her community rarely has time to discuss the proposed
project before the next consultation request comes flying in, due in part to a lack of resources. 617
The road that is being proposed runs through territory that has been used and protected by her
community and their laws since time immemorial. While their right to trap is what’s triggering
the consultation, 618 there is so much more to the land that is of importance to her community.
However, interest in the land does not trigger the duty to consult,619 and so her community is
forced to focus on their Aboriginal right to trap.
Raven sits down at her desk, placing her mug of hot coffee down beside her. With a sigh,
she opens the large filing drawer and searches for the letter F. Flipping through the file, her
index finger lands on the document she wants. Pulling it out and sitting upright at her desk,
Raven stares at the document in her hands. The document looks back at her, its large letters
dancing on the page, ABORIGINAL CONSULTATION AND ACCOMMODATION: UPDATED
GUIDELINES FOR FEDERAL OFFICIALS TO FULFILL THE DUTY TO CONSULT. With a
deep breath, she places the document on her desk and flips it open to the table of contents. She
picks up her mug and takes a sip. Placing her mug back down with a small thud, she starts to
read the all-too familiar Federal Guideline Step-by-Step Guide to Consultation and
Accommodation, hoping to find what she’s looking for: an opening to force the Crown to
consider their laws.
What never ceases to amaze her is that for such a complex, time consuming, and
expensive process, the Crown’s guide isn’t all that complex. It’s broken down into four phases,
each with numbered steps. In total, there are 18 steps, and Phase 3 – accommodation – may not
even be triggered, 620 meaning there may only be fourteen steps in total. Fourteen to Eighteen
steps, all dictated by the Crown.
Raven leans over the document, her left elbow against the desk, her chin resting on her
fist. With her right hand, she drags her finger down the table of contents, 621 drinking in each
step. Raven’s finger hovers over phase two before moving back up the page to phase one’s step
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six. Design the form and content of the consultation process, she reads. Raven leans back in her
seat, taking her mug in her hand. She thinks, if step six is designing the content of the process,
maybe that’s where our laws can be implemented. A small smile forms on Raven’s face as she
moves her mug to her lips, musing over the idea. But of course, she thinks, there is nothing
driving the Crown legally to implement our laws at this stage. Maybe honourably, but even that
is a long shot. Raven sits up and places her mug down on her desk again. She flips quickly to the
page where Phase 1: Step 6 begins and starts to read:
‘The Guiding Principles and key elements of a meaningful consultation process: A
Crown approach that is forthcoming, flexible and responsive; an inclusive processes to manage
issues, decision-making and ensure accountability; pro-active solicitation of Aboriginal
involvement and active listening to their concerns; real opportunities to inform and influence
decisions; assistance to support participation; serious consideration of feedback; clear and direct
responses on how concerns have been addressed or why they cannot be addressed –’622 A knock
sounds at her office door. Looking up, she sees her fellow consultation member, Roger. 623 With
a smile Raven waves him into her office and says, ‘Aanii Roger.’
‘I hope I’m not interrupting anything,’ Rogers says as he sits down at a chair across her.
‘No, not at all,’ she says. Raven turns the document to face Roger, her finger pointing to
the middle of the page. ‘I think I figured out how we can get the Crown to implement our laws
for the road project. You see here, how it says Pro-active solicitation of Aboriginal involvement
and active listening to their concerns; Real opportunities to inform and influence decisions
before they are made?’
Roger studies the page for a moment before looking back up to Raven. ‘Yeah, I see it,’ he
says, skepticism in his voice. ‘It’s always been there, and it’s never worked in our favour.’
Raven’s smile drops from her face. ‘What do you mean? If it says they have to proactively solicit us for involvement and to inform decisions, then we can use this to demand
implementation of our laws that apply to the tract of land, at a minimum, right?’
Roger shrugs. ‘Well, I mean it is always worth a shot. Maybe you’ll be lucky and have a
Crown actor who is open to this, but they don’t have to do anything to bring our laws or interests
into the conversation, let alone the decision.’ Roger slides the document closer to him and
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quickly scans the pages. Finding the passage, he points to it and turns it back to face Raven. ‘See,
look here.’ Raven looked from Roger to the page, a sinking feeling in her stomach. Her eyes
glance over the words: Many First Nation, Métis or Inuit groups have developed consultation
policies, guidelines or protocols and request that the Crown adhere to them. Officials must
follow the Updated Guidelines and their departmental or agency approaches. However,
understanding the policies, guidelines or protocols of the Aboriginal group may become the
starting point for a discussion on an effective and meaningful consultation process. 624
‘See?’ Roger says when she looked up to him from the page, anger in his voice. ‘They
must follow their own guidelines. They don’t have to consider anything we have. The word may
implies being optional. And even if they do look at our protocols – which they’ve done in the
past – it has never turned into anything meaningful. We send them documents with our laws and
they take it with the promise they’ll look at it, but they never do.’ Roger drops the document on
the desk and crosses his arms. ‘Unless there is a real change to the system, we’ll keep putting
time, effort and money into creating documents that would result in real relationship building,
real progress, and they’ll continue to take it with a smile then ignore it.’
Raven let out a deep sigh, rubbing her hand over her temple. ‘So, what do we do?’
‘Keep trying, I guess. Eventually they have to listen us.’ Raven scoffs as she turns to look
out the window adjacent her desk. From her office window, she overlooks the creek that leads to
the proposed road site. She knows that the creek will be affected by the road; it’s inevitable. Her
heart sinks at this thought, at the damage that could be caused to her community and their way of
life. She starts to think about all the times she and her siblings swam in the creek on hot summer
days and picked and braided sweetgrass with her mother at the water’s edge. She thinks about
Nokomis and all the times they sat with their feet dangling in the cool water, listening as
Nokomis told her all kinds of stories. What will happen to all those memories? Will they simply
be that: memories? Or will she be able to continue living them?
‘Do we know if the EA625 is going to consider the creek?’ She asks Roger, her head still
facing the window.

Federal Guidelines, supra note 539 at 48.
As seen in Chapter Four, Environmental Assessments can be used to fulfill the duty to consult, and the law is not
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its own. Due to time and space, and to keep the focus of this thesis on the broader duty to consult, I have vaguely
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‘Not likely,’ he says, his voice deflated. Raven looked back to Roger from the window
and watched as he too looked out the window, his mind in a faraway place. Finally, Roger said,
‘Just past the creek is a sacred site that isn’t being considered as part of the process. To the
Crown and proponent, it’ll just look like an empty meadow that doesn’t trigger any consultation:
the Crown’s position is that the project’s impact on the site – if any – is minimal, so it doesn’t
need to be accommodated. Even if we tell them how important that site is, it won’t matter; it isn’t
where we lay our traplines, so the sacred site isn’t being addressed.’
‘Not to mention the road isn’t considered that large-scale of a project. 626 Based on the
consultation notification we received, the Crown is considering the road a weak claim without
serious impact. 627 I doubt the EA will change where it hits on the spectrum that much, which
means it is unlikely the Crown will open up the scope of what should be considered, such as the
sacred site.’ Raven fumbles through some papers on her desk, picking up a correspondence letter
she received from the Crown a few days ago. ‘This latest letter says that once the EA comes in,
there will be a town hall meeting where the project will be talked about for Waagosh and nonWaagosh citizens. Concerns and issues can be raised in response to the project notice, as well as
anything presented at the town hall.’ Placing the letter back on the desk, she takes a long drink
from her mug. ‘As much as I want to take control of the process, I don’t know how feasible that
idea is. Without proper funding, or resources on our end, we’d be in just as precarious a spot we
are now, forced to go through their system and their laws. And with the building of this road, we
can assume more requests are going to come. Roads make land accessible, and accessible land
screams development and money.’
‘You’ve got that right,’ Roger said shaking his head. ‘The Elder Council, as keepers of
our environmental laws, 628 feel their perspective should be taken seriously and given real, careful
thought by the Crown. Having to tell them each time that that isn’t how Canada sees the process,
breaks me more and more.’629 Raven and Roger both sat in silence for a few moments, looking
out the window once more. What was once optimism and hope building inside her just a few
For more on the Haida spectrum in practice regarding large- and small-scale projects, see Malcom Lavoie,
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short minutes ago was now replaced with fear and dread. Once again, her community, land and
laws will be at the mercy of the Canadian state in the name of economic development. The only
reason they are involved at all is because the road may affect their trapping rights; rights defined
by the Canadian state, not Waagosh First Nation.
Minwamon – it is a good road
This next story begins once again on the fictional Waagosh First Nation. The duty to consult
process which was used across Turtle Island by the Crown was overhauled years ago, being
replaced by community-specific laws and processes. On Waagosh First Nation, this has
translated to governance structures informed by doodem, 630 decisions through consensus and
councils, 631 the use of Anishinaabemowin, giftedness, kinship, and mutual aid.632 All decisions
and application of laws are done through their own legal order whose legal standing is
recognized, respected and followed. Decision-making processes will be needed that are relevant
to the proposed project. The Crown and/or proponent approaches Waagoosh First Nation with
their need – in this case that need is the building of a road – and they join Waagosh First Nation
as a kinship relationship through mutual aid. 633 Through doodem, Waagosh First Nation will
assess whether this need the Crown/proponent has asserted is truly a need that must be met. If the
need is determined as a valid need that must be met, the full consultation process begin which
includes studies, reports, Traditional Knowledge, and the application of Waagosh First Nation’s
laws. This starts the timeline of the Crown and proponent providing all necessary documentation,
studies, and environmental reports to the affected Nation. I am not proposing what this
documentation and study timeline looks like, as I believe a strict timeline is counter productive.
When the timeline is so strict, it can force the studies to be rushed. It does not allow for proper
due diligence, the application of western and traditional science and knowledge, nor does it
foster relationship building.
I acknowledge that not having a timeline could be interpreted as ‘dragging out a process’.
To that I say, we only have one earth: rushing development projects in the name of timeliness
does not aid anyone except those who are set to make a profit, and through meeting needs via
See Leanne Simpson, supra note 352; Darlene Johnston, supra note 269; Heidi Bohaker, supra note 197.
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mutual aid and kinship, a need that is purely that of a capitalist mindset would not be a need that
is to be fulfilled. Furthermore, flexible timelines “reflect attempts to address the imbalance in
negotiating power”.634 Therefore, I leave the logistics of the timeline undisclosed. Timelines
should be decided between parties with flexibility built in so as not to force or rush studies and
risk compromising findings which will influence decisions. Additionally, timelines of each party
should be influenced, to a degree, by the laws which govern them. This would mean any
timelines on the Indigenous Nation side would be influenced by their laws and processes;
government and proponent timelines would be influenced by their laws and processes. Any
timelines which are collaborative should by default be informed by the Indigenous Nation unless
they decide otherwise. Funding on the part of the Crown and/or proponent will need to be laid
out as well. As with timelines, funding is project and process specific. All parties are unique and
have different funding and resource capacities. It would serve no purpose for me to state a
number or formula that must be followed. Additionally, as the process begins and builds, new
expenses may arise. Therefore, funding needs to be an ongoing discussion between parties.
The affected Indigenous Nation(s) provide any consultation protocol they have to the
Crown and proponent. The purpose of this is to give guidance, in writing, regarding what the
process will look like, by which legal orders, and what is expected to be included in the
documentation and studies. For example, the Nation may outline how the documentation given
to them will be disseminated and discussed, outlining the governance and decision-making
structures of their community. It may also outline who is the contact person for communications
between parties, who is to be contacted for Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) inclusion in
environmental impact studies, and any expectations for written correspondence.
For this second hypothetical story, there is once more a proposed road that will run
through fictional Waagosh First Nation traditional territory. The Anishinaabeg have been keepers
of this territory since time immemorial where they have been protecting, living on, and using the
land through their laws, kinship connections, and mutual aid. There is an Elders Council which
safeguards and applies environmental laws to this land, 635 as well as a Youth Council who
discuss how the land’s gifts should be protected and used for their generation, and the next ones
to come. As a Nation who uses doodem, each doodem has their own council to discuss decisions
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about land within their responsibility, with respect to doodem kinship relation to land.636 And
because consensus is how final decisions are made, each doodem council has a representative
who is then part of a larger council of all doodemag. 637 There are many councils of doodemag on
Waagosh First Nation, each with different responsibilities. 638 For example, there is a safety
council, education council, health council, and a consultation council.
The consultation council is responsible for the dissemination of consultation
documentation and studies, as well as organizing the other councils to discuss the information,
interpret and apply applicable laws, initiate any community studies, and of course, come to an
end decision on whether the proposed project can go ahead as is, if there are to be any
modifications, whether there is an opportunity for employment and financial benefit agreements,
and if the project cannot go ahead. On this consultation council is our character Raven. Raven is
of the Marten doodem, and because of her personal gifts, 639 she was chosen to be on the
consultation council, representing the other Marten doodem of her First Nation. She is
responsible for organizing correspondence on this proposed project, acting as a liaison between
her First Nation, the Crown and proponent. She also helps the Crown and proponent organize
town halls with non-Waagosh First Nation people who live in the area. At these town halls, she
explains Waagosh’s status on decision-making, where they are in the consultation process, and
how broader societal concerns are being discussed and considered. For this specific proposed
project, that means focusing much of the discussions with community, parties, and broad society
on the sacred meadow close to the proposed road site, the community’s interest in keeping the
creek that runs from the road site into the community clean and unaffected by run-off, and
minimal to no interference with community member’s traplines.
‘Aanii Raven,’ Nokomis says to Raven as she walks into the house. ‘I thought I’d let you
know the rest of the documents have been sent by the government for the proposed road project.
The finished Impact Assessment and EA reports are there as well. I placed it all on your desk.’
Raven kisses her grandmother on the forehead as she sits down beside her at the table.
‘Miigwetch for telling me. I will be sure to take a look first thing tomorrow.’
See Leanne Simpson, supra note 352.
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‘Shall I let the Elder Council know to expect a meeting to continue our discussion now
that we have all documents and studies?’ Nokomis asks. Raven nods and smiles wide.
‘Yes, please do. I will speak with the rest of the doodem consultation council about the
last of the documents and studies that have come in, and soon we will start the community-wide
consultation process back up.’ As a community run through consensus, the consultation process
happens in steps. Whenever new information comes from the other parties, the councils are
notified, and meetings are held to discuss. This not only allows people to understand the project
and information over time, but also allows concerns and questions to be raised throughout the
process, informing the next steps.640 The following week, after reviewing the final studies and
reports, Raven met with the other consultation doodem leaders of Waagosh First Nation.
Together, they make up the main doodem groupings of their community: Maang - Loon, Ajijaak
- Crane, Giigoonh - Fish, Makwa - Bear, Wabizheshi - Marten, Wawashkeshi - Deer, and Binesi Bird. They are responsible for their doodem members throughout Waagosh First Nation and are
chosen as doodem leaders for the community’s consultation processes. There are similar councils
of doodemag who meet for other things, such as community health and education. This ensures
the most qualified and best suited individuals are placed on different councils, and that there is
no one group of individuals taking on every aspect of Waagosh First Nation. It also allows for
one’s individual gifts to be used for the greater good of the community. As the doodem leaders
for consultation, this council of seven are the first community members to review any documents
and studies for all consultation requests. After reviewing the information and discussing their
first impressions, the council then takes the information to their respective doodem members.
Once each doodem council has discussed the materials and recorded feedback, questions and
concerns, the consultation doodem leaders meet to discuss and compare notes. A master list of
this feedback is then given to other councils, such as the Elder Council and Youth Council, for
their review and discussion as holders of the past and future. This allows Elders to have multiple
opportunities to review and discuss the information.
This is Raven’s favourite part of the consultation process as it allows new perspectives on
the project, which may have gotten lost or not been thought about up until now to be expressed.
The Elders, as keepers of the environment and applicable laws, 641 interpret which laws will apply
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to the project, and how they will influence the next steps in decision-making. The Youth, as the
generation of tomorrow, look at the information while reflecting on how the project may impact
their futures and the futures of their children. Together, the two Councils paint a picture for the
whole community on how the past and future come together, and how each should influence the
next steps in the process and the overall decision. And when there are multiple projects being
proposed at once, it allows everyone to think of the individual projects at designated times, as
well as how all projects may impact each other.
When a consensus is finally reached, Raven is responsible for conveying the decision in
writing to the other parties. She gives written reasons explaining the decision, how it was made
and why, and if the decision is that the project can go ahead, any mitigating factors that must be
taken, and how the community will be accommodated. When the answer is no, the project cannot
go ahead, the Crown and proponents have the opportunity to request another meeting with the
consultation doodem council to gain a better understanding, if the written reasons are not
enough, as to why. However, this meeting is not to be seen as a chance for the Crown and
proponent to coerce Waagosh First Nation to change their decision. Through the Crown and
proponent’s kin relationship to Waagosh First Nation, developed through mutual aid, the Crown
and proponent can speak from the heart further about their true needs. 642 The dialogue which
takes place at this step involves kinship, giftedness, mutual aid to non-human kin, and whether
the wealth coming from the project is truly needed. Essentially, this step allows the depths of the
parties’ true needs to be discussed, informed by all the previous steps. Even so, doodem
members, such as Raven, are unable to make decisions or speak on behalf of their Nation, a
system of governance that is respected and understood by the other parties. 643
If the project may affect multiple Indigenous Nations, an additional step is added. Raven
and the other doodem council members meet periodically throughout the process with the
doodem council members of the other Anishinaabe First Nations nearby. If the other Nations are
not Anishinaabe, or are but do not use doodem, Raven and the others meet with their equivalent
council. Select Elders and Youth from each Nation also meet throughout. This allows all Nations
to understand the other’s process, laws, decision-making, and thought process throughout. It also
aims to come to agreements as neighbouring Nations in regard to the proposed project. If one
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Nation decides through their process and laws that the project will go ahead, but the other Nation
affected similarly decides that it will not go ahead, the Nations may be able to come to an
agreement as to how each Nation’s decision can be implemented and respected. These
agreements will be passed onto the other parties in the written reasons for decision. Of course,
like anything else, these processes are not always easy. Raven has gone through consultation
processes that take many months, if not years, and no consensus decision is reached. She has also
gone through processes where the neighbouring affected Nation comes to the opposite decision,
and an agreement between the two Nations proves difficult to find. However, her solace is that
no matter how easy or difficult the process is, it is her Nation’s legal order, government, laws,
principles, language, and lifeways that are guiding and informing the process.
‘So, are we prepared to start calling councils to meet to discuss the final documents?’
Roger says, the Fish doodem representative on the consultation council.
Raven smiles and nods, looking to each of the six other members. ‘I am, what about
everyone else?’ A resounding yes sounded from the other doodem members. ‘Minotaagwad,
sounds good,’ she says. ‘I’m interested in hearing how the Elders view the environmental studies
in comparison to the studies they led. It seems both note the impacts run-off could cause to the
creek. Interestingly, the government’s report notes that the run-off could cause deterioration of
the waterbed, affecting the sweetgrass that grows beside the creek. They included it in their
studies at the guidance of the Elder Council. This potential needs to be considered carefully.’
Roger nodded as he said, ‘Exactly, and seeing as sweetgrass is medicine, the Elders will
want to protect it. I’m sure there are specific stories and laws that they will reference in their
discussion as a group, as well as when they relate it to their doodem councils and community as
a whole. If that is the case, then of course, in our final decision and written reasons we will
reference this in the way they see as best suited.’
‘And with a road will come more development,’ Raven chimed in. ‘That could be a good
thing for us, for the youth especially, with more opportunities for job growth and access to other
schools. But it can also mean development we don’t want and impacts to the land that are
irreversible, making the road a bad thing.’
The council nodded in unison. ‘All things we will note to discuss with our own councils,
amongst the Elder and Youth councils, and as a whole community,’ Roger said with a smile. ‘I’ll
start drafting the Call to Council Notice.’
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As Raven smiles back, an overwhelming sense of calm flooded over her. She starts to
think about all the times she swam in the creek and picked and braided sweetgrass at the water’s
edge, and about all the times she will continue to do those same things, road or not, because the
end decision will have been made with these memories, and these future memories, in mind. She
also thinks about the meadow, where ceremony has taken place since Turtle Island first began,
and will continue to take place, protected by her community and their laws. She thinks about the
future of her community, with the possibility of safe, beneficial developments in the years to
come. Then, she thinks about all the times she listened to Nokomis tell her stories of all kinds, so
often with their feet dangling into the cool creek’s water and with the strong smell of sweetgrass
flooding their noses, and how as long as the consultation process remained in their control, every
little girl and boy will also be able to listen to these stories, speak their language, and respect
their kin with their feet dangling in the cool water.
‘At least we know,’ Raven said as she looked around the room with a beaming smile, ‘no
matter what we decide, it was through our laws.’
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Conclusion
As I shared with you throughout these pages, this thesis was inspired by my own stories,
experiences, and questions. I had a lot of questions that needed answering before I could accept
the responsibility I have as someone bearing the title ‘lawyer’. The biggest of these questions
was: why is the law on the duty to consult what it is; why are Indigenous laws not being used to
make decisions about Indigenous lands; and, how can my writing make a difference? As my
Hope, this thesis set out to answer these questions for myself, but also for Canadian society more
broadly. If my thesis reached your hands, that means you, my reader. I hope, then, I answered
these questions, in some way, for you as well.
I set out to answer the first two questions in Chapter One by exploring how Lockean
theories and legal positivism set the stage for dismissing Anishinaabe legal orders as legitimate
law to be applied to the development and management of the natural world. The first question, in
particular, drove me to return to school and pursue this Masters of Law. It was also the driving
question throughout the entirety of this writing process and was the anchor of each chapter that
followed. I then took the second question further, proposing how Anishinaabe legal orders could
re-write the understanding of the duty to consult by exploring the building blocks of Anishinaabe
language, stories, and laws. Whether I would consider it answered, I would say no, as it is only
the beginning of what one Anishinaabe legal order could say about the law. Furthermore, I only
addressed one small area of law that requires a re-writing from Indigenous legal orders. As for
the last question, whether my writing has made a difference, I truly cannot say. I hope, along the
way of reading this thesis, I have given you, my reader, enough to answer that question for me.
Throughout this thesis, I explored the foundations of Canadian law and the duty to
consult and accommodate which are not that of Indigenous legal orders: they are, instead, that of
settler supremacy; Lockean theories on property; the dismissing of legal orders as primitive via
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legal positivism; natural resources and the grammar of objects; coercion and the hierarchy of
humans; and the justification of assumed sovereignty. With each chapter, I shaped my argument
that the Canadian and Anishinaabe legal orders are incommensurable, and therefore, a changed
understanding of the duty to consult is needed. Chapter One scaled back to the foundational
theories that create the laws we know, exploring Lockean theories of property and legal
positivism in contrast to the foundations of Anishinaabe legal orders, demonstrating how at their
roots, these legal orders are incommensurable. The underlying principles of how land and law
are understood set the scene for the remaining chapters to build and shape how an Anishinaabe
process could look. I built on this in Chapter Two by introducing what I call the two forms of
grammar – formal grammar and the grammar of principles – and the three forms of language –
Anishinaabemowin, stories and law. Through my own journey of language, I wove a picture of
how learning language is instrumental to learning law: I cannot learn one without the other.
There is an order to learning an Indigenous law, just like there is an order in place to learn
Canadian law. The first step in this order is the language we speak and write as it makes up the
very fabric of law. To assume the grammars of a language and law of a Nation is to assert the
supremacy of your law’s language. Doing so is continuing legal positivism and what Aaron Mills
calls the third form of settler supremacy.
With an understanding of the theories and languages of the legal orders, I moved on to
exploring some of the legal principles of Anishinaabe law: kinship, mutual aid, giftedness and
relationships with land and other beings of creation; what my mother calls having brothers and
sisters everywhere. This makes up the basis of many Anishinaabe legal orders, and therefore, the
basis of my Anishinaabe understanding to the duty to consult. In a legal order where there is no
hierarchy of species, reasoned decisions can be made about the benefit of all, including the fish
and beavers. A legal order built on the dependence we have on the natural world is a legal order
that considers more than the money going into one’s pocket after the trees are cut down. Chapter
Three laid this out, showing how legal principles make up governance and decision-making,
giving an example of how an Anishinaabe First Nation may come to the decision of a
development project. I then took a step back from Anishinaabe legal orders in Chapter Four,
where I dove headfirst into the Pandora’s Box that is the duty to consult and accommodate. I told
you the tale that is the Canadian jurisprudence, explaining along the way the truth in the case law
that is assumed sovereignty, the assimilation of interests into colonial boxes, and the control that
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comes with power. Every Pandora’s Box has Hope left under the lid; mine was writing this
thesis. But ours, as a collective, can be changing the understandings of the consultation process
through the laws of the Indigenous Nations that have always called Turtle Island home.
That brought me to my final chapter, Chapter Five. Here, I told you the final stories of
our time together. I told you the story of what the duty to consult process can look like through
two different narratives: the first is today’s process and the second is one way the process could
be understood through Anishinaabe legal orders. Which process was best, I left for you to decide.
I hope the small snapshots, influenced by everything I explored in the four chapters before, led
you to decide that the story with an Anishinaabe narrative was preferable.
Throughout this thesis, I continued to remind you that all I write is my interpretation as I
am still a student. An Anishinaabe Nation may agree or disagree with my interpretations in
whole or in part, and the beauty of my argument, of course, is that this is warranted. I am calling
for an overhaul of the current process, and this overhaul cannot happen if it is not individual
Indigenous Nations guiding the process. My interpretation of an Anishinaabe process will not
work for every Indigenous Nation, nor is it supposed to. This was one consideration of how
Anishinaabe legal orders could create a changed understanding to the consultation and
accommodation process. Each Nation is unique and has their own language of law and that, my
reader, is the beauty of Indigeneity. Fully autonomous Nations, societies, governance structures
and legal orders existed before colonization and continue to exist. They have been used to
honour, respect, use, develop, and co-exist with all of creation far longer than European ways of
life on Turtle Island have. These legal orders, therefore, should guide the road we are going
down; the road we currently call Canada. Until these legal orders are once again seen and
respected as real, legitimate legal orders, and have the full autonomy to operate as such
unhindered by colonial laws, languages and processes, the colonization, settler supremacy and
violence of Euro-centric lifeways will continue to dominate.
I recognize that many people – especially those who love the Canadian legal order – will
read these words and shake their head. How are hundreds of legal orders realistic, and how can
you expect the Crown to be able to operate within so many legal orders? To these questions, and
similar ones, I say, one last time, that I invite you to remove what you have been taught about
Canada, law, and colonization, for when they remain dominate in your reasoning, Indigenous
autonomy of legal processes will continue to be shrouded in question marks. I invite you to leave
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settler supremacy at the side of the road: it will not help guide you down these roads nor should
it. Remember that we, as humans, were last in order of creation and are greatest in need and
dependence. We have brothers and sisters everywhere and they have personhood and languages
that shape their laws and lives. We are on Indigenous land, within Indigenous legal orders.
When I first set out to write this thesis, I wanted to work with an Anishinaabe First
Nation to develop a process fully guided by their individual Anishinaabe laws, language and
grammar, principles, and lifeways. I was guided, rightfully so, to focus this past year on theory.
This thesis is therefore a story of theory; theory that can become reality. To become such, I
recognize a lot of work will need to be done. Nations will need funding and resources, and
Crown actors and proponents will need training. Changing a legal process will take time, and
many bumps will be present down this road. I invite you to see this long, bumpy road as a good
thing, and not something that may scare you into dismissing it as merely aspirational. Real work
must be done, and the first step, I believe, is asking the questions I did: what is law, and why. I
hope to one day soon work with any Indigenous Nation who wishes to have me. I also hope to
work with proponents and Crown actors to make these roads real.
As I said at the very beginning, this thesis was built on the work and knowledge of those
who have come before me, all forming my understanding of Anishinaabe law, told to you as
stories. And so, I thank you for letting me tell you these stories. I see my storytelling, and the
variety of mediums I chose to tell you these stories in, as my ‘methodology’. Unconventional,
perhaps. True to my identity, gifts, and legal order, I think so. I hope I showed you through my
storytelling not only how incommensurable the two legal orders are, but how attainable an
Indigenous process truly is. If this road of stories showed you things you have never seen before,
I hope they opened your mind to the big, beautiful world that is Indigenous legal orders. If this
road of stories was filled with things you have seen and lived through, I hope my stories related
to you in some meaningful way. Either way, I firmly believe the road we take as a collective
should not be left up to the powers of those akin to Calypso or Scylla. They should be that of
Indigenous peoples, the Odysseus’ of Turtle Island. At the same time, everyone else, especially
those who carry the title of lawyer like me, has a responsibility to work through stories such as
the ones I told you and use such meanings to guide your life. It is up to all of us to demand the
change we need.
Booshke giin – it is up to you.
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